Мэдыі ў посткамуністычных грамадзтвах: аб’ектыўная інфармацыя супраць ідэалягічных скажэньняў

Матэрыялы міжнароднай канфэрэнцыі, Менск, 18-19 кастрычніка 2002 г.


Кніга па англійску - Mass media: a forum for public debates and belarusian reality

Valer BULHAKAŪ, Chief editor of “ARCHE” journal, Belarusian Association of Journalists, Belarusian Collegium

BELARUSIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF BELARUS—RUSSIAN INTEGRATION

To explore this topic, it is important to answer the question: what “Belarus—Russian integration” means and when it started to count off. It would not be right to impute the honor of “the first Belarus—Russian integrator” to the first ever Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as integration initiatives were first voiced by the Belarusian side in the media long before the summer of 1994. At the same time, it is worth noting that the integration rethoric itself has not changed a lot over the past 10 years.

Immediately after Belarus gained independence, the Belarusian state-owned media began to spin off the topic of integration, portraying it as a matter of paramaount importance for the survival of the Belarusian economy and Belarusian state, in general. This idea is stressed very much in the interview given by the then Belarus Prime Minister (Viachaslaū Kebich). Already during a visit to Moscow in July 1992, Belarus premier did not rule out a possibility of creating a confederation between Belarus and Russia, had such a form be required by economic relations between the two countries. Mr.Kebich’s further integration game as well as the nature of his political rhetoric was sufficiently predictable. In a March 1993 speech to the heads of executive committees of municipal and distgrict Soviets of People’s Deputies, he was callling to create an economic union in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Simultaneously, the Kebich government spoke out in favor of Belarus joinining the CIS Collective Security Pact, a security grouping of former Soviet republics, founded in 1992. Kebich backed the idea, arguing that it would allow the Belarusian military complex to work for the Russian military market. In the autumn of 1993, he also voiced the idea of creating a single currency zone together with Russia.

The only considerable difference between the pre-summer 1994 situation from the situation after Lukashenka came to power was the lack of consensus on the question of Belarus—Russian integration. The most consistent opposition to Kebich on this issue came from the then speaker of Belarus parliament, Stanislau Shuskevich. By the way, in an interview to the 19 November 1993 Zviazda daily, he reasoned the need for rapprochement with Russia by hopes that it would push the Belarusian government towards reforms.

According to Belarusian media reports, Shuskevich doubted the need for cooperation with Russia in the military field and was condemning Kebich’s initiative of Belarus joining the CIS collective security grouping. Shushkevich also was very doubtful about the idea of economic union with Russia, especially the part that dealt with creating a single (Russian) currency zone.

The pursuing of his own political course ended disgracefully: Shushkevich was ousted from the post of parliament speaker. This, however, cannot be said about the nature of his political rhetoric regarding the Belarus—Russian integration. The pro-democracy politicians would later pick up Shushkevich’s rhetoric, and the independent media started to circulate the typologically similar views. Right after Sushkevich’s resignation, Kebich started out his presidential campaign, highlighting the topic of Belarus—Russian integration as a priority. Kebich’s statements of that time almost match the later rhetoric of Lukashenka. On the eve of the 1994 presidential elections, Kebich gave a pro-Russian interview to newspaper Pravda. The crash of Kebich’s election campaign and Lukashenka’s victory led to the situation when representatives of the official authorities tabooed any criticism against the Belarus—Russian integration in the state-controlled media. The taboo has lasted almost until 2002. Simultaneously, the pro-democracy independent media took a critical stance on this topic.

Shortly after his victory, Lukashenka said in an interview with Narodnaya Gazeta: “I am for the sovereignty of beloved Belarus, but without borders or custom controls with good neighbors, Ukraine and Russia, in the first place” (Narodnaya Gazeta, 1994, 18—20 June). Lukashenka was, indeed, more pragmatic than Kebich in some issues. For instance, after his election, Lukashenka refused from the idea of the single ruble zone with Russia. At the same time, already in October 1994 the state media disseminated his statement saying that Belarus should not have “relations (with Russia) of the same level as it was going to have with the countries of the far abroad”. In a March interview to Narodnaya Gazeta, he noted: “The strengthening of our ties with Russia is the fundamental factor of pulling the country out of crisis and stabilizing many other aspects of the republic’s domestic life. I mean the politico-economic, social, historical and moral aspect, which is directly connected with the 50the anniversary of the Great Victory (of the Soviet Union in WW II) and the restoration of the historic community of Slavic nations. To refuse a deep notional significance of this agreement means disrespect for that historical past and the present, with which brotherly Belarusian and Russian peoples lived live and will continue to live” (Narodnaya Gazeta, 1995, 23 March).

