Мэдыі ў посткамуністычных грамадзтвах: аб’ектыўная інфармацыя супраць ідэалягічных скажэньняў
Матэрыялы міжнароднай канфэрэнцыі, Менск, 18-19 кастрычніка 2002 г.
Кніга па англійску - Propaganda techniques: implementation practice
Zhanna LITVINA, President, Belarusian Association of Journalists
Ideology vs. Media: Grip Tightens
The colleagues from the neighboring country often proclaim: “…under the first Russian President Yeltsin, all the restrictions on the freedom of expression boiled down to Boris Nikolaevich turning his TV set off, when he saw Dorenko on the screen”; “…There was no better times for the press than under Gorbachev”.
Belarusian journalists do not have much to compare with. Our situation can best be described by an old saying — “It is bad, but can get even worse”.
In respond to concerns over the deteriorating media freedom record in Belarus, officials some years ago would utilize the traditional set of arguments: none of the newspapers were closed down; journalists were neither killed nor imprisoned; the opposition newspaper Svaboda could be purchased from a newsstand at the presidential administration. The times have changed, and officials have only one argument handy: since there is a debate about the freedom of speech in the society, it means the freedom of speech does exist…
Throughout the year 2002, there was indeed a lot of talk and concern (by the way only in the independent press) about the government’s attacks on the idea of the freedom of speech itself, about the pressure on newspapers and legal actions against them. The authorities used defamation charges to subject journalists to criminal prosecution, thus escalating the relations between the power and the press into a straight-out and harsh opposition.
Mikola Markevich and Paval Mazheika, the journalists from the Hrodna-based newspaper Pahonia (Pursuit) were charged with slandering the president and sentenced to 1,5 and 1 years of “restricted freedom” (internal exile). Judge Tatsiana Klimava handed down the verdict.
Viktar Ivashkevich, chief editor of the Minsk-based trade union newspaper Rabochy (Worker) was sentenced to 2 years of restricted freedom and forced labor for attempted slander of the president. The charges stemmed from the article titled “The Thief Must Sit in Jail” published in the special edition ahead of the 2001 presidential elections, implicating the president and his entourage in serious economic crimes. The issue never reached readers, as police at the printing plant seized it.
In 2002 the authorities applied for the first time ever the provisions in the Criminal Code — Slander of the Belarus President (A367), “Insult of the Belarus President (A368) — against the critical journalists.
If our authorities want to be accepted into the European organizations, they should start treating journalists in accordance with European standards. This is an axiom. Most European nations deal with defamation in the framework of civil law only. The presence of independent judiciary there, which ensures protection of the freedom of speech standards, should be especially stressed. Therefore, there are almost no exorbitant fines in favor of “insulted officials’. Furthermore, the practice of European courts proves that neither imprisonment nor restriction of freedom can be applied against journalists, who carry out their professional duty. In this country, it is the prosecutor offices and courts, which are used by the authorities to intimidate and punish journalists. I would like to remind all those — “klimaus”, kobyshaus”, “savichaus” and others — who hand down guilty verdicts today (normally behind the closed doors), that the government in Serbia have recently brought to justice and dismissed 21 judges for their role in harassing the independent media there.
In August 2002, Judge Anatol Savich upheld the libel lawsuit filed by Belarus State Control Committee Chairman Anatol Tozik against Paval Zhuk, chief editor of Pahonia newspaper, and Mikhail Padaliak, his staff reporter. The two were ordered to pay out up to $60,000 in fines for degrading the honor, dignity and business reputation of a public official. The newspaper ceased to exist after the trial.
In late August 2002, the Minsk-based private newspaper Svobodnye Novosti had to stop operation after Belarus Information Minister Mikhail Paghainy interfered into a private economic dispute between the founders. The Minister took the side of one of the founders, ignoring the interests of 36,000 subscribers.
