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SISTERS INTO NEIGHBOURS. Ukrainian-Belarusian Relations after 1991

Ukraine and Belarus are the two countries which today constitute the main part of the strategically important “new” Eastern Europe. Since 2004 they have been sharing a common border with the European Union (the EU) and have become potential candidates for the EU membership. In the 1990s Ukraine and Belarus were commonly perceived as part of the “grey” zone between Russia and the EU and were believed to be in the sphere of Moscow’s legitimate geopolitical interests. However, the EU enlargement to the East and the relative political stabilisation in the Balkans have made these countries more visible for Brussels. Western disappointment with Russia’s democratic reforms and Putin’s politics in the “near abroad”, especially his use of “gas blackmail”, seen as a potential threat for European security in general, are additional factors explaining the EU’s increasing interest in Ukrainian and Belarusian affairs. The engagement of Brussels and of some European governments in Ukrainian affairs during the Orange Revolution, the growing political pressure on Lukashenka’s regime and the introduction of sanctions against Belarus officials indicate a serious commitment of the EU for this region.

Although political transformations in Ukraine and Belarus are often discussed and compared, the problems of the Ukrainian-Belarusian relations themselves and their role in Eastern Europe are rarely addressed. This is not surprising given that for more than 60 years relations between the Soviet republics were mediated by Moscow. For more than a decade after the collapse of the USSR Ukraine and Belarus remained corners of the “East Slavic triangle” dominated by Russia. During the 1990s new bilateral relations between Kyiv and Minsk were shaped mainly within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS) as the successor of the disintegrated “Soviet empire”. With the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the

pro-Western orientation taken by the new Ukrainian leadership the geopolitical context of Ukrainian-Belarusian relations changed. Ukraine, which after the Revolution claimed its democratic leadership in the post-Soviet space, has joined the chorus of critics of Lukashenka's regime, though only half-heartedly. At the same time, the recent gas conflict between Minsk and Moscow opened new perspectives for Ukrainian-Belarusian relations.

This article uses a constructivist approach in international relations in order to analyse how new independent nations and former Slavic "sisters", namely Ukraine and Belarus, have been reinventing each other since 1991 as new neighbours / allies / competitors in the process of post-Soviet transformations. The ruling elites, the political opposition and the intellectuals in both countries refer to "Belarus" or "Ukraine" as symbols of a (n) (un) desirable alternative, use them as examples to demonstrate their own successes or failures or seek mutual support and solidarity. Although Russia and Europe remain the dominant constitutive "Others" for the national identities of both Belarus and Ukraine, the processes of mutual re-discovering and re-mapping of the two East European countries have been intensifying, especially after the Orange Revolution. In the context of the EU enlargement and the changing role of Russia in the post-Soviet space Ukrainian-Belarusian relations can have an important impact on the new symbolic geography of Eastern Europe.

1. Chronology and Basic Facts of Ukrainian-Belarusian Relations

Ukraine and Belarus established diplomatic relations on December 27, 1991, only a few weeks after the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Accords had been signed by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; the signing of this act led to the dissolution of the USSR. In June 1992 the embassy of Ukraine was opened in Minsk and in October 1993 the embassy of Belarus started to operate in Ukraine. During the official visit of President Leonid Kuchma to Minsk in July 1995 the basic Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation was signed (effective since August 1997).¹

In May 1997 Leonid Kuchma and Alexander Lukashenka signed the Treaty on State Borders between Ukraine and Belarus. This treaty has not been ratified yet by the parliament of Belarus, the fact which for years has been seen by Kyiv as the main obstacle in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers the delimitation and demarcation of the national border an important issue of national security and a necessary condition for the accession to the NATO and EU. However, official Minsk uses the ratification of the Border Treaty as a bargaining chip in the negotiations about the so called "Ukrainian debt". This debt emerged in 1992 with the interruption of economic relations between Ukrainian and Belarusian enterprises and their asynchronous departure from the "rouble zone". Ukraine, being afraid of creating a precedent, refused to recognize "the state debt" and prefers to call it a corporate debt. While avoiding the recognition of the fact of the state debt officially, Kyiv offered a partial compensation scheme in order to de-block the ratification of the Border Treaty. The compromise was nearly reached in 2002, but then the Belarusian government refused. In 2003 Leonid Kuchma officially

recognized the problem of debt, and later Viktor Yanukovych, at that time the prime minister, signed the protocol defining the amount of debt (134 million dollars). However, the new Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko does not recognize the debt; neither did the Orange prime-minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, who visited Minsk in 2005.²

During Kuchma's presidency (1994-2004) the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus met 19 times (half of these meetings took part during official visits, the other half during the CIS summits and other multilateral meetings of the leaders of the former Soviet republics). Since 2004, president Yushchenko and Lukashenka have met three times, always on the occasion of the CIS summits. During the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the Chernobyl disaster in April 2006, an official visit of Lukashenka to Ukraine was planned and widely announced, but did not actually take place. As this visit had been scheduled for just one month after highly ambiguous Belarusian presidential elections and repressions against the political opposition it would certainly have helped Lukashenka to overcome his international isolation and legitimise his regime. In exchange, the Ukrainian side had hoped for the ratification of the long-awaited Border Treaty. Moreover, both sides were to have signed an agreement regarding the simplified procedure of the border crossing at the Slavutych-Komarin crossing point, which Ukraine needed urgently for the maintenance of the Chernobyl nuclear station.³ Nevertheless, Lukashenka did not arrive in Slavutych. The meeting of the two presidents was then rescheduled for spring 2007, already after the dramatic gas conflict between Minsk and Moscow. The new issue of energy cooperation was, therefore, added to the agenda. However, the visit was again postponed, now due to the political crisis in Kyiv, which led to the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament and the new elections in September 2007.

In 1998 both countries signed the Agreement on Economic Cooperation for the Period of 1998-2008 and adopted the Program of Long-term Economic Cooperation. Despite the obvious stagnation of political contacts, economic cooperation has been developing quite well. In 2005-2007 trade turnover between the two countries has been growing steadily thus correlating with the sustainable economic growth in both Belarus and Ukraine. Trade relations between the two countries are relatively balanced and mutually profitable, but they are mainly concentrated on raw materials and semi finished products (oil products, fertilizers, ferrous metal, mixed fodder etc.). At the same time, trade relations are seriously undermined by antidumping measures, practiced by both sides. In 2007 the Agreement on Free Trade between Ukraine and Belarus came into effect, which, however, does not exclude antidumping measures completely. Despite the hidden political tensions, in May 2007 the first national exhibition entitled "Products of Ukraine" took place in Minsk. Industrial cooperation, especially in the sphere of machine construction (motors and other devices for tractors, harvest combines, locomotives etc.), is developing well due to the long Soviet tradition of cooperation and compatibility of technical standards. However, mutual investments are rather small, especially from the Ukrainian side, reflecting Lukashenka's economic protectionism and uncertain political perspectives.

Ukraine sells electric power to Belarus and plans to increase its supply in the nearest future. For this purpose, a new line from Rivno Nuclear Station in Ukraine to the Belarusian town of Mikashevichi will be built. After the gas conflict with Moscow the Belarusian government takes measures to diversify the energy supply. Among the offered measures are the projects to increase the purchase of Ukrainian coal (two new coal power stations are planned in Belarus – in the Brest and Hrodno regions). Minsk also indicated its interest in other common energy projects in the region (for example, the reverse use of the Odessa-Brody pipeline), which would decrease its energy dependence on Moscow.

Further promising prospects of the Ukrainian-Belarusian cooperation include such projects as the common use of transport infrastructure (especially of the Ukrainian sea ports and the Dnieper River) and the development of transit routes. In 2006, an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed between Belarus and Ukraine.

Although Belarus is not so present in Ukrainian public debates on national identity and geopolitical orientation, mutual contacts on the levels of population, civil organizations and cultural institutions have always been very important. Ukrainians compose 2.4% of the Belarusian population and form the third biggest national minority group. Ukrainian settlements are traditionally concentrated in the near-border Homel and Brest regions. However, the main part of the Ukrainian minority in Belarus is of the Soviet origin: most Ukrainians are former labour migrants and live in urban areas. 30% of the Belarusian academics are ethnic Ukrainians.⁴ The Ukrainian embassy in Minsk actively promotes the Ukrainian culture and language in Belarus and tries to consolidate the Ukrainian Diaspora.⁵ There are several cultural associations of Ukrainians in Belarus. Ukrainian studies are taught at the Belarusian State University, but until now there have been very few Ukrainian classes in Belarusian schools.

In Ukraine Belarusians make up 0,6% of the entire population. A compact zone of Belarusian settlements can be found at the border with Belarus (Rivno oblast), although many of them have already assimilated.⁶ In the 17–19th centuries several Belarusian settlements emerged in the East and South of the Ukrainian territory encouraged by the tsarist migration policy. Now most of them are ethnically mixed, and the population is assimilated into the Russian language. As it is the case with Ukrainians in Belarus, the number of Belarusians in Ukraine particularly increased in the Soviet period. At the end of the 1980s almost half of the Belarusians in Ukraine were urban citizens, and according to the census of 1989 the share of specialists with higher and special technical education among Belarusians was higher than among Ukrainians.⁷ A relatively high social status of both national minorities in the neighbour countries, combined with cultural closeness, a low level of national mobilization and absence of any ambitions of territorial autonomy create no ground for interstate conflicts in this respect. Ukraine and Belarus signed several humanitarian agreements: on the rights of migrants and their families (2003), on the rights of national minorities (1999), on a simplified procedure of changing citizenship of Ukrainians living in Belarus and vice versa (1999).

2. (Re)constructing East Slavic “Sisterhood”

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Ukraine and Belarus have been looking for their new place on the European continent, between the reluctantly enlarging European Union and the ambitious post-imperial Russia. Taking rather different paths of post-Soviet transition, both countries struggle for a new national identity, make geopolitical choices and look for new partners in the region. Struggling with the heritage of “East Slavic unity” and a common “post-Soviet destiny”, Belarus and Ukraine have been re-inventing themselves as European nations (even if this is only a “minority faith”⁸, as it is the case with Belarus). These processes open a new space for solidarity, competition and learning from each other. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the presidential elections of 2006 in Belarus have accelerated this process (which will be discussed extensively in the next section). The old paradigm of East Slavic unity has not died with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 but has been reinvented, a metamorphosis which deserves our attention.