Both under Lukashenka and Kebich, the repertoire of integration rhetoric has remained traditional: it is stated, that “friendship with Russia is a guarantee of our country’s sovereignty”. Lukashenka a little bit updated his integration rhetoric in the second half of 1996, when he said that in Belarus “the Russian-speaking population feels itself like in the former Soviet Union” (Narodnaya Gazeta, 1996, 15 November).

The thesis about the equality of Russia and Belarus in a new union was part of the then Belarusian propaganda in order to play down even the possibility of Belarus’ incorporation into Russia as a separate province. As Zviazda wrote in early 1997, Lukasenka stated about it at the top of his voice during a meeting with the delegates to the Minsk-hosted 3rd Congress of the Peoples of USSR.

For some time, one could observe a balance in the state media between the full-steam-ahead integration propaganda and the full-steam-ahead independence propaganda. That fragile balance was destroyed in July 1999, when Lukashenka emotionally accused the Russians of sabotaging integration decisions: “We…have made a great mistake, having declared the multi-vector approach of our foreign policy, yet making an extreme heel eastward. As a result, we can lose a lot in the long-term perspective” (Belarusky Rynok, 1999, ¹ 26, p.4). A new sub-topic emerged in the integration topic: the Belarusian regime wants to integrate not only with Russia, but with Ukraine as well. In the autumn of 1999 the then Belarus Foreign Minister Ural Latypaū told Belaruskaya Dumka that it would be better for Belarus to unite with Russia together with Ukraine.

Developments around the Belarus—Russian integration attained a new quality after Vladimir Putin was elected the Russian president. The new Kremlin administration staked on the Russian economic dominance in the former Soviet countries and at the expansion of the Russian private capital into those countries. Belarusian and Russian economic elites got into a conflict, caused by the Russian capital’s plans to put under their control the strategic industries in Belarus. In May 2002 Lukashenka stated at a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Belarus—Russian Union that the real use from Belarus—Russian integration was “almost invisible”. The question of introducing the Russian ruble on the territory of Belarus remained very foggy, too. Already in December 2000, Lukashenka hinted in Respublika that this question was far from being resolved.

The state-sponsored media played the integration card with a far greater enthusiasm during the last year’s presidential elections. Lukashenka actively turned to this topic already in May 2001 in his speech at the 2nd All-Belarusian Congress.

But, right after the elections, the nature of integration rhetoric in the state-sponsored media drastically changed. In December Lukashenka stated through the central media that Belarus was prepared to integrate with Russia as far as Russia was ready. In 2002 the previously designed formula — “full integration and full independence” is living through a crisis and nearly collapses amongst the Belarusian elites. It even has become trendy among the government officials to confess their adherence to Belarusian independence as well as their understanding of the need to revise the previous policy towards Belarus—Russian union.

Mikhas TYCHYNA, Belarusian P.E.N.-Center

THE STYLE OF JOURNALISTIC PUBLICISM AS A BASIS FOR PROSECUTION IN COURT

It is perhaps surprising to reflect on such marginal phenomena as the style of journalistic publicism at the time when political situation is dictating its game rules and is not taking into account the details. The disinterested, “pure” opinion in such circumstances is always an illusion, an escape from a real situation or even the exclusion of the conditions for such an opinion.

However, modern journalistic practice once and again reminds us that the pressure of the “grand” political field has its limits. Eventually this pressure encounters the border, beyond which everything depends on the natural, autonomous existence rules of a modern intellectual, who has interest in events, strives for independence and has the feeling that “the common case” is feasible. The autonomous existence of an intellectual (journalist, writer, scholar), which envisages orientation to inner criteria, gains a status of the efficient weaponry in the fight with the social evil. That is why the authorities, which tend to control everything, eventually dared to declare war against the language.

But, I am not yet talking about the language in general. What I am talking about now is the style of journalistic publicism as well as the cases when style serves as grounds for prosecution in court, requiring a literary and linguistic expertise. There emerges a new profession of literary expert, which does not deal with the traditional fiction, pushed at the background of public interest. Rather, it has to deal with such a phenomenon of the contemporary cultural life as a new journalism. The new journalism gave birth to a new language of describing events, which in return has remarkably changed our reality. This process is not complete yet; it is moving hard, but the model of virtual Belarus is gradually attaining its image. Authorities, which regard independent journalists as their main enemy, readily take use of the problems of growth and age of the new wording for the sake of self-assertion.

Based on my practical experience as an expert, I think that we have gone through three stages in the making of journalism, which can be labeled as golden, silver and bronze stages. Of course, on condition that we keep our sense of humor in place. I think we are quickly approaching the Iron Age of Belarusian journalism, when all the media will be following Belarusian Television (BT) and presidential daily Sovietskaya Belarussia (SB) as a role model, just like copying news program Vremya and newspaper Pravda in the Soviet times.