Prosecutors also opened a criminal case in connection with the publication of the article “The Afghan Greyhounds” by Iryna Khalip in the investigative supplement to Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta. Top prosecutor officers and investigators felt insulted by the journalist, who had investigated corruption in the state catering monopoly, Beladziarzhkharchprom.
In the summer of 2002, prosecutor’s office opened yet another criminal case on charges of slandering the president in connection with the publication in Narodnaya Volya newspaper, which reprinted a Radio Liberty broadcast.
These are only the most high-profile cases, which illustrate how authorities treat the press. Independent media, which until recently were able to think critically and influence on the workings of the government at least indirectly, have today found themselves cowed with the prospect of being destroyed.
The power not only tends to control all the public sectors; it also wishes to avoid any public control whatsoever, trying to become the “untouchable”. In European countries, civil servants are themselves the sources of information for the media, while their decisions and actions are subject to public scrutiny through the media. In this country, as the monitoring service of Belarusian Association of Journalists reports, the government classifies the information about the distribution of state-sponsored housing, salaries of top government officials, and even the number of the drowned.
Down in the provinces, journalists and the press in general become hostages of a local government chief as well as of his vision of the principles of the freedom of speech and legal standards.
Anatol Makushyn has been trying for 2 years already to obtain approval from the local authorities for the location of his youth newspaper Novy Viek (New Century). He has filed a dozen of requests to the Hrodna city authorities. Even the local commercial court ruled that the denials by the officials had been unjustified. However, he has not yet received an approval for the location of his outlet.
Authorities in the town of Smargon (Hrodna province) have denied for three times requests from the local successful private publisher Ramuald Ulan for the approval of the location of the two new publications — Novaya Gazeta Ostrovtsa and Novaya Gazeta Oshmian — he wanted to launch. As of the time of writing, the local executive committee lodged a lawsuit seeking to revoke a commercial license from Mr. Ulan. This appears to have come as a revenge of the authorities for the critical position of Mr. Ulan, who publishes his successful Novaya Gazeta Smargoni.
In the town of Gorky (eastern Belarus), the chairman of the local executive committee Uladzimir Dalzhankoū ordered to bar journalists from the local independent newspaper Regionalnye Novosti from attending the official news briefings of the local authorities.
Authorities in Belarus routinely mount pressure on the independent press at times ahead of electoral campaigns. Alternative sources of information are forced out in order to create a “favorable environment” for propaganda. The reprimanding of journalists along with the creating of obstacles for the operation of editorial offices has become a common practice elsewhere in Belarus. The government uses all levels of the vertikal, a top-down command system, including local chiefs and ministries to harass the critical press. Until recently, in 51 ministries and state agencies the top officials had their deputies to promote what they call the ideological and propaganda work of the state. The special post of advisers on ideological affairs was introduced at every state-owned enterprise with over 300 employees. In January 2002 the state newspapers disseminated the presidential edict, which ordered the establishment of seven “information and consultative groups”, head by high-level Belarusian leadership, including the speaker and vice speaker of the parliament, the chairman of the State Control Agency and the Secretary General for National Security Council…
“The restoration of the system of ideological work as a nation-wide system of shaping the public opinion is carried out in accordance with the personal initiative of the president”, Ivan Karenda, a top ideology official in the Lukashenka administration, admitted in an interview with newspaper Zviazda. By the way, Mr.Karenda, who considers himself a writer, had until recently worked as the deputy chair of the State Committee for the Press (currently, the Ministry of Information). Back then, he could sometimes afford to speak out about the freedom of press and denounce censorship. Perhaps, we should not be surprised… As we all remember, during the last year presidential campaign, Uladzimir Glushakou (also calls himself a writer), the then first deputy chair of the State Committee for the Press, was installed to actually censor independent newspapers at the only private printing plant in Minsk. Acting in breach of Belarus Constitution, Glushakou restored the notorious tradition of “blanc spots”, which appeared in Predprinimatelskaya Gazeta, Belaruskaya Maladzyozhnaya and Narodnaya Volya.