In the formally multinational federal structure of the Soviet Union the East-Slavic core played, of course, a central role.⁹ This can be seen in the concept of “Sisterhood” which was a well known metaphor for the relations between the Soviet republics (famously represented by the “Friendship of Peoples” fountain at the All-Union Exhibition of People’s Economic Achievements in Moscow). Naturally, not only Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were referred to as “sister republics”. The metaphor of “Sisterhood” was meant to stress equal, non-exploitive relations between the subjects of the Soviet federation. At the same time, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus had a special position in the Soviet family of the fifteen republics. Indeed, in their case “sisterhood” was not just a thin metaphor for a community in principle open to any nation and based on shared communist ideology, but a thick metaphor for the “blood ties” of the three East Slavic nations.

The official paradigm of Soviet historiography, established in the 1930s and fully developed after World War II, considered the Kievan Rus’ a common cradle of the three East Slavic peoples – Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Separated due to unfortunate historical circumstances, they were predestined to re-unite, and this mission was finally fulfilled in the form of the Soviet federation. This narrative of common ancestry was partly borrowed from the 19th century Russian imperial historiography which “saw Ukrainians and Belarusians as prodigal sons of the single Russian nation and estimated historical events and persons from such a perspective. Differences between Russians, on the one hand, and Ukrainians and Belarusians on the other, were considered the result of damaging Polish influences.”¹⁰ An anti-Polish pathos was also characteristic for many Ukrainian historians of the “populist” school (the so called *narodnyky*), which associated the Polish national oppression with the economic and social exploitation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peasantry. This narrative was later merged with the Marxist concept of “class struggle”. Soviet historiography, while admitting the existence of Ukrainian and Belarusian national cultures and languages, stressed their direct “kin” relations with the Russian culture. The paradigm of the East Slavic unity was based on the (constructed) cultural and

linguistic closeness of the three peoples, and carefully selected historical myths. Thus, the Pereiaslav agreement (1654) was celebrated as an act of unification of Ukraine with Russia, while Hetman Mazepa's alliance with Sweden was considered a betrayal of Russia, and the conquest and destruction of Belarusian Smolensk by the Russian army in 1654 was forgotten.

In the Soviet period a new important myth was added to the construct of East Slavic unity – the myth of the Great Patriotic War. As Ukrainian historian Vladyslav Hrynevych put it: “The myth of the War, creating common heroes and common enemies, aimed at the integration of the whole population of the USSR into a single “Soviet people”. However, every national republic and every Soviet ethnos created its own small myth, adding to this colossal ideological construction.”¹¹ Thus, Belarus, the “partisan republic”, was glorified for its mass resistance and became at the same time the symbol of suffering from Nazi repressions (famously, every fourth Belarusian died in the war) while Ukrainian traditions of national liberation and historical memory of Cossackdom were mobilized by the Soviet propaganda and integrated into the Ukrainian myth of the Great Patriotic War. It was the territories of Ukraine and Belarus which were completely occupied by the Nazis and became sites of the cruellest battles, with most of the cities destroyed and with huge losses of the civil population. Having been under Nazi occupation for more than two years, it was the Ukrainians and the Belarusians, who survived hunger and repressions, who had to choose between resistance and collaboration in their everyday life, being torn between occupational authorities, partisans, communist underground and nationalists. Finally, it was Ukraine and Belarus, which became the main site of the Holocaust East of the Polish border. No wonder the memory of World War II in Ukraine and Belarus differed from the dominant Russian official narrative of the Great Victory, but these differences could be openly articulated only after the disintegration of the USSR. In the late Soviet era the common victory over fascism became a new myth cementing the “friendship of peoples” and their East Slavic core. The myth of the Great Patriotic War, officially constructed in the Brezhnev era,¹² thus stressed the solidarity of the East Slavic peoples in their common fight with an external threat (once again coming from the West!).

Of course, this coherent narrative of “sisterhood” grounded in common fight and suffering, became possible only due to the exclusion and suppression of certain “unwanted” episodes and aspects. First of all, this was the upsurge of national self-consciousness in Ukraine and Belarus at the beginning of WWII and the hopes for national revival that nationalists naively connected with the new Nazi administration. Thus, members of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian nationalists) as well as the UPA (Ukrainian Resurgent Army) were unambiguously condemned by the Soviet regime as fascist collaborationists (the same can be said about the structurally similar but less representative phenomenon of the Belarusian nationalist anti-Soviet resistance).

Another less known but very telling example is the story of Khatyn, an ordinary Belarusian village, which became a symbol of fascist crimes against civilians in Belarus.¹³ The inhabitants of Khatyn, accused of collaboration with Soviet partisans, were burned alive,

including children. Only few people survived this extermination by chance, and the village was completely destroyed. After the war Khatyn was made the main memorial site of WWII in Belarus, with its world famous symbolic cemetery of the 628 Belarusian villages, destroyed by the Nazis. But the fact that the Khatyn inhabitants were actually executed not by Germans but by a special police unit consisting mainly of Ukrainians is not well known. The chief of this unit, Grygoriy Vasura, was eventually found by the KGB at the end of the 1980s (he was a Communist party member and held a rather high position in the Kyiv region). He was arrested and sentenced to death as a war criminal by a military tribunal. Interestingly, the Soviet media did not mention this case at all. First information appeared much later in a Latvian newspaper. As it became known later, the First Secretary of the KPU Central Committee, Volodymyr Sherbytsky, kept this case under his personal control. Only selected journalists were allowed to the tribunal, and no materials about it were ever published.¹⁴ It is easy to understand that there was a lot at stake here for the Soviet authorities: the myth of the East Slavic Unity, of the common antifascist struggle and common victory.

Despite certain similarities between the two republics, the status of Belarus and Ukraine in the Soviet federation differed substantially. Ukraine was more important economically and geopolitically (as Zbigniew Brzezinski formulated it, without Ukraine Russia ceases to be an empire). The Ukrainian nationalism was, therefore, seen as a dangerous challenge, as well as the Ukrainian dissident movement from the beginning of the 1960s. Respectively, the Ukrainian party elite was more retrograde and the Ukrainian political regime even more repressive than those in the centre. Belarus was less of a headache for Moscow in this sense. Virtually re-built from scratch after World War II, it had the reputation of a shop window of socialism. The Belarusian party nomenklatura had the image of being the least corrupted in the USSR, and its communist leader Pyotr Masherov, a former partisan, was widely respected in the republic, contrary to his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Sherbytsky. Masherov's sudden death in a car accident caused numerous speculations about the "hand of the KGB". One can probably say that at the beginning of perestroika the Soviet regime was less compromised in Belarus than in Ukraine, which partly explains the different paths taken by the two republics.

How could the idea of East Slavic unity survive the disintegration of the Soviet Union and what kind of evolution did it go through? This concept, which in the Soviet times helped to legitimise the coexistence of the three Slavic nations in one state, has been re-invented after 1991 by the post-communist political elites as the ideology of re-integration in the post-Soviet space. Explicitly or tacitly, the idea of East Slavic unity has been present in such geopolitical projects as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurazes), the Common Economic Area (CEA) and the Union of Russia and Belarus. Initiated and dominated by Russia, these projects were unimaginable without the re-integration, first of all, of the former East Slavic republics. In case of success, the East-Slavic core would once again become a gravitation centre for the fragments of the Soviet empire. In this respect, the East Slavic unity fitted into a more vague concept

of a “Eurasian” integration after the model of a “Russian doll”. It was especially obvious at the end of the 1990s, when the growing international isolation of Lukashenka’s, but also of Kuchma’s regimes, the political rapprochement between Kyiv and Moscow and the institutionalisation of the Union of Belarus and Russia revitalized the ideas of common historical destiny and geopolitical identity of East Slavic peoples.

How does this re-invented “East Slavic unity” differ from the old Soviet construct? Firstly, its cultural and religious component is much more present, especially if one looks at the important political and symbolic role of the Orthodox Church in the reconstruction of the “East Slavic civilisation”. Secondly, one can observe some relative devaluation of the Soviet symbolics and historical myths (although Lukashenka’s regime manages to combine both). The Communist period is reduced to a common historical experience and thus becomes just one element of the East Slavic unity. The myth of the Great Patriotic War is still important as a common point of reference, although in all three countries one can observe a tendency to nationalize the World War II historical memory.¹⁵

This re-invented post-Soviet version of the East Slavic unity is represented, for example, by significant changes in the memorial landscape of the Kursk battle in Belgorod region (Russia) bordering with Ukraine. Particularly, the small village Prokhorovka was the site of the biggest tank battle of WWII (1943), where the Soviet Army defeated the German troops paying for it a heavy toll of lives. After the War a significant memorial was erected near the highway Belgorod-Moscow and became a locus of organized pilgrimage and state commemorative events.

In 1995 this Soviet memorial was superimposed by a new one – an Orthodox church and a war memorial symbolically centred on the heroic figure of Marshal Zhukov. The new cathedral was built in Prokhorovka in an “old Russian” style untypical for this region and associated with nationalism and patriotism in the 19th century. The new memorial uses orthodox symbolic elements reflecting the renationalization of the Soviet narrative. The names of the fallen Soviet soldiers are engraved on the inner walls of the church. In this way they are included in the imagined community of the “Orthodox” and Russians. At the same time this imagined community of “Russian Orthodoxy” is defined in a way that opens it to all Eastern Slavs – Ukrainians and Belarusians (most of the orthodox symbolic used here is common for East Slavic peoples). Thus, while it is especially typical for the Yeltsyn era, the boundaries of the re-emerging Russian nation are merged with the “East-Slavic civilisation” corresponding to the culturally relatively homogeneous core of the former empire.

The most interesting part of the memorial connects common historical experience with the common future of Eastern Slavic peoples. This is represented by the chapel consecrated by Patriarch Alexius II at the occasion of the meeting of the three presidents – Putin, Kuchma, and Lukashenka in May 2000, and accompanied by a “bell tower of unity” decorated with the icons of three orthodox saints – protectors of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Three young trees planted by the presidents during their meeting add beauty and value to this symbolic landscape. Visits to this new memorial site have become an obligatory part

of various official events and meetings of politicians and officials from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, which were especially frequent in Kharkiv and Belgorod in 2000-2004 (for example, Sobor Slavianskih Narodov / the Council of Slavic Peoples in 2002).