The first (“golden”) age (1989—1996) was marked with impetuous (and chaotic) heyday of the media, with dozens of talented people emerging and the controversial processes of pushing away from the previous new language and the birth of the modern language. The power, genetically linked with the Soviet times, naturally recognized writers as potential enemies. It was at that very moment when they set up a trial of Svetlana Alexievich, the author of the documentary book titled “The Zinc Boys”. During the proceedings, the court invited literary experts, myself included. The experts had to start again a campaign against illiteracy in the field of fiction, as almost every recent Soviet citizen routinely considered itself a literary expert and did not assume that the language of fancies was intended for an advanced reader. Particularly, we had to explain the basic truth: 1) that the “documentary prose” is the “fiction prose”; 2) that a documentary author has the right to literary fiction (deliberate selection of facts, a conceptual text construction, etc.); 3) that the literal restoration of an oral narration by heroes is impossible on paper; 4) and finally, that trying a writer for her works resembles the repertoire from the absurdity theater.

Another case, that of Slavamir Adamovich, displayed that the authorities had finally detected a weak link amongst the literary ranks and found the way to show writers their place. However, they did not take into account the reaction of the international literary community and the role of International P.E.N. Nevertheless, the decisive trial, after which an imprisoned poet was released having spent 10 months in jail, was carried out instructively. Literary experts, who were immediately downgraded to the rank of witnesses, were questioned with partiality during the trial. We were talking only about the poem for maybe over two hours. The prosecutor got so interested in the problems of literature, that apart from routine questions like whether the text in question had anything to do with art, he was asking about what poetical tropes the author of the notorious poem used.

It was quite clear that this method of putting pressure on the free press led to a deadlock. Attempts by a Shkolnikaū to claim $1 million from Peter Byrne, director of Belarusian Soros Foundation, for alleged libel, ended funnily enough. Experts from the both sides competed with each other trying to figure out the stylistic nuances of the word “vot” (“well” in English), repeated three times (“vot… vot… vot…) by the defendant during a television program. In fact, that meant one thing only: that the speaker did not speak the Russian language quite well and was searching for a correct word. In reality, he said the following: “…It does not matter to me or to the Foundation, who will apply to the Foundation for grants. The Communist Party or Mr. Shkolnikaū or anybody else might do it, too… Political views do not matter in this case”. Well, these were the stylistic connotations, which were solving the question of whether Mr. Shkolnikaū would be a millionaire or not.

In the second (“silver”) age (1996—2001), “new journalism” did not go through their best times, either. It is characterized by the attempts to knock the state-employed and non-state journalists together on the legal field. The former, feeling that they were becoming a laughing-stock in the eyes of the public, opportunely refused from probes in court, while the latter had to defend their honor and dignity to the very end. Those cases were widely covered in the periodic press and remained topical for quite a while, so I am not mentioning them today. I will only note that literary and linguistic expertise was required in those cases, too. For instance, I had to explain to the plaintiff that the expression “I was under pressure for two days” does not contain any intention to degrade anybody, and that he was exaggerating his personal role in the public discussion about the results of the 1996 referendum.

In the stirred atmosphere, when society was split into two parts, the sides inadequately perceived the usually routine expressions in the spoken language. Debates between personalities were easily transferred on the field of political accusations, insinuations and personal insults, and attempts to demonize a competitor as the chief culprit of all the country’s problems. There were also suggestions heard calling on the “competent bodies” to “chill down the libelous passion” of journalists. In short, they actively used the beaten off set of methods, familiar from the Soviet times, in order to discredit independent journalists both as individuals and professionals.

At the time, authorities tested other means of political, economic and moral pressure, namely, the different provisions in Penal Code. Although the referendum had already taken place, authorities started harassing all those who had openly voiced their position during the pre-vote campaign. For example, six months after coming out, the publicist article “The Gospel from Lukavogo (the Evil) by Alexander Starykevich in the 17 September 1996 Svaboda newspaper was considered as “the call to instigate social intolerance or hostility”. The lack of acceptable legal practice and criteria as regards the notions “social intolerance” and “hostility” again required a literary and linguistic analysis of the article. It turned out that the text did not even hint on any social communities or groups in the strict sense of those notions. And the named “groups” could be referred to with the expressions like “social stratum — hereditary slaves”, “political carpet-baggers, who seized on power”, “the most served out”, “accomplices”, “the leftwing and rightwing”. It means that there were no grounds for charging a journalist. In the article, the talk was about the communities, united on the basis of ethical and moral principles, between which tension, not the confrontation, is possible. In his article, the journalist was addressing every voter and his responsibility: “In this situation, everyone will have to make a personal choice…This is exactly the case when the scales can be pushed this way or another by the actions of literally a couple of persons”. The “slow-down reading” method (R.Bart) brought about its results.