“The truth has remained with us”, Glushakoū open-heartedly admitted in his interview to the government-sponsored newspaper Narodnaya Gazeta. It is hard to understand those who have declared the monopoly on truth.
US Congressman Curt Weldon also “misunderstood” the Belarusian specifics, when describing the work of the Belarus President Administration’s press service as “the lowest form of politics”. On the results of the visit to Belarus of a US Congress delegation, Belarus President’s press service put out a press release ascribing to Congressman Weldon the words that “…Belarus President was elected in a fair and democratic election and brought a new momentum for the development of this country”. “I am appalled that anyone would take such blatant action and put out such outrageous lies”, Mr.Weldon stated. The presidential press service simply ignored the professional standards of news reporting, winding up in the center of an international scandal. But, judging by explanations and the assured behavior of the president’s spokeswoman Natalia Petkevich on Belarus television screens, she was apparently praised by the head of the state for her work. Meanwhile, the scandal did not provoke an adequate reaction from either the state media or the Belarusian society. Instead, it was picked up by the Russian media, which have an alarming dominance in Belarus.
The Belarusian authorities have overlooked the expansion of the Russian media, yet have continued to discuss the prospects of creating a single Belarus-Russian information field. The recent polls suggest that only two Belarusian outlets — presidential daily Sovietskaya Belorussia and independent Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta have made the list of the top five most popular media in Belarus. Almost 80% of the respondents said their views were most influenced by the Russian television channels. Obviously, we are facing a situation when citizens of the independent country perceive the world through the prism of the neighbor’s national interests promoted and influenced of by a huge number of Russian politicians and journalists. Furthermore, the Russian newspapers have come to Belarus as purely business projects, focusing largely on entertainment and avoiding sensitive political and social topics.
The Belarusian national press should be protected immediately, because this is the only media capable of dealing with internal national issues. The power has long since formulated its vision of the place of the media in the society. It simply made it part of the state propaganda machinery. Twenty days after the presidential elections, the newly established Information Ministry was tasked to carry out “the state regulation in the field of transmission and dissemination of information”. Information Ministry now gathers FM radio managers for meetings and summons state newspaper editors to warn and instruct. For instance, this was the case right after the independent press reported about the EU travel ban for President Lukashenka and his seven top officials. “The state builds its relations with the media in a strict accordance with the Constitution”, Information Minister Mikhail Padhainy stated in one of his interviews…
As a result, on the one hand, the propaganda-imposed stereotypes like “nobody is waiting for us in the West”, “we cannot survive without Russia”, “who else if not Lukashenka”… easily were rooted deep in the consciousness of Belarusians. On the other hand, this consciousness was blocked for the reception of topical and socially important information. Some pollsters suggest that up to 50% of Belarusian citizens have not heard anything about the disappearances of opposition politicians. Other high-profile topics are either tabooed or censored. “This is not a censorship; this is the coordination of views”, Belarus State Radio Chairman Uladzimir Martynaū stated, when asked whether the radio was censored or not. The routine propaganda article in the daily state newspapers should also be called “the coordinated view”. “The Belarusian court has become more democratic, human and operative (a headline in newspaper Zviazda), “Electoral Code is the result of accord of the whole Belarusian nation” (Siarhei Posahau, former aide to the president wrote in Sovietskaya Belorussia), “Belarus takes a decent place amongst the international community” (Respublika)…
Uncensored information makes people think, react, take decisions and make choices. Therefore, officials cannot overcome their desire to distribute information the way they want. For the society, the best-case scenario means simply a stagnation. In the worst-case scenario, it means degradation and the distorted perception of the reality.
“Belarusian television is a mirror, in which the Belarusian nation looks at itself”, the notorious propaganda specialist Alexander Zimoūsky once said. It is worth reminding that one should wipe the mirror from time to time, whatever magnificent it could be. Because, the gap between the reality and cheerful pictures and TV reports about our prosperity has grown day after day. The power is likely soon to look in this mirror just like in a laughter room.