Thus, in the re-invented paradigm of the East-Slavic unity the old dominant ideological opposition of capitalism and communism has been replaced by the cultural opposition of “the West” and the “East Slavic world”. The geopolitical choice for Belarus and Ukraine was represented as a cultural choice à la Samuel Huntington: between the European civilisation and the East Slavic, or the Orthodox one. The concept of the post-Soviet integration, to some extent adapted from the European integration model, was not necessarily anti-Western, but, nevertheless, was meant as an alternative and counterweight to the integration of Eastern Europe into the EU.

The new “post-Soviet” concept of East Slavic unity was, undoubtedly, not a coherent, centrally produced ideology; rather it was a range of narratives and symbols instrumentalized in different ways by various political forces in all three countries. In Ukraine under Kuchma the official political discourse combined this concept with the rhetoric of “the European choice”; even the pro-presidential political forces started to formulate their relations with Russia rather in the context of the European integration (“To Europe with Russia!”). In fact, the idea of East Slavic re-unification was fully supported only by the forces of the political margins (Communists, pro-Russian parties and left populists such as Natalia Vitrenko). At the same time, during the election campaign of 2004, the Party of Regions successfully used some elements of the “East Slavic unity” myth to mobilize votes in the East and South of Ukraine.

In the Russian version the “East Slavic unity” was transformed into a neo-imperialist ideology aimed at consolidating Russia’s sphere of influence in the near abroad and keeping the satellites, namely, Ukraine and Belarus, under control. Popular among the left and the right margins of the political spectrum and feeding popular nostalgia for the lost status of “the great power”, this ideology got into competition with the growing nationalism, hostile to and suspicious of Russia’s neighbours. For Putin, particularly during his second term, the language of East Slavic unity seemed to be too archaic; he preferred the aggressive language of national interests.

Only Lukashenka seems to succeed in keeping the Soviet version of “East Slavic unity” somehow intact. It still forms a part of his usual rhetoric: “proved by centuries old ties of Slavic brotherhood (...) Russians (or Ukrainians – depending on the circumstances, T.Z.) are not aliens in Belarus, they feel at home here”; “we defend the western border of Russia”; “Russian is also our language, it is not a foreign language in Belarus”; “Belarusians understand Ukrainian without translation”.¹⁶ For him the unity of the Eastern Slavs goes back in history as far as the Battle of Kulikovo against the Tatar-Mongols (1380) and the Battle of Poltava (1709). But the most important shared value is the Soviet past: “together we created a mighty state”. In Lukashenka’s highly populist version it is the short-minded politicians and the egoistic elites, who betrayed the Slavic unity and destroyed the Soviet state, thus, having caused the damage he feels called upon to repair. This rhetoric, which earlier had

been addressed mainly to the Russian audience, is now adapted to the Ukrainian one as well. During the meeting with Ukrainian journalists in November 2006 Lukashenka discussed the prospects of integration “in the interest of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples”, speculating even on the possibility of a union state with Ukraine instead of Russia.¹⁷

In short, the longevity of the East Slavic unity paradigm helped the populations of the three countries to adapt to the disintegration of the USSR and to survive the trauma of the imperial collapse due to the firm belief in some kind of union between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. From the mid-90's the instrumentalization of the idea of the East Slavic unity between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus indeed secured a broad support for the leaders of these countries: for Yeltsin not less than for Kuchma and Lukashenka. They used the “East Slavic unity” paradigm at various points of their political careers: in 1994 Lukashenka was elected president while promising re-unification with Russia; the same year Leonid Kuchma defeated Kravchuk by responding to the pro-Russian sympathies of the Eastern Ukrainians; and Yeltsin was re-elected by instrumentalizing the project of the Russian-Belarusian Union State in his fight against the communist candidate Ziuganov. For both Kuchma and Lukashenka the “East Slavic unity” was basically reduced to a special partnership with Russia; it is the fact that reveals a lot about the hierarchy and asymmetry in this triangle construction. Russia still remains the constituting “Other” for the national identities of both Ukraine and Belarus.

While marking the contours of the disappearing Soviet civilization, in geopolitical terms the “East Slavic unity” is a phantom, as the ongoing polarisation in the post-Soviet space demonstrates: while Belarus still remains in the “pro-Russian” camp (it is a member of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, of the EURASEC, and supports the “Single Economic Area” project with Russia and Kazakhstan), Ukraine claims its ambitions to lead a “pro-Western” camp. It didn't join the Tashkent Treaty, limited itself to an observer status in the EURASEC and is rather reluctant when it comes to the issue of participation in the SEA. Instead, Ukraine created the GUAM group (together with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova) as a counterbalance to Russian geopolitical and economic dominance and in 2005 together with Georgia initiated the Community of Democratic Choice (which also includes Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and the Republic of Macedonia).

The Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict in winter 2005-06 and a similar conflict between Belarus and Russia one year later revealed the true geo-economic fundament of the post-Soviet East-Slavic unity. Besides their similar mentalities and political cultures, the post-Soviet elites of the three countries thrived on the compatibility of their political and economic interests: cheap oil and gas for Ukraine and Belarus in exchange for cheap transit and geopolitical loyalty to Moscow. This kind of deal helped to secure relative social stability, contributed to strengthening the power of the oligarchs in Ukraine and consolidated the authoritarianism in Belarus. However, the “reorganisation” of the Russian business elites during Putin's second presidential term and the changing political role of Gazprom made this deal obsolete. The nostalgic language of “East Slavic unity” on the Russian side

was replaced by the pragmatic language of “market prices” and “national interests”. Thus, the Belarusian official news agency BELTA in its commentary on Russia’s conflict with Georgia accused Moscow of the policy of “turning the former sister republics into whores of the Gazprom harem”.¹⁸ At the same time, the rise of Russian ethnic nationalism¹⁹ and Putin’s power politics in the near abroad indicates even more than the Orange Revolution the death of the East Slavic unity paradigm. Although the idea of close cooperation between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is still popular among populations of the three countries²⁰, it is supported only by marginal parts of the national elites.

3. Claiming European Identity, Reinventing the Neighbour

Perestroika and disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the way to alternative historical narratives both in Ukraine and in Belarus presenting them as European nations rather than parts of the Russia-dominated East-Slavic civilization. While during the Soviet period these alternative narratives were marginal and even banned, they became popular with the rise of the national-democratic movements. They were partly institutionalised in the first years of independence through the education system and official memory politics.²¹ These pro-European narratives became important in the process of the symbolic re-mapping of Eastern Europe corresponding to the political emancipation of the former Soviet republics from Moscow. This process was, however, full of compromises since the Soviet historical identity and the above mentioned concept of “East Slavic unity” remained instrumental for the post-Soviet elites. Moreover, since 1994 Belarus has been experiencing a comeback of the Soviet historical narrative as the result of Lukashenka’s politics of national identity.

The reconstruction of the history of Ukraine as a European nation brings some new aspects to the fore.²² Among them are the long term historical ties that the Ukrainian lands had with Western Europe while being part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the openness of the Ukrainian elite to European cultural influences, Ukraine’s role as a cultural bridge to Europe and as a supplier of intellectual resources for Russia in the 17th century, and the role of the Greek-Catholic church in the Ukrainian national revival. While before 1991 these aspects of the Ukrainian history could be developed only in Western and Diaspora literature, today they are included in school textbooks. Another important element of Ukraine’s European historical identity is owed to Halychyna, which had been part of the Polish Kingdom since the 14th century and during the 19th century was a province of the Habsburg Empire. Not only the architecture, but also the mentality and political culture of this region is seen by its elite as “European”, thus making Western Ukraine a locomotive which can pull the “Ukrainian train” to Europe.

However, in case of Ukraine the transition from the Soviet to the national historical narrative was in many aspects not a radical break. Volodymyr Kravchenko, among other authors, pointed to the ambivalence of the post-Soviet politics of history in Ukraine.²³

while initiating in 2004 a pompous celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty, criticized by many Ukrainian intellectuals, president Kuchma just one week later issued a decree on the official commemoration of the Holodomor, now officially recognized as the genocide of the Ukrainian people. The jubilee of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1972 -1989 was celebrated parallelly with another jubilee – that of the famous Ukrainian dissident and leader of the national democratic movement, Viacheslav Chornovil, a victim of the political repressions under Shcherbytsky. This ambivalence of the post-Soviet politics of memory in Ukraine reflects the historical compromise between the former communist elite, which in the early 1990s faced the challenge of building a nation state, with the national democrats, who endowed this project with their ideology and symbolic resources. In our opinion, the relatively smooth transition to a new national historical narrative was supported by the re-interpretation of some historical topics and figures, which had been fundamental already for the Soviet Ukrainian identity (Kievan Rus, Cossackdom, Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising, Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko etc.). Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, famous Ukrainian historian and the first president of the short lived Ukrainian People's Republic, was soon added to this new pantheon. In particular, the popular myth of Cossackdom, already accepted by Soviet historiography, has become a cornerstone of the new Ukrainian historical narrative. The new nationalized version represents the Cossacks as a European phenomenon and compares Khmelnytsky's uprising and the war for national liberation with the English revolution as a key moment of the European history in the 17th century. The democratic tradition of the Cossacks (as opposed to Moscovite despotism) and numerous contacts Hetmanat leaders had in Europe of that time are often underlined in this context, as well as the fact that one of the first constitutions in Europe was written by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk.