Entire organizations felt degraded by the independent press. Somehow they got this feeling only six months after the publication came out. I am talking about the charges put out by the Minsk City Police Department against Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG) over the articles “Who Will Punish Uniformed Bandits?” and “The Silence of Belarusian Lambs”. Similarly, in the Soviet times “veterans”, “generals”, “firefighters”, “sportsmen” would pump the editorial offices with collective letters if they came across the name of a fellow hero who was at fault. Finally, policemen burst out defending themselves because they were policemen and that’s why untouchable. While preparing an expert evaluation, I reflected on the absence of a concrete object, the ambiguity of using the word “bandit” in the context of the article. The use of the word was actually caused by moral condemnation of concrete actions by “people in police uniform” and aimed to give assessment of the event in order to improve the spiritual state of the society. We all felt degraded in that situation.

In the silver age, ordinary citizens found an interest in the possibilities of the literary expertise, too. They thus tried to solve their own material or moral problems. It seemed to Mr. Sudziloūsky that he was defamed, so he unwillingly exaggerated the extent of the journalist’s guilt in the article “Prosecutor was drunk”. Expressing his condemnation of those in power, the defendant used the verbs in the present tense form (“the authorities are behaving”, “are trying to make sure to put a hand on…”). At the same time, the plaintiff took a post at the presidential power “vertical” in the past. Thus, the predicate — a neutral part of speech — saved the journalist.

Back at those times already, they started mentioning more and more often the provisions in Penal Code, which protect the country’s number-one person, and applying them in court. The new epoch — which I call “the bronze age” — began.

Simply citing some Lukashenka’s paradoxical statements, which did not require comment even if taken out of context, were considered to be an insult. The famous collages (in newspaper Imya and A.Suraū’s book “U Pahoniu” (Pursuit) made readers laugh. The trials of this category could be rated as the most popular in terms of their frequency and efficiency. Finally, the authorities found a “painful spot” in the public consciousness, which rejected differences in interpretations, common for the style of publicism, and prevented any other incline than the accusatory one. Pahonia and Rabochy newspapers lost their cases. Despite being kept in the trial records, literary expertise as the last truth was simply ignored in the dispute between the sides. I will quote a chapter from the experts’ conclusion regarding the poem “Promised! Still Promising! Will Be Promising!” By the way, we again are dealing with the work of art.

By its content and the form, this poem in the ¹ 37 Pahonia issue is a typical parody, expressed in verse and perceived as a literary work piece. (The artistic level of the poem is another story). Parody is usually based on the deliberate lack of convergence between the theme and the style. In the given case, we are dealing with the high object (elections), expressed with the low style (“trasianka”). Deriding may be concentrated on both the topic (when stock phrases from the oral and written language are parodied: “good pay”, “proletariat”, “Mafia”, “to return deposits”, “birthrate”, “to maintain prices”) and style (tongue-tie, incoherence, the lack of diversity). By the nature of comicality, this parody can be attributed to the satirical genre with a certain transition into humorous genre. The main literary technique used here is the ironic imitation of the ridiculed object, caricaturing and exaggerating tits features o the extent of absurdity in order to achieve the comic effect. In this case, parody is perceived as a means of election campaign. Mimicry takes place on behalf of the political opposition, which, naturally, stands against the official position and works to use the weak spots of the latter. The talent of speaker, who is able to convince a listener (by what means is another story), is opposed here to the talent of unnamed satirist (artistic level is again a separate story). The usage of parody is explained by the intense political struggle, when the topicality and resourcefulness are valued the most. In the text, the author does not mention the name of the parody object, yet indicates it in the rhymed epigraph. The work is perceived as a means for creating the image of the “beloved candidate”, who can among other things also recite poems. Lukashenka is known not to speak in verses, though he reads the poems by Vasil Bykaū, as we have learned.

In the versed parody “Promised! I am promising! I will be promising!”, the author creates an artistic image, in which readers can recognize, or maybe not recognize, concrete candidates, who give out election promises and speak a specific language, aimed at various recipients (folks, proletariat, Mafia, women, lawmakers, the poor, journalists).

I would add to the above that the only thing it is worth reproaching the journalists for (surely, I did not do that in my literary expert evaluation) is their distrust in readers and their shrewdness. This is the reason for overexposure, understandable in conditions of election war, mounting the heat and using the epigraph, which mentions the object, etc. In fact, I level my reproach to all of us, who are learning the new language of journalism, and by creating it, create the future society, where, let us hope, the First Amendment will be passed here and there will be no need for literary experts in courts.

Semyon BUKCHYN, Belarusian P.E.N.-Center

THE PROBLEMS OF CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE BELARUSIAN PRESS

In the current social and political situation in Belarus, it is obviously easier, and probably, more important to discuss not the questions of journalistic culture, but the ways of survival of the non-state press. Yet, I am going to focus on the problems of cultural level of the non-state press, in the first place, since the essence of our state-owned publications is — I will quote Russian writer Shchedrin — something which lightens up “the road of faction, mental disquiet and lies with a fume-emitting torch”.