The state media have overlooked the moment when they turned into a supplement to the power. Having accepted this role, they are not capable any longer of resisting the arbitrariness of those who control them. The massive lay-off of staff at the Belarusian Television and Radio Company is explained by “state interest”. The forced change of the management of state-sponsored literary magazines and their transformation into a holding company, the orders to cut their editorial staff by 20% as well as the cuts in funding for those publications apparently should also be regarded as part of the “state interest”. This situation does not evoke protests from the subdued, the attitude is known without saying. The state media receive budget subsidies to the amount a state official decides to give them. However, everybody understands that this cannot last forever.
Parallel to that, the state pursues the policy of economic discrimination against the non-state media, forcing several newspapers (Dien, Rabochy, Salidarnosc, Golas Pruzhan, Kucejna, Tydniowik Mahileiski) to go out of business. The state-owned delivery and printing monopolies are the instruments of this policy. The Belarus Post has raised by over 60 % its delivery fees for the non-state newspapers, while state-owned printers raised their tariff 40% up since early 2002. Under the Presidential Decree ¹ 495, the office spaces rental fee is ten times higher for the non-state outlets than for their state-sponsored competitors.
Apart from economic discrimination, the information deliberately leaked to certain journalists poses yet another threat. You get an impression, that someone deliberately picks up certain journalists and guide them into the needed direction. The lack of accuracy and the hurry in the journalistic work with this kind of information normally take journalists to court, where they often feel themselves defenseless. Newspaper Nasha Svaboda appears to have become victim of a similar combination.
Over the ten years, the independent press has failed to gain true allies and proponents. They are difficult to find. Political parties are going though difficult times. Businesses are over-cautious. Elites have not consolidated. Sometimes it seems that the problems of journalists are only their own problems and do not touch on those who receive information. We are impressed how the press and journalists are defended in the neighboring Ukraine. President Leanid Kuchma has been charged under 11 articles in the Criminal Code. Apart from embezzlement and graft, he is charged with prosecuting the opposition journalists. After Gregory Gongadze disappeared, thousands of people poured out on the streets in the capital Kiev, while lawmakers opened hearings and pushed for the impeachment of the president.
“No to Repressive Laws!” is the slogan of the action, which the Belarusian Association of Journalists launched to collect signatures demanding the repeal of criminal defamation provisions which were used to sentence Mikola Markevich, Paval Mazheika and Viktar Ivashkevich. We have collected nearly 10000 signatures, yet the figure does not prove that the problems of journalists and the freedom of speech have become understandable and important to the Belarusian society. Furthermore, it does not display the solidarity of journalists. Not a single state newspaper has even mentioned the criminal prosecution of their colleagues and other trials of independent papers. Not a single journalist at the three-hour long press conference of Alexander Lukashenka has asked the president about the state of affairs in the media field in Belarus.
The situation can change only when market laws will start working in the media market in this country. Market is the chief factor of the freedom of speech. The press first should be freed. Only thereafter, economic mechanisms would work.
“From survival tactics towards the strategy of leadership and economic viability” is the name of the program, which BAJ has developed. The program aims to promote the development of the concept of de-monopolization and denationalization of the state media, to develop a program of privatization of the state media, to improve laws, to study investment experiences in other countries. The Belarusian publications must learn management and develop attractive business plans. All that the authorities are expected to do is to ensure legal, economic and political guarantees for the operation of the media.
Vasil Bykaū described the Belarusians as a “retarded nation”. Since we have in fact run late, we must learn now the experience of neighbors who had begun to stick to the standards of developed democracies. If we do not do it, we will hover over one spot just like that bird with different wings, will live under burden of fear and dream only so that tomorrow would not be worse than yesterday.
Maxim ZHBANKOŪ, Belarusian Association of Journalists, Belarusian Collegium
THE WAR OF MYTHOLOGIES: THE PROPAGANDIST VOCABULARY OF BELARUSIAN MASS MEDIA
The dependence on information is known as one of the most widespread addictions in the modern world. This obvious disease is displayed by an acute need for a regular consumption of information packages.