Belarus does not have such a "Piedmont" and "inner Europe" as Ukrainian Halychyna, nor does it have something comparable to the Cossack mythology. The heritage of the Kievan Rus' also turned out to be rather marginal for the new national historical narrative, which, in radical opposition to the Soviet one, puts Belarus in the context of the Polish and Lithuanian history. It was the national democrats, who interpreted the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a proto-Belarusian state and made it the new founding national myth. However, represented by only a rather narrow segment of the Belarusian intelligentsia, this narrative remained marginal. Unlike in Ukraine, no compromise between the national democrats and post-communist elite was reached in Belarus in the early 1990s. Instead, Lukashenka's restoration of the orthodox Soviet narrative only increased the polarisation between the two versions of history. The absence (or weakness) of symbols and historical figures which could bridge the old Soviet and the new European narrative of the Belarusian history partly explains the revival of Soviet ideology and symbolics under Lukashenka. While Lukashenka's official historiography is still anti-Polish²⁴ focusing on the negative consequences of Polonization and Catholicism for the Belarusian lands²⁵, some young historians try to re-assess the Polish factor in the Belarusian history and claim the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for Belarus, with its tradition of civil

society, its parliamentary system, its self-administration and religious tolerance.²⁶ In the national democratic movement and later among the opposition various versions of “Litvinism” became popular.²⁷ Litvinism as supranational regional patriotism was an ideology widespread among the Polish and polonized regional elites at the end of the 19th / beginning of the 20th century and died only after WWII.²⁸ The Belarusian version reinvented at the end of 1980s considers the Grand Duchy of Lithuania a *de facto* Belarusian state, which was destroyed by the Russian imperial aggression. Cultural Litvinism sees Belarus as a site of on-going conflicts between Western (Latin) and Eastern (Byzantine, or Muscovite) civilizations and as an outpost of the Latin world. Political Litvinism (represented by the Belarusian Popular Front “Renaissance” and by the former leader of Belarusian nationalism Zenon Pazniak) promotes the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea Association which would unite Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine as nations sharing not only common history, but also common interests in the West and similar problems with Russia.²⁹

As one can see from this short glance into the politics of history and identity formation in Ukraine and Belarus, both nations are in the process of re-inventing themselves as European nations. Of course, what in Ukraine has become a state-sponsored policy (especially after the Orange Revolution) in Belarus is still an oppositional discourse. (However, this can change quickly, and even before Lukashenka’s fall, as his conflict with Moscow and the recent attempts to win European sympathy show.) Still, there are many similarities in the strategies of re-inventing a “European” identity and distancing themselves from an “East Slavic unity” dominated by Russia, as both national elites share similar cultural resources and face similar challenges. In this way they also re-discover each other not only as new/old neighbors, but also as potential partners on their way to Europe. The new geopolitical identity of both countries is increasingly defined as “East-Central European” or even “Central European” by their intellectuals and politicians. Ukrainians and Belarusians claim common historical roots in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is often interpreted as the common state of Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (the latter two were called Ruthenians at that time), with the Ruthenian language, traditions and public institutions dominating. The ancestor of the Lithuanian kingdom, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth whose policy was less inclusive in regard to Ukrainians and Belarusians, is still considered to be culturally closer to them than the “Asiatic” and despotic Muscovite state.

According to these new narratives Ukraine and Belarus, having been for centuries objects of geopolitics rather than active subjects, have common European roots, a long history of mutual contacts, but practically no historical burden of conflicts and mutual violence. However, until recently there has been no political need for such a narrative of political and cultural closeness between the two nations. Both have been preoccupied with Russia and the pro-western and democratic forces in Ukraine and Belarus are too weak to profit from the newly discovered Europeanness of their neighbour.

However, the new “European” narratives in Ukraine and Belarus get some support from the outside, especially with the EU enlargement to the East. In particular, some new EU members like Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania show solidarity with the pro-Western

part of Ukrainian and Belarusian national elites and have developed some sensibility for their European aspirations. Especially Poland sees its historical mission in encouraging democratisation in Ukraine and Belarus and in pleading for their eventual accession to the European Union. The strategic vision of Polish politics is easy to understand: strengthening democracy in Ukraine and encouraging a regime change in Belarus would contribute considerably to the security of Europe and of Poland in particular. The ambition of Poland to expand European values and norms to the East can be seen as a sublimated, post-nationalist form of the traditional Polish nationalism. The success of such *Ostpolitik* could also strengthen Poland's position in the EU. Given the difficult past – a long history of tensions and conflicts between Ukrainians and Poles which culminated in the mutual ethnic cleansings of 1943-44 – the ability of the Polish political elites to differentiate “between state interests and national memories”³⁰ is rather exceptional for this part of Europe. Poland's politics of reconciliation has been welcomed and embraced by Ukraine, for whom Poland is an influential neighbour, an advocate of Ukrainian interests in the EU and a counterweight to Russian influence. During the Orange Revolution it was due to the initiatives of the Polish and Lithuanian leaders that the EU played an important mediating role in solving the political crisis.

Although the Polish-Belarusian relations are less burdened with mutual violence in the past they are not harmonious at all. Lukashenka considers Poland's politics towards Belarus a threat to his power (and, accordingly, the pro-Lukashenka media characterize it as “Cold War”). Poland and Lithuania are both determined to support democratic changes in Belarus, but their political means are limited. While in the Ukrainian case one of the most promising long term programs proved to be cross-border cooperation (institutionally supported within the European Neighbourhood Program from 2007), such regional initiatives are not welcomed in Minsk and limited by administrative barriers. Another strategy, which does not require cooperation with the regime, is the support of cultural and educational projects (fellowships for Belarusian students, the project of the Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian University in Lublin etc.). One should not forget that Lithuania gave asylum to the European Humanities University, closed by Lukashenka in 2005 for being too pro-Western. The existence of a Belarusian university in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, the city that has been claimed by Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian nationalists for almost a century, would be unimaginable without the EU-enlargement. It symbolizes the re-establishment of old historical ties in the new Europe despite the hostilities of the recent era of nationalism. All this represents a new geopolitical context which is conducive for the narrative of “European Belarus”.

4. Uses of the Other

The title of this paragraph is borrowed from Iver Neumann, whose influential book on the role of the Other in European identity formation and European geopolitics contributed significantly to the use of constructivist approach in International Relations. Of

course, Russia and Europe are the most important constituting “Others” preoccupying the national imagination of both Belarus and Ukraine, as it has already been demonstrated in the previous paragraphs. At the same time, the two former Soviet republics have been reinventing each other as neighbours / allies / competitors in the new Eastern Europe. The ruling elites, the political opposition and the intellectuals in both countries refer to “Belarus” or “Ukraine” as symbols of a(n) (un)desirable alternative, use them as examples to demonstrate their own successes or failures or seek for mutual support and solidarity.

Since the end of the 1990s the image of Ukraine in the West has been profiting from the comparison with its northern neighbour. Against the background of authoritarian Belarus, even the problematic democracy of Ukraine looks like a partial success. This contrast, by the way, was skillfully used by President Leonid Kuchma for promoting his European and democratic image and strengthening the legitimacy of his rule. Although critical about the lack of affirmative national identity politics in Ukraine, national democrats and Ukrainians from the Diaspora had to admit that the situation in Ukraine is still much better than in neighbouring Belarus, where Lukashenka reintroduced the Soviet ideology and made Russian the second state language. At the same time, Lukashenka’s Belarus represented “the worst case scenario” for the pro-Western part of the Ukrainian political and intellectual elite, the danger of falling back into authoritarianism and giving up the nation building project. The threat of “the Belarusian scenario” seemed to be growing especially noticeably in the second term of Kuchma’s presidency (1999-2004). The attempts of the presidential administration to control media and harass independent journalists, to put pressure on the political opposition and on pro-Western NGOs looked like “Belarusization” of Ukrainian politics. The political isolation of Kuchma’s regime from the West, caused by the Gongadze case³¹ and some corruption scandals (for example, “Kolchuga story”³²), as well as the growing political rapprochement with Putin’s Russia suggested that Ukraine slides into Lukashenka’s path. Therefore, the discourse of the pro-Western Ukrainian intellectuals in relation to Belarus was actually more about the fate of Ukraine and could be summarized as “Today’s Belarus is tomorrow’s Ukraine”.³³

By the end of Kuchma’s second presidential term the historical alternative posed for the Ukrainian nation had often been formulated as a choice between “good and evil”: “Either Ukraine will continue to build bridges to Western Europe, or it will become an isolated island like its northern neighbour – Belarus”.³⁴ The feeling of reaching a dramatic turning point where the fate of both nations is decided was reflected in the democratic Ukrainian media in October 2004: while the highly politicised Ukrainian society was approaching its first really competitive presidential election, the Belarusians once again supported their “Bat’ka”, approving in a referendum changes to the constitution which allowed Lukashenka to run as a candidate for the third presidential term.³⁵ Observers noticed that Yanukovych’s election program had astonishing similarities with Lukashenka’s in 1994 (giving up multi-vector policy and Euro-Atlantic integration, the promise to give Russian the status of the state language and to grant double citizenship) and warned about the serious danger of a Belarusian scenario for Ukraine.³⁶ Representatives from both “Our Ukraine” and Yulia Ty-

moshenko's Block criticized the results of the Belarusian referendum of October 17, 2004, and denounced it as a falsification. Anatoliy Hrytsenko, later the minister of defence in the Orange government, expressed his concern with the situation in Belarus, particularly "with the conditions journalists and opposition work under". He noted, that "Belarus is a problem because it preserves 'Asiatic values'. At the same time, the country has an opportunity to break through and widen the post-Soviet space".³⁷ Oleksandr Turchynov, Tymoshenko's right hand man, stressed that Ukraine cannot cooperate with the Belarusian regime, if it wants to be recognized as a civilised country.³⁸

The prevailing pro-Western discourse regarding Belarusian transition to be a total failure is in obvious contradiction with the image of a relatively stable and prosperous country which Belarus still enjoys in some parts of the Ukrainian society, especially in the East. The Ukrainian Communists and Natalia Vitrenko's Party of Progressive Socialists - political forces which traditionally are sympathetic to Lukashenka - see "the Belarusian model" as a preferable option for Ukraine. In October 2004 both parties welcomed the results of Lukashenka's referendum and condemned the Orange coalition for interfering in the internal affairs of the neighbouring country. In the Ukrainian communist and left populist discourses Belarus is the only example of the post-Soviet state which managed to avoid criminal privatisation and to preserve the social achievements of the Soviet socialism. Especially praised are the absence of unemployment, relatively high pensions (in comparison with Ukraine) and social benefits as well as Stalinists methods used by Lukashenka against corruption. Ukrainian Communists solidarize with the Belarusian regime in its confrontation with the West and promote the idea of East-Slavic re-integration. Natalia Vitrenko, a populist politician fighting against the NATO and EU membership and advocating the Russian language has been its most enthusiastic supporter until today.

The Party of Regions and its candidate for the presidential elections 2004, Victor Yanukovich, also used the pro-Belarusian sentiment in Ukraine. In October 2004 Serhiy Tigipko, at that time head of Yanukovich's election team, refused to criticize the controversial Belarusian referendum, referring to the economic success of Lukashenka's policy. "Today the average wage in Belarus is higher than in Ukraine. Belarusians will decide themselves",³⁹ was his comment regarding the option for the third presidential term for Lukashenka.