However, let us not flatter ourselves as regards the non-state press. Look at non-state newspapers in the first half of 1990s. They were far more interesting, and — what is especially important — their cultural level was higher than the one of today. Of course, the time was different, the situation was different and authors were different. The current authoritarian regime has not only destroyed public aspirations. It has also brought the non-state press, which expressed those aspirations, to degradation. Who is making an independent newspaper today? A dozen of hired journalists, who have learned well or maybe not very well the Western media tradition, which separates facts from commentaries. Does it meet the readers’ interest? Allegedly, yes. There is a fact; there is a commentary.

However, the problem is that our reader is not a Western middle class representative, who scans through stock reports over a glass of morning milk. Our reader is still very much a Soviet-style reader, who seeks a “mind direction”, sympathy, understanding, and a contact. But, where would a publisher get authors capable of meeting this readers’ demand for a compassionate word? The principle of survival of an independent newspaper itself is based on clear exploitation of a dozen of employees.

Apart from diverse facts and commentaries, publisher in a Western market democracy offers readers the whole pages, where publicist can brush up his frolic and free pen, attracting readers with both the train of thought and magnificence of style.

Well, we have other problems, of course… Nasha Niva opened the most significant debate on relations between the opposition and the power, on the fates of national culture at the background of uncovered conflict between Belarus President Lukashenka and Russian President Putin. But, what is the result? Instead of taking these polemics out on a truly wide societal expanse, the editorial office resorted to squabble. However, the situation is crucial. The obvious ideology crisis along with the disappointment with the possibility of democratic reforms in the country have forced nationalists to seek bashfully the ways of cooperation with the power for the sake of some supreme aims. Those aims are described by Ales Arkush as preserving Belarusian identity, which he says is more important than Lukashenka’s “regime’s clashes with Belarus liberal opposition leader Anatoly Lebedko or the problems of Belarusian social democracy”.

Politics and culture, politics and morale… These problems are not new in history. They are not at all new to the Belarusian history. Let us recall the World War II, when activists from Belarusian national organizations took an active part in implementing the Nazis’ race policy for the sake of that Belarusian identity idea. If we do not forget that Mr.Arkush is calling to collaborate with the regime, the head of which openly spoke out his sympathy for Hitler, you cannot but observe a certain historical continuity in the actions of those worried about the fate of national culture. Clearly, cultural workers, who are part of literature and journalism, do not have to go to barricades. However, there is a degree of disgust, which keeps you away from the “sinister” authority, and this criterion should guide us all.

Meanwhile, there is a clear diversity of orientations ranging from those primitive nationalistic ones to enlightened national, and cosmopolitan and liberal ones. To display this spectrum, to identify what could bring at least partially all its components together, is the most important work of independent press. For, we have no other forum available for the exchange of opinions. But, how could we do it, if allegedly tolerant and pro-democracy Nasha Niva’s chief editor, Andrei Dynko rushes to make a reservation, when placing a response by Anatol Sidarevich to an article by Siarhei Dubavets, who had called to seek ways of interaction with the authorities? And, perhaps, he did not given the floor to the former, if his views were not shared by a significant part of intellectuals.

Furthermore, Dynko immediately pinned a label on “Marxist Sidarevich” very much in the spirit of the Soviet ideological brainwashing. The chief editor did not bother to disguise his frenzy denouncing the “Marxist”, who considered it impossible to cooperate with the current regime. Apparently, Dynko did not understand that it was inappropriate for a chief editor to take the floor in the very beginning of exchange of opinions, thus, violating a necessary objectivity. Newspaper, no doubt, has the right to speak out and voice its position. But, please do it in the end of a conversation, in a wrapping-up commentary, and do not thrust your solidarity with one of the sides in dispute on readers, especially in such a tactless and even coarse manner.

This is a definite indicator of our lack of newspaper culture. Although, let us be grateful to Nasha Niva at least for letting different sides speak out.

The importance of free press today is growing immeasurably, if we take into account that literature has lost its leading, yet to some degree artificially overstated, spiritual role in the society. The departure of literature from public scene occurred due to a number of reasons, its natural return to one of insignificant grounds in the system of cultural values seeming to be a major one. However, quite a few former authors still regard themselves as “the lords of thoughts” or “nation’s mentors”, and, therefore, stubbornly urge the state to return their privileges. By the way, the mentoring role of literature in the Russian Empire became obvious only in the second half of nineteenth — early twentieth century. Beginning from mid-20s of the twentieth century, the power has used that role for its own purposes and has put an ideological yoke on the literature by giving it an unusual societal status, which turned writers into a special privileged class. Many still find it difficult to put up with the loss of those privileges.