At the first glance, the informational dependence is certainly positive. The mass media guide us in this complex world by providing information about the top events and major tendencies both in this country and around the globe. But, there also is another side: addiction to the consumption of a specific information product programs our view on the things. We begin perceiving the world through the prism of our favorite newspaper or a television channel. Just like in the Middle Ages, today we take on trust the fantastic stories about what is happening beyond our day-to-day experience. The media do not really explain the world. Rather, they make it sacral in their own way.
In a post-industrial mosaic society, media environment is competitive, i.e. “informational myths” compete on equal conditions for consumer’s attention. This is not a competition of the ideologies. This is the competition of attractions in an amusement park. Individuals opt for an one-time entertainment, not the global “fairytale about the essentials”, brightness and unobtrusiveness being the chief advantage of the former. A post-Soviet society, which has inherited the total polarization from the collapsed empire, is building a media landscape in an absolutely opposite way. For such a society, the ideological opposition — so to say, “the fight for commanding heights” — becomes its main task. This is a big game, with no one willing to accept “a consolatory prize”. This is the game of survival, and the victory means the end to the competitor. Such media landscape is not competitive. Rather, it is a landscape of extreme conflict.
Furthermore, the conflict unfolds at the common field of popular sentiment, while gaining controls over the sub-consciousness of the society is the prize. The opposed to each other ideologically biased media — we can symbolically separate them into two categories: the state-controlled and the non-state — thus pursue similar objectives: shaping the attitudes and managing the sentiment. In a certain sense, these are the players from the same league, yet from different clubs. Their basic difference lies in the content of the message and in the set of key stylistic figures. When based on this approach, the analysis of propagandist vocabulary of the Belarusian mass media allows us to come to quite interesting conclusions.
I will base my further discourse today on the analysis of the sampling of the first-page texts from both the state-run newspapers (Sovietskaya Belorussia, Narodnaya Gazeta, Respublika, Zviazda) and the non-state publications (Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Niva, Svbobodnye Novosti plus, Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta), which appeared in the period from 7 through 15 October 2002. I will pay a special attention to the analysis of the texts in Sovietskaya Belarusia (SB) and Narodnaya Volya (NV). In our opinion, these two newspapers are the most active in working with the so-called “ordinary man”: a man in the street busy with a monotonous job and having no inclination for intellectual efforts. Such “a man from the mass” is an ideal object for the ideological work. That is why the texts in SB and NV, both being pretentiously “popular”, represent the bottom-line of the actual “war of mythologies” on the Belarusian media landscape.
The world according to SB. The Belarusian state-run media are traditionally aimed at demonstrating a social stability in the country and displaying the undoubted competence of the authorities. Stability is understood as an absolute control over all the processes in the society. The illusion of such controllability is ensured by the following elements of media discourse:
1. Demonstration of the total subordination of any social activity to the government apparatus. The 10 October Respubika (page 2.) carries a blitz interview with several ministers. All of them, including Culture and Sports Ministers, report about the implemented projects and the disbursed funds. It appears that the “consolidation of material, organizational and financial resources”; the introduction of the system of personal rise in wages to cultural figures and the protracted reconstruction of the Gorky Theater are the chief successes of the country’s cultural policy.
2. The permanent practice of overt reports to the supreme power leadership, which are demonstratively discontent with the workings of the lower civil servants. The latter are both punished in a pointed manner and let go to correct their failures. In this regard, an article in the same Respublika, devoted to the working of Prime Minister Genadz Navitsky, is very instructive. It contains everything: the epic beginning — “Many had surely remembered those ten famous features, which the head of the state used to describe the personal and business qualities of Gennady Vasilievich [Navitsky]…”; a note on the difficulties and the scale of the tasks — “[he] had to reform the whole system of state administration bodies”; the inevitable criticism by the president — “suffice it to recall at least two recent reports to the head of the states, [in which the president] gave the most severe assessment of [prime minister’s] work…”; and an optimistic ending — “This day in the calendar is only a date in the biography of the current government, but not at all a landmark. In the coming weeks, the government is to face another report to the head of the state…”
3. Protection of bureaucracy from any forms of “incorrect” social activity by means ranging from fighting the small-size vendors to banning the rallies. The 10 October SB responded to the strike of private entrepreneurs with a commentary titled “The Business or Bazaar?”, remarkable for the undue familiarity of its tone: “The decent entrepreneur has made the society to talk about itself…The protest sentiment at any small market place across the country fades away by Saturday. This is not the gist of the situation; this is just a grimace…” etc.