The other way round, Ukraine also serves as the Other for Lukashenka eagerly making use of it in his populist propaganda of "the Belarusian model", which according to his definition is a social welfare state based on direct plebiscitary democracy and taking care of people's needs. Lukashenka used Kuchma's Ukraine, which had become notorious for its wide-spread corruption, growing social inequality and the rule of oligarchic clans, as a contrast case, showing his own policy in a positive light. He presented himself to the Belarusians as a true people's president, who is able to prevent such catastrophic developments in his own country. For example, in August 2003 the official newspaper of the presidential administration Soviet Byelorussia published an editorial under the title "Who is rich in Ukraine?" The article was devoted to clan politics in the neighbouring country

and discussed the new administrative appointments made by the Ukrainian president: “Achmetovs’s men” Victor Yanukovych and Vitaliy Hayduk had become the prime minister and the vice-prime minister on energy issues. Referring to the Polish magazine *Wpost*, which published a list of Russian and Ukrainian billionaires, Soviet Byelorussia pointed to the close relations that Ukrainian oligarchs had with president Kuchma. The Ukrainian case as a negative example is opposed to Belarus: “There are no ministers in Minsk, who own “enterprises and ships”⁴⁰, no almighty media barons and “members of the family”, who operate in the world of capital and open the door to the presidential office by foot”⁴¹

At first glance it seems strange that Kuchma and Lukashenka, who at the beginning of the 2000s both were marginalized by the West (for example, at the end of 2003 they both were ignored by the NATO summit in Prague), showed so little solidarity for each other. In fact, until his last days in office, Kuchma cared much about his democratic and European image (one of the reasons why he refused to use repression against demonstrators) and did not want to be put into the same category as Lukashenka. He probably saw the developments in Belarus, its sliding into the hands of Moscow, as a warning which strengthened his policy of keeping both doors open as long as possible. Contrary to Kuchma, Lukashenka consciously chose integration with Russia and isolation from the West. He repeatedly showed his frustration with Putin’s cool response to his integration plans, and was evidently jealous of the more independent Ukrainian colleague, who was still respected by Moscow. Behind Lukashenka’s ritualised rhetoric of East Slavic brotherhood one could notice constant irritation with Kuchma’s flirting with the EU and the United States, by his lack of enthusiasm for the CIS, Eurazes and other projects and by his moderate nationalism and ambivalent attitude towards Moscow.

For the Belarusian opposition (especially for its liberal and national democratic wing) Kuchma’s Ukraine, despite its rather moderate democratic achievements, served as an inspiring example. The democratic accounts of Poland and Lithuania, two other neighbours, were definitely more substantial, but they were on their way to the EU and already members of the NATO, moving into a completely different geopolitical context. Ukraine was a more comparable case, and it was more advanced in terms of press freedom, civil society and consolidation of the political opposition. This made Ukraine an object of special interest for the Belarusian democrats. Since the end of the 1980s there have been not only regular contacts and mutual learning between the national democratic movements in both countries, but also a common vision of democratic Ukraine and Belarus as allies and geopolitical partners (the idea of the Baltic-Black-Sea Association). However, the democratic forces were too weak and fragmented to act beyond the borders of their own countries. The few acts of solidarity with the Belarusian opposition organized by Ukrainian civil society were purely symbolic. Of course, professional contacts between civil society activists, journalists and intellectuals⁴² and youth organizations had existed long before the turning point of 2004, but the frame for them was in most cases provided by Western NGOs and sponsors. The Orange Revolution inspired the pro-Western part of the Belarusian society, especially young people, and showed that a peaceful democratic change is possible also in

this part of Europe. Hundreds of Belarusian democratic activists and ordinary students took part in mass demonstrations in Kyiv, and Belarusian journalists closely followed the Ukrainian events. The Orange Revolution has been probably the first moment since 1991 when Ukraine attracted so much attention in both Belarusian society and the regime that it almost replaced Russia as the constituting Other.

5. After the Orange Revolution: a New Policy towards Belarus?

Considered by Lukashenka as a direct threat to his rule, the Orange Revolution became a symbol of hope and a model of action for the Belarusian opposition. Not only was it a proof that a peaceful transition from authoritarianism is possible, but it also offered a technology of the regime change, a “know-how” for the opposition which in Belarus could be applied to the coming elections: parallel vote counting, exit-polls, and in case of fraud, mass street protests, organized by the leaders of the opposition. In one of his interviews the candidate from the united opposition, Alexander Milinkevich, held that the Belarusian situation is rather similar to the Ukrainian one. In case the regime fails to guarantee free and fair elections, he “would not exclude calling people to take to the streets, as it happened in 2004 in Kyiv.”⁴³ The Orange Revolution also demonstrated the need for consolidation of the opposition and for a charismatic leader, and proved the efficiency of the “round table” model as a mechanism for a peaceful shift of power. The Belarusian youth organization “Zubr” was created according to the Ukrainian “Pora” model. Ukrainian events taught activists in Belarus a lot of practical skills: how to mobilize masses and keep their enthusiasm, how to organize peoples’ needs, block police actions, and so on.⁴⁴ Especially for those, who spent the decisive weeks on the Kyiv Maydan, this experience was a real school of revolutionary action (in this case, the geographic proximity between Minsk and Kyiv and the absence of a visa regime was a considerable advantage).

But even more important than the “technology” of the Orange Revolution was the moral and organizational support that the opposition in Belarus expected from the new Orange leadership in Ukraine. The very fact of having a democratic and pro-European neighbour, who closely and critically follows Belarusian political life would increase, one hoped, the pressure on Lukashenka’s regime. In his article “The new role of Ukraine” published in the Ukrainian weekly “Mirror of the week” in May 2005, Andrey Sannikov, the international coordinator of the civil initiative “Charta’97”, stressed the importance of the Orange Revolution for his country, Belarus.⁴⁵ He argued that Ukraine has a chance to become a new leader in the post-Soviet space and to initiate and support the democratic tendencies in the region. Sannikov warned Ukrainian politicians about the “pragmatic” approach to Lukashenka’s regime, and argued that the support of democratic forces in Belarus would serve the national interests of Ukraine and its new mission in Eastern Europe. Alexander Milinkevich, in the above cited interview, also pointed to the special role of Ukraine as a show case for Belarus: “Your political and economic achievements are especially important for us now. They calm the fear of reforms people have.”⁴⁶

No wonder that Alexander Lukashenka considered the Ukrainian Orange Revolution as a serious challenge to his regime. The new Ukraine represented a double threat for authoritarian Belarus: an external one as Ukraine had joined the geopolitical interests of the EU and the USA in the region and an internal one as the Belarusian opposition could follow the Ukrainian example and draw on the Ukrainian experience. Although the official presidential rhetoric pretended to be neutral during the election campaign of 2004, it became rather aggressive with the victory of Yushchenko and with the approaching presidential elections in Belarus. In his annual address to the parliament in April 2005 Lukashenka called the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine “open banditism in democratic guise”⁴⁷. A counter propaganda film, prepared by the First National TV channel and entitled “Conspiracy Theory: Controlled Chaos”, once again presented the opposition in Belarus as the puppets of obscure international forces, interested in the destabilization of the post-Soviet countries and in weakening Russia’s geopolitical position.⁴⁸ Until autumn 2006, when Gazprom announced its plans to raise the gas price for Belarus, Lukashenka defined colour revolutions as a Western conspiracy aimed, first of all, at Russia and its interests in the near abroad.

In 2004 some Belarusian experts (for example, Valeriy Karbalevich) believed that Minsk could, in fact, be interested in the victory of pro-Western Yushchenko, creating a scenario which would push Russia and Belarus closer to each other.⁴⁹ The victory of Yanukovich, Kabalevich argued, would not be in the interest of Lukashenka, because in this case Ukraine would replace Belarus as a key partner of Russia in the post Soviet space (the view that certainly underestimated the pragmatic economic nationalism of the Donetsk clan and the Party of Regions – T.Z.). On the contrary, other experts considered the possible victory of Yushchenko a clear threat for the Belarusian-Russian integration: “It would discredit the ability of the Russian leadership to defend their geopolitical interests, stimulate the activities of the national and pro-Western political forces in Belarus and their anti-Russian rhetoric, thus weakening the public support for the integration projects.”⁵⁰ Whatever the complex and unpredictable geopolitical consequences of the Ukrainian elections of 2004 for Belarus would be, the immediate threat to Lukashenka’s regime of personal power was certainly coming from the victory of the democratic forces in Ukraine.

As some observers had predicted, Lukashenka took preventive measures against the possible “Orange scenario” in Belarus.⁵¹ Imposing administrative and financial limitations for NGO activities, harassing activists and independent journalists, threatening students with administrative sanctions, and a counter-propaganda campaign in the pro-presidential media, he used it all to keep the opposition isolated and fragmented. Police forces were strengthened and trained to act properly in case of street actions. At the same time, the conflicts and corruption scandals in the Ukrainian Orange team were instrumentalized by Lukashenka’s administration in order to demonstrate the failure of the revolution and to warn the Belarusian voters of “a false choice”. Publications in the pro-presidential media with characteristic titles like “Self-Liquidation of the Orange Virus”, “Love has Gone,

Oranges have Shrivelled” or “Maydan has Become a Cemetery” systematically made the pro-European, democratic political forces in Ukraine look ridiculous.

Were the Belarusian expectations and fears in respect to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution really grounded? Did Yushchenko and his team have a principal position on Belarus and a clear political course? The initial intention of the victorious Orange team was to unambiguously support democratisation in the post-Soviet space. The new Ukrainian leadership, which already felt with one foot in the EU, had a strong ambition to play the same role of a democratic patron in relation to Belarus, as Poland had done before towards Ukraine.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the first prime-minister in the Orange government was especially optimistic about the perspectives of the Belarusian “Orange Revolution”. In the interview she gave in Paris in June 2005, Tymoshenko urged “to study and apply” the Ukrainian experience in other countries, first of all, in Belarus.⁵² At the end of August 2005, some days before she had been ousted from office, Tymoshenko argued that Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic lands would develop a common position and coordinate their policies towards Lukashenka’s regime.⁵³ No wonder that Tymoshenko’s dismissal was enthusiastically welcomed and commented by official Minsk. However, Anatoly Lebed’ko, the leader of the United Civic Party, optimistically believed that Yulia Tymoshenko, now out of office and not bound by diplomatic obligations, could give even much more support to the Belarusian opposition.⁵⁴

At the beginning of his presidency Victor Yushchenko also took a rather resolute attitude towards Lukashenka’s regime. In January 2005 a joint statement of the presidents George W. Bush and Victor Yushchenko condemned the non-democratic regimes of Cuba and Belarus.⁵⁵ A clear commitment to democracy in Belarus was also expressed in a special declaration of the Forum of the Community of Democratic Choice, held in December 2005 in Kyiv under the patronage of Yushchenko.⁵⁶ The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by the pro-Western Boris Tarasiuk, actively supported this political course. During the session of the UN Commission on Human Rights held in May 2005 Ukraine, despite the pressure of the Russian and Belarusian delegations, voted for a resolution which condemns human rights abuse in Belarus. Ukraine also joined several EU declarations expressing concern over the state of democracy in Belarus.