The break-up of the Soviet Union uncovered the falseness of this status. It was natural for both the electronic and print media to come out in the foreground. Therefore, one can say about a certain replacement of literature by the press. The replacement took place, yet readers were palmed off with many rotten and second-grade products at the same time, not only because writers have failed to become journalists on a massive scale. Journalists have also lost a link with the literature, which used to allow maintaining a certain quality level even during the Soviet times.

While writing in Dlya Sluzhebnogo Polzovania (a supplement to Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta) about the pressure of the authorities on Ales Adamovich and Vasil Bykov in the Soviet stagnation and even perestroika times, Sergei Shapran used for some reason black-and-white colors only. However, the situation was far more multicolored indeed. Therefore, if the images of oppressors are not subject to a particular complication, then the figures of fighters and the time itself in reality are more diverse. One can, of course, say, that newspaper material is not a dissertation; that newspaper requires acuteness and intelligibility, sensation and, at the same time, a certain simplification. It is so, however, under condition this simplification did not create an image of simplified, and, therefore, distorted time. Does a reader need that?

What, in general, does a modern reader need? Reader is assumed to have a spontaneous bent for freedom. But, a Russian literary figure has recently stated in Literaturnaya Gazeta: “however unexpected it may sound, culture, literature and a human life, in general, have more important things than freedom. When a country is destroyed, and the ground slips away from under your feet; when aims (even though illusory and mythical) are given up, and everyone and all have to think about survival in a literary sense of the word; when there is neither time nor money for allowing yourself “a little extra” [spiritual values of a human being, its spiritual life, culture, literature easily get into the category of “a little extra”], then freedom loses its absolute meaning and vivifying force. It somehow becomes “unwanted” by the majority; it becomes a toy for the minority…”

If we agree with this not unfounded thesis and include journalism in the notion of “culture”, it turns out that journalism, too, is “unwanted” by the majority and a toy for the minority. The proof is scanty circulations of most of the newspapers as well as their desire to lure readers with risqué content and different kinds of yellowness, which is obvious on the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belarusi. The whole pages, devoted in this popular newspaper to lengthy discussions about the size of man’s pride, testify not so much to the victory over public sanctimony and the absence of forbidden topics as to “the triumph of meanness in a human being”, as Vasily Rozanov put it. In its turn, this “triumph of meanness” contributes to the lowering of cultural level. It is clear that one can and should talk with a young reader about everything. But, when an interview with the departed Viktor Astafyev neighbors with an “erotic” strip, I cannot but think about either deliberate or unintentional inflation of Astafuev’s word.

On the pages of the same Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belarusi we again observe a clumsy attempt to meet different reader preferences. Still preserved in the editorial office, the noble petrifactions like Inna Rudenko and Olga Kuchkina, still try to converse with Yury Lubimov and Mark Zakharov. But, they are successfully pressed aside by young sexually enlightened colleagues. There has been a sort of consensus of personalities between a journalist and a reader, with youth’s slang, a mandatory irony on the verge of cynicism and the loss of a common tact being a characteristic of the latter.

Whatever happens in the world — planes crash into the Manhattan Towers or a submarine sinks — this is just an occasion for a quick pen to brush up turning everything into a masterpiece, let alone heart attacks and infarcts, which have become a specialization of Komsomolskaya Pravda. The newspaper apparently finds it very difficult to conceal a sick passion for misfortunes of the others in combination with a fake intonation of “empowered’ spokesman of the people’s love to the distressed fame.

I am not a stranger to irony in my writings, either. But, I cannot but agree with “one of the last grievers for the outgoing Europe” (a quote from Susan Zontag) Emil Choran, who said that “irony is a privilege of those hurt. Every reason causing the irony speaks about a covert break-down”.

Nevertheless, was it only a societal breakdown, which called into being such journalism: grimacing, motley, illiterate and anti-cultural? There are obvious tectonic shifts in the modern history, under influence of which classical cultural values are drifting to some kind of a ghetto, which exists under the mask of a garden for aesthetic strolls. The three-century old history of literature is ending before our very eyes with a post-modernistic degeneration.

These are not the problems of spelling, literacy and culture. A semiliterate culture-lacking man from the street with all his cheap interests has rushed into our journalism. His appearance is a symptom of the time.

Siarhei ZAKONNIKAŪ, Belarusian P.E.N.-Center

X-RAYING THE INFORMATIONAL SPACE OR WHY BELARUS AUTHORITIES CREATED A LITERARY HOLDING

It is impossible in a short presentation to give a complete analysis of the operation of the media in Belarus and define comprehensively their influence on this society. I will stop at only some instructive moments.

First of all, I must admit that the Belarusian society, if assessed by the civilized world standards, is very ill. The first indicator of the illness is that it has turned out to be unprepared to accept and defend its independence and voice firmly its political will. It is still hesitating.