The common message of such media texts to the average man can be generally described as follows: “Do not fuss around. The bosses will do everything for you!” The social tension is deliberately “discharged” and “neutralized”. The current slogan in use is: “Do not stand in the way, we are working!”
And, now is the example from the 11 October SB’s material on the agenda of a sitting of the House of Representatives. It reads: “We have currently been observing the process of evolutionary lawmaking… Those who have visited this world in its crucial minutes and who have outlived this steep turn are likely to support emotionally the agenda of the 5th [parliament] session…” The power apparatus appears in such a media mirror as the careful “fathers of the nation”, while the political opposition resembles the cunning and capricious “children”.
In the same issue (page 2.), the article titled “It is better late than never” focuses on the upcoming local elections. It reads: “One can surely forecast that very few will be seized by the reformist itch, and that suggestions to break what was created three years ago will not carry the public away”. The same article carries on: “The opposition is going to take part in the March 2003 [local] elections…Apparently, they have come to understand that only the people can vest power in you, not anybody else and in no way by pressure, street actions or PR-techniques. It took them four years to realize this simple truth”.
In this scheme, the simple man is given the role of “a good child”, who obediently carries out yet another “civil duty”: “A voter, faithful to the mentality of a sober-minded and reasonable citizen, came to polling boxes and reasonably expressed its will” (Same article). Next time, the people will be asked to construct a library urgently in order to make another contribution to the universal harmony and stability. The only feedback mechanism proposed is typically Soviet: complaining and denouncing.
In another example, the president visited the site, where the government-funded historical blockbuster “Anastasia Slutskaya” was being shot. The 11 October SB reported that the funding for the movie was under the personal control of the president. It further explained: “It is not the infringement on the creative freedom. Rather, it is a reliable guarantee that the movie would be finished on time”. Apparently, there was no other guarantee handy. None the less, this did not prevent film-director Yury Elkhov from voicing an immediate complaint that they had in fact been short of funds. And here is the result. “The President made a decision to allocate additional 400 million rubels ($ 200,000)” (Same article). This is not the end. According to the 15 October Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta, the movie production team also complained to the president that the cost of lunches had been deducted from their daily allowances (p.3)
The world according to NV. Ideologically, the Belarusian non-state media outlets are not homogenous. On the whole, however, the propagandist task they are trying to accomplish is completely opposite to the one of the state-run media. I am talking about the display of incompetence of the authorities, the demonstration of problems within the society, and the critical commentaries by opposition politicians and analysts. What happens is a general dramatization of the situation in order to “waken up” the compatriots: (the outcry against fascism by speaker Sharetsky back in 1996 or a zealous headline “Belarus cares about their fate!” under the pictures of the disappeared politicians in the 10 October NV). With that aim in view, NV also makes use of special techniques:
1. Nervous and filled-with-zeal statements by the opposition leaders and representatives of “conscientious intelligentsia”. Typical headlines: “Self-isolation”, “Off The Road!”, “Writers’ Union: What Is It Needed For?”, “We Will Perish Equally”, “The Wall”.