In spring 2005 the Ukrainian MFA took a firm position in the diplomatic conflict with Minsk caused by the detention of five Ukrainian citizens during the annual April 26 commemoration of the Chernobyl disaster. Ukrainian students, activists of the NGO “National Alliance”, were detained among 33 other young people (including eight Russians) near the presidential residence, where they assembled to submit a petition to the head of the state. They received sentences of 9-15 days in prison. The arrested Russians were released in some days at the request of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In case of the arrested Ukrainians, however, Minsk did not make any concessions despite angry protests from the Ukrainian MFA. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasiuk accused Minsk of applying double standards and called these arrests politically motivated.⁵⁷ The MFA did not only deploy all diplomatic means to help its citizens, but actually solidarized with their political

position, an unprecedented case for Ukraine. A similar situation happened again one year later, some days before the presidential elections in Belarus. On March 12, 2006, several Ukrainian citizens were detained during the meeting in support of the oppositional candidate Milinkevich, among them TV journalists from the Ukrainian "5th Channel". They were arrested during the live broadcast from the meeting. The Ukrainian supporters of Milinkevich, most of them members of "Studentske Bratstvo" ("Students brotherhood") organisation, were sentenced to 10 days of arrest. In its note the Ukrainian MFA called Belarusian authorities to immediately release the Ukrainian citizens, to respect democratic norms and to guarantee free and fair elections.⁵⁸

However, despite all the official declarations and diplomatic demarches, Ukraine's position in relation to Belarus has been rather ambiguous. Ukraine has not officially recognized the results of the presidential elections of 2006, but also did not join the EU sanctions against Belarusian top officials, accused in the West of kidnapping journalists and oppositional politicians in Belarus. The Ukrainian president, although having little personal sympathy for the "last dictator of Europe", did not boycott Alexander Lukashenka and repeatedly stressed that "total isolation of Belarus would be a mistake". Moreover, Victor Yushchenko invited Milinkevich, as a candidate from the united opposition, to the Forum of Democratic Choice in Kyiv, but did not find the time to meet him personally.⁵⁹ Already the official visit of prime-minister Yuriy Yekhanurov to Minsk in October 2005 signalised that Ukraine's relations with Belarus are slowly returning to the old Kuchma model: "pure business, no politics".⁶⁰ Yekhanurov did not raise any painful questions, he admired the economic development in Belarus and praised social achievements in the countryside which, he said, Ukraine should copy. Both sides focused on trade and economic cooperation (however, with no breakthrough in the border delimitation issue). Lukashenka profited from this visit symbolically by using it to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime. In conclusion, one can say that the Orange coalition, unable to find a common position even in burning issues of the Ukrainian politics, actually delegated the "Belarusian question" to the NGO sector.

Indeed, the pro-European part of the Ukrainian civil society has been more active and determined in this respect than official Kyiv. Ukrainian youth organizations (such as "Pora", "National Alliance", "Students brotherhood" etc.) did not only send their people to Minsk to support the opposition during the elections of 2006, but also put moral pressure on the Ukrainian authorities, forcing them to take a more resolute position. Thus, in April 2005, in the midst of the diplomatic crisis between the two countries, "Pora" called to refuse Lukashenka and his top officials entry to Ukraine, to strengthen the role of the NGO sector in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations and to base them on democratic standards and respect of human rights.⁶¹ An open letter signed by prominent Ukrainian intellectuals in May 2006, blamed the government for replacing democratic standards in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations with pragmatism, neglecting the "ideals of Maydan", the rule of law and European integration. The letter called upon president Yushchenko to openly solidarize with the victims of political repressions by joining the EU sanctions against the Belarusian regime and

to refuse its officials entry to Ukraine.⁶² (A similar letter, appealing to the solidarity of the Ukrainian leadership, was signed later by Belarusian intellectuals, human rights activists and oppositional politicians.) However, no official reactions followed these initiatives.

With Victor Yanukovych's comeback to power in August 2006, Ukraine's policy towards Belarus was switched from pragmatism to Byzantinism. There are several events which signal a clear relapse into anti-democratic politics and cooperation of the executive forces in both countries against "disturbing elements". The following case is just one example which demonstrates how efforts to establish the rule of law are obstructed in the end. During the night of November 24/25, 2004, Ukrainian policemen illegally arrested four Belarusian activists, representatives of "Charta 97", "the European Coalition" and "Zubr", at the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. They were on their way from Kyiv, where they had been taking part in protest rallies in support of Viktor Yushchenko. In the process of detention Ukrainian policemen, border guards and "people in camouflage" used brutal force against them. Released by the court only after a few days, Belarusians called this incident a revenge of the old regime and a common operation of the Belarusian and Ukrainian security forces. The fact that in February 2005 a criminal case was opened against Ukrainian policemen involved in the incident was considered an important step to democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine.⁶³ Dmitriy Bondarenko, one of the Belarusian activists, expressed hope that the investigation would become a model case particularly for his country, where police often uses brutal force during street protests. However, the case was dismissed in August 2006, a couple of weeks after Yanukovych's return to power. Belarusian activists perceived this news as a sign for an authoritarian backlash in Ukraine.⁶⁴

Another example signalling the retreat from democratic standards in Ukraine was revealed in September 2006 by the Belarusian newspaper "Nasha Niva". It reported about recent cases when Ukrainian security forces harassed and threatened Belarusian activists. Serzhuk Vysotski, the director of the Belarusian National Democratic Center in Kyiv, who was an object of such harassment, suspected that there is some cooperation between the Belarusian KGB and the Ukrainian security forces.⁶⁵

Why did Ukraine's "new" Belarusian policy become half-hearted and returned so quickly to the old pattern of "pragmatism"? Why did Ukraine after the Orange Revolution fail to support democratic changes in Belarus? There are several reasons for this failure:

First of all, obvious pragmatic considerations did play a role, such as the hope for the resolution of the border delimitation issue and more generally, the unwillingness of Kyiv to turn a neutral neighbour into a hostile one (given the already problematic relations with Moscow and the still rather marginal geopolitical status of Ukraine).

Second, the fragile balance of political forces behind the Orange coalition as well as the permanent political crisis made it difficult for Yushchenko to develop consistent Belarusian policy. With the return of Victor Yanukovych to power this project became even more difficult. Ukraine turned out to be too weak for its newly claimed role of a democratic leader in Eastern Europe.

Third, the Belarusian political opposition was not successful during the presidential elections in March 2006, despite mass street protests. Although Lukashenka's victory was rather ambivalent, the election results, even if partly falsified, demonstrated a relatively high support of his rule. Despite the fact that the results were not recognized by the West, they helped to legitimise Lukashenka's regime and consolidate his power. This made the export of the Orange Revolution to Belarus rather improbable, at least for another four years.

Fourth, the EU has not shown sufficient clarity and resoluteness in the Belarusian case. It does not dare to go much further than soft political isolation of the regime. Although the Belarusian opposition calls the EU to use economic sanctions against Lukashenka, it is rather unlikely that such harsh measures will be taken against Minsk. Successful isolation and international pressure would require the support of Russia, which at the moment is not determined to cooperate with the EU. And as Ukrainian leadership's initial optimism about the perspectives of the EU membership has faded it does not see any reason to identify too much with the political line of Brussels.

The fifth and last factor, the new gas conflict of Belarus with Gazprom in 2006 and its impact on the Ukrainian-Belarusian relations will be analysed in the next paragraph.

6. Gas Wars: Partners despite Themselves?

The first open conflict regarding the gas price between Minsk and Moscow emerged already in February 2004.⁶⁶ In the midst of winter Gazprom switched off the gas supply to Belarus, which impaired the gas transit to Europe for some days. Already at that time Lukashenka demonstrated his political will, the ability to act quickly and pragmatically and to change his political rhetoric radically in one day. The Belarusian leader won this war of nerves: after some days Gazprom restored the gas supply and both sides started negotiations. As a result, in 2004 the gas price for Belarus was raised by 50%, from 30\$ to 47\$ for 1000 m³, still less than what the other former Soviet republics had to pay. However, it seems that Lukashenka did not really learn from this conflict. At least, his pro-Russian political orientation did not change and nothing was done to overcome the almost total economic and energy dependency of Belarus upon Moscow. In his interview to the "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" in December 2005 Lukashenka explained why Belarus should be treated preferentially in terms of gas prices and why it will never get into a precarious situation like Ukraine: first of, because Belarusian tariffs for gas transit are much lower than in Ukraine; secondly, because Belarus allows the free deployment of Russian troops on its territory and does not charge money for military infrastructure; and thirdly, because Belarus does not strive for the NATO membership and remains Russia's strategic ally.⁶⁷ The harshest critics of Russian "energy imperialism", who called the Gazprom ultimatum for Ukraine in 2005 "the price for democracy", in fact, followed Lukashenka's logic. Similar arguments were used by the Yushchenko's political opponents, who blamed his pro-NATO course for the raised gas price.

However, the events of the subsequent winter should prove those analysts right, who were inclined to see in Gazprom rather a capitalist enterprise, led by the normal logic of profit maximization, than an instrument of political control in the “near abroad”. In 2006 Gazprom announced that it would raise the gas price for Belarus to 200 dollar pro m³ and demanded a 50 % participation of Gazprom in Beltransgaz, which meant that Belarus would nearly lose control over its pipeline system. Long negotiations brought no results, and at the end of 2006, Gazprom threatened again to stop the gas supply to Belarus. Lukashenka, internationally isolated more than ever after the ambivalent March 2006 presidential elections, nevertheless, did not give in to pressure. He rejected the Gazprom conditions appealing to the union agreements with Russia, which allegedly allows Belarus to buy gas at the Russian internal price. Finally both sides gave in, and on December 31, 2006, Gazprom and Belarus signed a new contract for the years 2007–2011. According to this contract, Belarus pays 100 \$ per 1000 m³ in 2007 and the price will gradually increase in the next years up to the “European level” in 2011. Gazprom also buys 50% of Bealtransgaz assets for 2,5 billion \$, with the price being much higher than what was offered initially.