The reason for hesitation is obvious. For over more than three hundred years, our land was exposed to either a total Russification or Polonization, and then again to Russification, Sovietization and superinternationalization. As a result, for a huge part of our population (in several generations), Belarus remains as only a geographical expression, a place of registration, where they live, work, earn money, raise children grandchildren and grand grandchildren, and nothing more. They do not feel themselves Belarus’ sons and daughters or blood elements of the Belarusian nation both in the concrete and supreme sense of this notion. It does not even get home to them, that their belonging to the nation, which was suppressed for several centuries by Russia and Poland, yet which, thank God, has continued to exist, requires today — the times of easily gained independence — that every Belarusian express most actively their patriotism, responsibility for their fate and their future.

The talk here is not only about the native language, which, indeed, is the soul and the soil of national self-assertion. Many other negative things add up to the dramatic language situation, which also made a negative input to the current situation within the society. People’s character and behavior have changed. We observe increasing aggressiveness, boorishness, lies, intellectual and physical laziness, indifference, alcoholism.

My mother, who perceived extremely painfully all the ugly processes and negative changes within the nation, would often say with a bitter sigh: “We are living like in the Barbarian street!” While a child, I could not yet understand what sense she was putting in her description. Later, it became clear to me that the mother meant our main trouble: immaturity, instability, and uncertainty about the fate.

Belarusians live and behave themselves as if they are not on their land, where they are masters, but as if they are at a railway station. They are all the time busy waiting for a rescue train, which will arrive one day and take them somewhere into a stable and wealthy being. At a railway station, with all that fuss and noise around, one can steal, deceive, curse or beat someone heavily, knowing there will be no punishment. The train will come, you board it and that’s it — none will be the wiser! The current political fuss around the planned unification of Belarus and Russia deepens the railway-station mood, the feeling of uncertainty among our people.

Totalitarianism, unforgotten and still undefeated because primarily based on fear, prevents Belarusians from rising to their feet and believing in their own forces. Stalin used this human weakness fully and achieved what he wanted. He abused and “raped” millions of concrete people and the whole nations. Stalin still continues to rule our life from his grave’s darkness, as the current “local dictators” are copying his experience on the whole post-Soviet space. For, fear, just like physical diseases, is passed from generation to generation. An intelligent, honest and freedom-loving person gets lost under totalitarian pressure. He fears not really for himself, but for his loved ones, for the cause he began and what has become the meaning of his life. Let alone the notorious electorate. In a totalitarian society, the brainwashed and politically culturally and socially uneducated majority can be far more dangerous and despotic than a dictator itself.

The sick Belarusian society is exposed to a triple influence of the mass media. Why triple? Because, there are three currents in today’s informational space: Lukashenka regime’s propaganda mouthpiece, independent press and the Russian media.

The realities of the Belarusian life prove very explicitly that with all its primitivism in methods — blatant lies and populism, the regime-serving propaganda machinery affects a quite huge part of our society, keeping it stoned. The regime takes by its quality and massiveness, for it has all television and radio channels and both the central and local newspapers in its hands. But, it has recently become clear that this is not enough. Totalitarism stands no dissent. Having taken care of the most significant opposition politicians and factory directors, the regime is now heading towards a total cleanup of the whole ideological and informational space. It is aiming to place civil institutes, trade unions and others under its unconditional dictate. The cleanup has touched on almost everything: Academy of Sciences, universities, colleges, lyceums, gymnasiums, and schools. “Unreliable” specialists are fired from their posts. The independent press has faced an especially severe attack.

Literary publications have not remained without attention, either. In breach of the legislation and ethical standards, a “holding kolkhoz” named “Editing and publishing agency “Literatura i Mastactva” (Literature and Art) was created in place of literary magazines? Many people were surprised: “What kind of threat to the regime can literary magazines pose?” But, they should not have thought that way. The totalitarian bureaucracy began fighting with the Belarusian literature not today, but right after getting to power. It is worth recalling the massive attacks on the prominent writers, known both in Belarus and internationally, have not stopped in the state media for years. It is not accidental. Traditionally, the Belarusian literature, which at all times fought for the national dignity, for the creation of the Belarusian state and defended the ideas of humanism, truth and justice, enjoys attention and respect in our society. Even now, that just like in 1930s, the regime considers writers as “public enemies”. Meantime people tend to listen to the literary people’s word. That’s why, the authorities need to deprive them of the possibility to express their thoughts.

After the creation of the holding, literature has again found itself in the grip of censorship. Honest people resigned from their magazines in a manner of protest. Many writers took back their manuscripts and halted cooperation with the censored magazines. But, the regime counts on “taming” the writers. For the regime, it is important to display to the society that even the dissent have given up. Of course, just like in any other environment, there have been collaborators and traitors amongst writers, too. However, it is very instructive that they do not represent the basis of the Belarusian writers organization. The extraordinary 15th Congress of the Union of Belarusian Writers brilliantly demonstrated the unity of literary community, their unbound civil and patriotic position in defense of independence and sovereignty of Belarus, our language and culture. The congress also passed an important resolution and has become one of the most significant events in the society over the past several years. The writers have not put out the white flag, and will continue to take a firm stand in the future.