2. Sarcastic topical commentaries (by Semyon Bukchyn, Anatoly Kozlovich, Valery Karbalevich), which often “fire at friendly troops”. In his article titled “We Will Perish Equally” in the 10 October NV (p.2), Mr. Bukchyn offers an equally sarcastic assessment of the activity of the pro-presidential “stall” [of representatives] and the congress of the writers’ union. On the “stall”: “The National Assembly of Belarus, disdainfully labeled by the non-state press as “stall”, is either growing bolder or becoming insolent before our very eyes.” On the writers: “The old and ailing people with baggy faces and fattened functionaries in their forties… the first secretaries of the Writers’ Union and other nomenclature scum, moved away from the rich pie”. The real — and obviously not planned by the author — result for an average reader is simple: the growing feeling of a global crisis and chaos.
3. The emphasized attention to the repressive functions of the power. The latest example: detention of Natalia Shevko, former owner of the Minsk-based Fico company, by German police authorities. The story in the 11 October issue of Nasha Niva newspaper was placed on the first page under the top headline. The situation is assessed simply: this is a political case, and human writes activists immediately got down to business. However, Belarus authorities accuse Shevko of economic crimes. And, according to materials in Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (№ 153, 15 October), the whole story is far from being completely clear. Actually, it does not really matter, as the “right” impulse has already been sent over to readers. Yet another touch. A Belarus opposition leader Anatoly Lebedzko wrote in the lead to his article “Self-isolation” in the 9 October Narodnaya Volya that the disc with his text had been seized by customs officials at the Minsk airport. Not less instructive is the list of “those who suffered for Belarus”, regularly published in Nasha Niva. Somehow, attention focuses not on the courage, but on the fact of suffering. Naturally, a new cult of martyrs and disappeared heroes is being formed.
The message of such media texts can in general be described as follows: “The authorities are senseless and untalented. One could only live on [being] in a permanent opposition to the system”. The opposition propagandist discourse makes an orphan out of the average man, describing his conditions as being in a “disciplinary sanatorium”. The positive of the official propaganda lies in the present; the opposition discourse is romantic and dreamy. The harmony of the world here is prospective only. They promise the orphan that they will return him back home and will get “correct” parents for him.
It is interesting that with the obvious confrontation between the basic ideological aims, both the “official” and “unofficial” discourses have several features in common.
1. A stable set of key actors and the “heroization” of their activities.
2. Exaggerated and emotional assessment of the current state of affairs.
3. Relying on authoritative “friendly” experts and media figures.
4. Didactic tone. Lebedzko wrote in the 9 October Narodnaya Volya: “Deeds and actions are needed… We need a political will…It is time to ensure…” And here is the information about the sitting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in the 9 October Respublika: “The relevant ministries have not developed a precise and clear understanding…There is a lack of clear vision of the strategic directions…The work is being done by the spread apart fingers, without the concrete and targeted preparations…”
5. Critical perception of the “aliens”. Here are some headlines of the international news digests in SB and NV. SB: “The Live on the Edge of Shock”, “Missile Argument”, “All Under Gas”, They Rob Everybody…Regardless of Faces”. NV: “Moscow Is Preparing Respond to Georgia’s joining NATO”, “Jewelry Store Counter Cleared By Vacuum Cleaner”, “Veteran Kamikaze Lands in England”, “Sex Museum Opens in New York”.
6. Similar features of the “firm” style: a combination of the administrative bureaucratic language and the language of the people. It is more faceless and beaten off at the official press. Non-state outlets have a more individualized and obstinate style.
7. Magic perception of the world in a rational cover: instructions and reports (let’s recall the classical expression “You asked for rain? I gave you the rain!”) and economic pundits’ calculations, overloaded with digits and vague discourses. In this regard, we can pick up the huge texts by the dean of Belarus State University’s economic faculty, Mikhail Kovaliov, in the 9 October Zviazda, and by Sergej Bandysev, director of Belarusian Potato Research Institute in the 11 October Narodnaya Volya. Example: “Enterprises find the way out by reducing the price for feed potato down to the level where one cannot even think about raising a high-starch feed” (p.2). Is it good or bad? Should Belarus trade the starch? What would that mean personally to me? It is unclear. It sounds like either a plot or a spell.