It is difficult to say whether Minsk made a better deal with Gazprom than Kyiv one year earlier (the official price for Ukraine in 2006 was 130 \$, although it was paying only 90 \$ to RosUkrEnergo, a mediating company; besides, Ukraine kept control over its transportation system). What is more important in the context of this paper is the perception of both gas wars by the public opinion at home and in the neighbouring country. While Kyiv’s conflict with Gazprom, which ended in the obscure RosUkrEnergo deal, was seen as a professional and political failure of the Ukrainian government, cast a shadow on “Our Ukraine” and even on president Yushchenko, raised the issue of corruption, and considerably contributed to the public frustration with the Orange Revolution, Lukashenka’s regime, on the contrary, profited from his dispute with Gazprom. Once again he got a chance to demonstrate his strong hand and his personal control over key issues, his ability to defend national interests and to resist external pressure. He managed to use this conflict to consolidate his power, and even some representatives of the political opposition supported him against the dictate from Moscow. Ukrainian media also compared Lukashenka’s firm position vis a vis Gazprom with the failure of Kyiv in a similar situation one year earlier. As it was noticed by the media, the bargaining conditions of Ukraine were better than those of Belarus: the Belarusian energy sector uses mainly gas fuel, while Ukraine also has nuclear power stations and coal industry; Belarus is dependent on Russia, while Ukraine formally buys Turkmenian gas; finally, the volume of the Ukrainian transit is more significant than the Belarusian one.⁶⁸ In the eyes of the democratic press the fact that Ukraine failed to use these advantages in its negotiations with Gazprom, can be explained only by the corruption and by the pro-Moscow mentality of the Ukrainian government. “Even if there is corruption in Belarus, its scale does not pose a threat to national security and state interests, as it is the case with Ukraine,”⁶⁹ wrote “Dzerklo tyznia,” a pro-Western Ukrainian weekly which is usually rather critical of Lukashenka. In the eyes of the pro-Western Ukrainian public the conflict with Gazprom did not make Lukashenka a democrat, but turned him

into a potential ally in the gas wars with Russia, into a “nationalist despite himself”. One regretted that the two countries are not able to defend their interests together against the pressure of the “energy empire”.

With the gas crisis tapering Lukashenka easily gave up his traditional pro-Russian rhetoric and started to look for new allies. The Belarusian government approached the neighbours in the West with cooperation initiatives, but the new EU members did not hurry to shake hands with the “last dictator of Europe”. In the second half of 2006 some business propositions were made to Kyiv, which had already before demonstrated its pragmatic approach to the Belarusian issue. Pushed by the urgent need to diversify its energy supply, Belarus showed certain interest in renting some reactors in Ukrainian nuclear stations, in increasing electricity import from Ukraine, and in purchasing Ukrainian coal for its thermal power stations. According to some media, the Belarusian side asked for the re-export of 10 billion m³ of gas from the Ukrainian quota of RosUkrEnergo, but “Naftogaz Ukrainy” showed little enthusiasm.⁷⁰ Minsk indicated its wish to join the Odessa-Brody project⁷¹ while the Belarusian media speculated on the possibility of cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus in transporting Azerbaijani oil to Europe. In October 2006 the heads of Beltransgaz and Ukrtransgaz met to discuss the possibilities of coordinating the transit tariffs for Russian gas.⁷² Moreover, as Minsk was afraid of Russian trade sanctions, it showed some interest in exporting Belarusian products to Ukrainian markets.

In November 2006 Lukashenka for the first time met a large group of Ukrainian journalists and spoke about the perspectives of the Belarusian-Ukrainian cooperation. He did not criticise the pro-Western course of Ukraine, praised Yushchenko as a good banker and even speculated on the possibility of a Union state for Ukraine and Belarus. The last idea sounded sensational, but nobody in Ukraine took it seriously and considered it rather a message addressed to Moscow.

However, Lukashenka's new initiatives did have some response in Ukraine. Contacts intensified not only on the governmental level; the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Viktor Baloha, visited Minsk in December 2006 in order to prepare Lukashenka's visit to Kyiv planned for the first months of 2007. The energy security of Belarus and Ukraine and their possible cooperation in this sphere was supposed to become a central subject to be discussed by the two presidents. Both sides were supposed to sign a memorandum on cooperation regarding energy issues⁷³, including the increase of electric energy export from Ukraine to Belarus (with the construction of a new power line between Rivne, Ukraine, and Mikashevichi, Belarus) and the shared use of the gas transit infrastructure (pipelines and gas storages). The idea of the Ukrainian-Belarusian-Azerbaijani consortium on export of Caspian oil to the West was also mentioned. On February 15, 2006, Viktor Yushchenko told journalists that he supports the idea of the Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus to develop a common energy policy for Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as transit countries. Lithuania has been in conflict with Russia since summer 2006 because it sold its refinery “Mazeikiu nafta”, in which Russia was interested, to a Polish company. In response, the Russian oil company Rosneft' closed the “Druzhba” pipeline “for technical reasons”,

leaving Lithuania without oil and transit profit. As the shutting down of “Druzhba” also caused significant losses for the Belarusian budget, Adamkus’ proposition was timely and reasonable. It was not completely new, since the idea of a common EU energy strategy had been put forward by Poland already in 2006, and possible cooperation between Poland and Ukraine concerning energy security had been already discussed. However, the proposition to include Belarus in this “anti-Russian” coalition was somewhat unexpected and caused an outrage in the Russian media. It was even speculated (also mainly in Russia) that Belarus might join the GUAM.

However, no geopolitical sensations happened and the Krakow energy summit in May 2007⁷⁴ took place without Belarus. Probably, Lukashenka hesitated to show too much disloyalty to Moscow as he was hoping to get a credit from Russia to stabilize the state budget. At the same time European partners might not have been eager to have him sit at the same table. The EU did not change its position and in June 2007 deprived Belarus of its trade preferences. The planned visit of Lukashenka to Kyiv did not take place in March 2007 either; it was postponed for an indefinite period of time due to the outbreak of the political crisis in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian analyst Malinkovich, Yushchenko was not interested in addressing the Belarusian issue in the wake of new parliamentary elections. While he could not afford any political rapprochement with Lukashenka for ideological reasons, he does not want to lose a potential ally in a possible confrontation with Moscow.⁷⁵ Another Ukrainian political commentator, Volodymyr Fesenko, argued that the Yanukovych government was not interested in a new confrontation with Moscow on energy issues.⁷⁶

As always, the Ukrainian political elite proved to be split on the Belarusian question. The Party of Regions did not support the idea of the “energy union” between Ukraine and Belarus because of its “anti-Russian” orientation.⁷⁷ Unlike Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych and Yuri Boyko, the minister of energy, did not make any comment on the Adamkus proposition of cooperation between Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The Ukrainian government did not have a clear position about the conflict between Minsk and Gazprom either and even tried to profit from it. The energy minister proposed to increase gas transit through Ukraine in order to “fully satisfy the needs of the Ukrainian neighbors”.⁷⁸ When the “Druzhba” pipeline was closed by Russia in January 2007, Ukraine, according to some media, profited from the additional transit of oil, earning \$ 25 million extra (although according to other sources, instead Ukraine lost the money due to the same measure).

The “Gas War” between Minsk and Gazprom in 2006 created the precondition for at least a temporary alliance between Ukraine and Belarus and possible coordination of their energy politics. It caused some confusion across the spectrum of the Ukrainian political forces, shifting their traditional attitudes towards Lukashenka’s regime. While “Our Ukraine” and the Tymoshenko Block applauded Lukashenka’s move away from Moscow and his firm defence of national sovereignty and state interests, and hoped that distancing from Moscow could push his regime to democratisation, the traditionally Lukashenka-friendly Communists and Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialists avoided any comments regarding the gas conflict. Moreover, the criticism of the state of democracy in Belarus made by

prime minister Victor Yanukovich during his visit to Brussels on March 27, 2007, turned out to be a small sensation.

However, it seems that under Lukashenka Belarus is unlikely to change its geopolitical orientation radically. The faded friendship with Russia is not enough for Belarus to join the camp of those post-Soviet countries, which managed to avoid total dependency on Moscow. Neither does Belarus enjoy as powerful friends as Georgia nor does it sit on its own energy resources as Azerbaijan, and its way to Europe is blocked as long as Lukashenka insists on his authoritarian regime.

The possibilities of a Ukrainian-Belarusian alliance are also limited. For Ukraine Belarus is not only a potential ally, but also a strong competitor (especially in relation to gas and oil transit), the fact that limits the perspectives for solidarity. As long as Ukraine at least formally adheres to the attitude of the EU and NATO towards the Belarusian regime, it will not act single-handedly. At the same time, the position of those forces in the Ukrainian political elite, which do not want to provoke Moscow, is much stronger than immediately after the Orange Revolution. Thus, nobody in Ukraine is interested to play the Belarusian card in the moment. Paradoxically, both Moscow and Brussels (although from very different positions) block a further rapprochement between Ukraine and Belarus.