And now let’s talk about the independent media. Being under permanent pressure from the authorities and fighting for survival in this difficult economic and political situation, independent media have worked a lot, not only bringing objective information to people and shaping the public opinion, but also in the field of political, social, legal education of the population. The role of independent media in democratizing the Belarusian society can hardly be overestimated.

But, however it may be, I should take this opportunity to raise a very important for the independent journalism problem: the state of its national identity. I understand that this topic, never seriously touched before, is very complex and sensitive. I know I will face a lot of criticism, yet I will a take a risk.

The thesis that journalism always has an international nature and carries out a universally common mission — to bring objective information to the public — seems to be incomplete and lacking accuracy, because it does not take into account the important role, which journalism plays in shaping a nation and promoting national identity and constructing a statehood. You simply cannot do without it. Our journalism permanently run across specific national, historical, political, social, cultural and spiritual realities, which one should know and comprehend. Yet, our journalism often tends to avoid or disregard them.

I will take the language factor as an example. Our country is called the Republic of Belarus. Belarusians as the indigenous population make up the majority, or 78%. Under the latest census returns, over 80% of population called the Belarusian language as their mother tongue. Of course, calling it a mother tongue does not necessarily implies having a good command of it. But, this national progress within the society, which reveals itself even at the level of sub-consciousness, should seem to be strengthened and developed. However, nearly all the independent press is Russian-language. One can refer to the fact that many publications are determined by national features, which are expressed in the motives and topical approaches, and lexical specifics. Well, that’s true, but who can deny the indisputable: the Russian-language environment will inevitably leave its trace on the very essence of journalism. Some Belarusian journalists behave as if they are Russian missionaries or Russian correspondents in Belarus. Their language, thinking and assessments are all only Russian.

Independent journalism pays a lot of attention to empty events and good-for-nothing people, often sounding like a gutter press, filled with platitude. Is it really so important, for instance, how Eleanora Ezerskaya’s pet-cat Kazanova is feeling today? Otherwise, why are newspaper pages filled with the descriptions of his biography?

Journalist cannot be guided by the buy-and-sell categories only. The newspaper magazine and book market is neither journalism nor literature. The market, of course, keeps up the material existence of creators and ensures the movement of certain informational and spiritual values. The market converts those values into commodity, yet it does not create them. A true journalism is created by searching people, who are gifted and who are able to penetrate into the history, traditions, the character of their nation and into everyday routine, to the bottom-line of acute social problems. When reading some publications, I think it to myself: “Whose journalism is it? Who has created it, for whom and for what?” Many publications leave an impression that they were written not by real people, born and raised on this land, but by robots, which do not get hurt and do not see the current tragic state of the nation.

I would also like to touch upon the ethical part of journalistic trade. Since recently, one can observe a moral degradation in the work of some journalists and literary people. Furthermore, both those who write in the official press and those who contribute to independent newspapers match one another. To be certain of this, it is only sufficient to refer to the publications by Eduard Skobelev or Semyon Bukchyn.

As for the Russian media, the brainwashing of Belarusian society over the unification of Belarus and Russia has risen on a new level of barefaced impudence, boorishness and cynicism. On TV, radio or in newspapers, Russian politicians, lawmakers, analysts and journalists, often behave like arrogant merchants at a slaves market, where the Belarusian people are on sale.

I regret very much that with its deafness to national problems, our independent press often unifies with the Belarusian establishment, which pursues an anti-national policy, and with Russian newspapers, which promote imperial myths about the “single nation and the single language”.

All our journalists should think about what place they need to take in our national self-assertion and formation of the independent Belarus. One should not step forth both directly or indirectly against our own history, language, culture, and erode our national foundation and our statehood.

If we continue to live like at a railway-station, nothing good will turn out. Joining Russia will not save us, either. Time will pass, but there will be no complete assimilation of Belarusians, and the national idea of constructing our own independent state will be alive and topical. Like it happened in the history of other nations, which had been swallowed by empires, our children will have to correct a great and tragic error of their grand grandfathers, grandfathers and fathers, who were either brainwashed or busy playing political games. They will need a lot of time and effort for that. Isn’t it better to do everything necessary now, on time and without victims and blood-shedding in order to strengthen statehood and assert the nation for the sake of a stable and decent living in the future?

Ukraine, Lithuania and even the tiny Estonia can live independently; why don’t we? To what extent one cannot understand its people, does not sympathize with them and does not believe in their creative force and capacity, by leading them into non-existence!