Horoscopes, compulsory for the “people’s” publications, fit in very well. This similarity between the ideologically conflicting discourses is extremely instructive. In the both cases, we are dealing with the artificially created reality models. This is not a game of imagination. Rather, this is a movement of chief editor’s marker, who edits the flow of facts with a bold hand and filters “non-format” materials and promotes “needed” facts onto the first page. Propaganda raises “the inhabitants of information myth”.
Average people treat the media as the key to reality. For an intellectual or an author, it is his job. Myth here is an estranged product. Correct selection of active symbols, a language simulation. “I am his creator, not his servant”.
Why in our conditions is it possible for journalists to combine their work both in the state-run and non-state media, or even both in Russian and Belarusian media? Why can authors move from the non-state to the official publications? Emotional remarks about “defectors” and “turncoats” in combination with calm commentaries by “traitors” themselves do not explain anything. We see a more rational explanation: the change of “residence” is possible because it does not touch on the author’s personality. He does not change his views. He changes a working place at the myth factory.
The argumentation and rhetoric of political texts by the both sides has remained unchanged for years. The “war of mythologies” has practically turned into the positional confrontation. Each side has already “covered” its readership, and does not actually have a resource for growing the audience. The set of additional attractions is boringly hackneyed. Sovietskaya Belorussia attempts to renew itself by changing the name to Belarus Segodnya (Belarus Today) and introducing innovations: crosswords, detective stories and a TV program. Belaruskaya Gazeta is also changing. What new? Ad insertions and a TV program. In a matter of development, Nasha Niva… places a TV program, too.
The previous ideological competition on the pages of newspapers has lost its momentum. Everything is said; there are no new slogans. It resembles a truly Mexican duel from Tarantino’s movies: two heroes level their guns at each other’s forehead, but do not shoot off. The ordinary sparring, the nerveless fight between the two yesterday’s heroes. And, the public gets bored and goes out to bars.
Of course, “the silent majority” does exist “without us”, as Valiantsin Akudovich precisely and rigidly put it. Let us have no illusions: the “silent” majority surely does without them, too. The Belarusian propagandist media myths are the ideologies without neophytes. They conquered their supporters long ago, but they are not needed to others. Even the most convinced optimistic democrat can hardly explain the recent fall of the rating of our number one media hero by the successful informational tactics of the “dishonest” media. The deterioration of living conditions is the opposition’s best argument for the simple man. The myth of the power is being destroyed today not by the myth of the opposition, but the emotional perplexity of ordinary citizens.
However, it is naive to assume that a discontented man in the street automatically joins the ranks of the “system opposition”. The opposition in its current form makes sense only in a tight connection with its ideological opponent. This is what the current crisis is based on. The opposition is being “aging” along with the decrepit authorities, and becoming similarly uninteresting to the public. One could say that today the significant portion of the Belarusian society in principle does not accept a propagandist discourse, regardless of its orientation. A simple man now satisfies his thirst for myths in the other formats, ranging from cinema through knight tournaments to the extreme sports.
What could be done in this situation? To search feverishly for a new national idea? To raise yet another charismatic leader? To get united immediately around the unknown name? To join the ranks of “informational partisans”? All these questions come from yesterday, the epoch of ideological bayonet attacks.
The true alternative to the totalitarian myth is neither a new “ideological mobilization” nor the monolith of “corrected and improved” state ideology. A truly democratic society offers a “choice of myths” to its citizens, meaning a diverse range of informational sub-cultures in accordance with the individual demand and the organization of your private life.
The myths of the power and the people make way for the mythology of personal success, decent life and creative self-realization. Do we want changes? We need already now to begin constructing a nonlinear (i.e. post-totalitarian and post-ideological) media landscape, to refuse from habitual “partisanship” and eternal claims on life, authorities and the country. We need to shape the image of a multidimensional thinking and lay out the basis of a new society and a future Belarusian “middle class”, which will search for its own “choice of fairytales” and will be able to pay for it decently.