Notes

- ¹ Official information from the web site of the Embassy of Ukraine in Belarus: www.belarus.mfa.gov.ua/belarus/ua/publication/content/5394.htm, last visit 10.10.2008.
- ² Kravchenko Volodymyr. Sweets from Batka, in: *Dzerkalo tyzhnia/ Mirror of the Week*, April 15-21, 2006; Kravchenko Volodymyr. Ukraine-Belarus: Treaty in exchange for money, in: *Dzerkalo tyzhnia/ Mirror of the Week*, November 1-7, 2003 (both in Ukrainian).
- ³ Kravchenko. Sweets from Batka.
- ⁴ Voloshyn Yuriy. Ukrainians in Belarus, in: *Dzerkalo tyzhnia/ Mirror of the Week*, January 21-27, 2006 (in Ukrainian).
- ⁵ This is the general policy of the Ukrainian MFA. For example, the law on the status of the overseas Ukrainians, adopted in 2004, grants special privileges to foreign citizens of Ukrainian origin.
- ⁶ Historically «Polissia», (Russ. Polesje) which today is a borderland between Ukraine and Belarus, was part of the Polish Kresy where the national identity of the local peasants remained undefined at least until the end of World War II.
- ⁷ Vorona Valeriy et al. Belarusians in Ukraine, in: *Viche*, 1995, no. 8(41), pp. 104-112 (in Ukrainian).
- ⁸ A reference to the title of the well-known book by Andrew Wilson: *Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990's. A minority faith*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- ⁹ This was confirmed in 1991 by the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement signed by the three leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Yeltsyn, Kravchuk and Shushkevich. Other former Soviet Republics ratified this agreement later in Alma-Aty.
- ¹⁰ Kohut Zenon. *The Roots of Identity. Studies from the modern and early modern history of Ukraine*. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004, p.11 (in Ukrainian).

- ¹¹ Hrynevych Vladislav. Split Memory. Second World War in the historical consciousness of Ukrainian society, in: *Memory of War Sixty Years After*. Russia, Germany, Europe. Moscow: NLO, 2005, p.420 (in Russian). German version: *Gespaltene Erinnerung. Der Zweite Weltkrieg im historischen Bewusstsein der Ukraine*, in: *Osteuropa*, no. 4-5-6, 2005, pp.88-104.
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- ¹³ Not to confuse with Katyn (Smolensk oblast), the place where thousands of Polish officers and civilians were massacred in 1940 by the NKVD.
- ¹⁴ Gordasievich Bogdan. The truth about Khatyn. What do we know about the tragedy of the exterminated Belarusian village?, in: *Kiyevsky Telegraf*, April 8-14, 2005, no. 14 (256), <http://telegrafua.com/256/history/3964/> (in Russian), last visit 3.11.2008; see also Natalia Petrouchkevitch. Victims and Criminals: Schutzmannschaft Bataillon 118, pp. 102-104, University of Western Ontario 1999, http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0001/MQ44823.pdf, last visit 3.11.2008.
- ¹⁵ It is probably Lukashenka's version of the "Great Patriotic War" narrative, still very much Soviet, which is the most inclusive.
- ¹⁶ Citations taken from the official web site of Lukashenka: www.president.gov.by, last visit 10.11.2007.
- ¹⁷ Press-conference of President Lukashenka for Ukrainian journalists, 23.11.2006, www.president.gov.by/press38014.html#doc (in Russian), last visit 03.11.2008.
- ¹⁸ Gavrysh Viktor. Georgian-Russian conflict will split CIS. Belta - Belarusian news agency, 02.11.2006 (in Russian). www.belta.by/ru/actual/comments/?id=119193, last visit 3.11.2008.
- ¹⁹ See Tsipko Aleksander. A Slavic Farewell. Is the Russian national revolution coming?, in: *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 26 – March 4, 2003 (in Russian).
- ²⁰ According to the NISS sociological survey conducted in 2006 in Ukraine, 31,7% of the respondents supported the idea of East Slavic integration, 13,7% a cooperation with CIS countries, 9,9% a cooperation mainly with Russia, 15,2% a cooperation with Western countries, 20,3% were for an independent development of Ukraine. See: Citizens attitudes to the foreign policy orientations of Ukraine (2005-2006) www.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/Monitor30_n/01.htm (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
- ²¹ Wanner, Catherine. *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
- ²² Among other publications, see Szporluk Roman. Die Entstehung der modernen Ukraine - die westliche Dimension, in *Transit* 29, 2005; Hrytsak Yaroslav. Are we also in Europe? In: *Passions over nationalism*. Kyiv, Krytyka, pp. 309-324 (in Ukrainian).
- ²³ Kravchenko Vladimir. Fighting the Shadow: the Soviet Past in the Historical Memory of Contemporary Ukrainian Society. *Ab Imperio*, no. 2, 2004, pp. 329-368 (in Russian).
- ²⁴ A fact which corresponds to the latent tensions between official Minsk and Warsaw as well as with Lukashenka's conflicts with the Polish minority in Belarus.
- ²⁵ Smolenchuk Aleksander. „Polish presence“ in Belarusian history, in: *Perekrestki*, no. 1-2, 2006, pp. 55-72 (in Russian).
- ²⁶ Saganovich Gennady. *Sketches of the history of Belarus from antiquity to the end of 18th century*. Minsk, 2001 (in Russian).
- ²⁷ Yankovich Aliaksey. *Antology of Litvinism: sources, idea, realization*, in: *Palitychna Sfera* no. 6, 2006, pp. 11-18 (in Belarusian).

- ²⁸ Snyder Timothy. *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1669-1999*. Yale University Press, 2003.
- ²⁹ See Yankovich.
- ³⁰ Snyder, p. 274.
- ³¹ Georgiy Gongadze was a Ukrainian journalist kidnapped and murdered in 2000. Secret tape recordings made by Melnychenko, a former presidential bodyguard, revealed a possible involvement of president Kuchma in this affair. The circumstances of Gongadze's death caused a national scandal and a wave of mass protests against Kuchma's regime.
- ³² Kolchuga is a Ukrainian early warning radar device. In 2002 the US State Department accused president Kuchma of personally approving to sell the Kolchuga system to Iraq, a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 661.
- ³³ Strikha Maksym. Belarus today – Ukraine tomorrow?, in: *Ukrainska pravda*, 06.10.2004, <http://pravda.com.ua/news/2004/10/6/12431.htm> (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
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- ³⁵ Orovetsky Kyrylo. Lukashenka's victory and the Ukrainian choice of October 31, in: *Ukrainska Pravda*. 20.10.2004, <http://pravda.com.ua/news/2004/10/20/12824.htm> (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
- ³⁶ Strikha.
- ³⁷ Headquarter of Yanukovych does not criticize Lukashenka's falsification. In: *Ukrainska Pravda*, 19.10.2004, <http://pravda.com.ua/news/2004/10/19/12815.htm> (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ A reference to Mayakovsky's poem "Mister Twister".
- ⁴¹ Cited from: Lukashenka attacks Kuchma because of Akhmetov, in: *Ukrainska Pravda*, 21.08.2003, <http://pravda.com.ua/news/2003/8/21/29798.htm> (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
- ⁴² The best example is shown by two European-oriented journals, the Belarusian *Arche* and the Ukrainian *Krytyka*, which regularly exchange materials and publish articles on the situation in the neighbouring country.
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- ⁴⁶ Milinkevich.
- ⁴⁷ President of Belarus addresses Belarusian people and the parliament. 19.04.2005, <http://www.president.gov.by/press10257.html> (in Russian), last visit 3.11.2008.
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- ⁵⁸ Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine relating to the arrest of Ukrainian citizens in Belarus, in: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/5333.htm, last visit 3.11.2008.
- ⁵⁹ Kravchenko Volodymyr. The Belarusian question, in: Dzerkalo tyzhnia/ Mirror of the Week, March 25-31, 2006 (in Ukrainian).
- ⁶⁰ This visit was planned during the meeting of the two presidents in Kazan. If Tymoshenko would not have left office she would have been the head of the official Ukrainian delegation to Minsk.
- ⁶¹ "Pora" calls to refuse entry for Lukashenka, in: Korrespondent.net, 22.04.2005, <http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/256697/>, (in Ukrainian), last visit 3.11.2008.
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- ⁶⁶ Already in the 1990's Gazprom pressed Belarus to get its debts paid and offered to rent the assets of Beltransgaz in exchange for a supply guarantee, but due to the political priorities of Moscow at that time could not pursue its economic interests. With its new head Alexei Miller, Gazprom has intensified its pressure on Belarus since 2002. (Cf. Roland Goetz. Ukraine and Belarus: Their Energy Dependence on Russia and their Roles as Transit Countries, in: The new

Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova. D. Hamilton and G. Mangott (eds.), Austrain Institute for International Affairs, 2007, p.165).

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NEW “DEMOCRATIZATION WAVE” IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHY DEMOCRACIES UNITE?

“The bulldozer revolution” in Serbia in October, 2000, “the revolution of roses” in Georgia in November, 2003, “the orange revolution” in Ukraine in November-December, 2004 and “the revolution of tulips” in Kyrgyzstan in February-March, 2005 without any exaggeration appeared to be symbolic stages in the development of the countries of Eastern Europe¹ in particular and the Post-Soviet states, in general, at the beginning of the XXI century. Political events known as “color revolutions”, give the chance and reasons to study the so-called second stage of post-communist political transformations on the post-Soviet territory. These processes essentially affected the peculiarities of development of political regimes both in the countries which had already gone through a certain stage of democratic transformations and in those which had evaded democratization earlier. We base our research on the fact that the so-called first wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991 led to the destruction of communistic regimes while the second wave is deconstructing the remaining authoritative and pseudo-democratic systems. Because the second stage of democratic transformations in the Eastern European region coincides chronologically and has similar features with the universal “democratization wave” these processes are studied by us in a general context². Political transformations in the Eastern European region turned out to be quite indicative from the point of view of reorganization of political regimes and activization of regional partnership. We believe that modifications of political regimes caused by “color revolutions” gave an impulse to the strengthening of cooperation, allied relations and, probably, integration between the states of the region interested in it.

The first component of our article is the defining of democratization itself, the phenomenon of new “democratization wave” and

peculiarities of development of democratic transformations in some Eastern European states. Under “the new democratization wave” in Eastern Europe we understand a number of “color revolutions” that swept across the post-Soviet territory. First of all, it is the Georgian “revolution of roses” (November 2003) and “the orange revolution” in Ukraine (November-December 2004). Given examples provide us with an opportunity to identify the causes leading to the occurrence of political crises resulting in political regimes transformations, to describe general features of democratization in the given region and to outline the consequences of democratic transformations. When analyzing reorganization characteristics of political regimes in the specified countries of Eastern Europe, we adhere to the opinion that the democratic transition of the disintegration period of the socialist camp and the USSR did not bring in the formation of the consolidated democratic regimes in the majority of the former Soviet republics. We believe that the transition from formally democratic to consolidated democratic regimes began with the success of “color revolutions”. Modification or transformation of formally democratic regimes is the process of “the second wave democratization”.

In the second part of our research we will analyze the essence of regional partnership between the countries sharing the values of democratization, cooperation, and all-European and Euro-Atlantic integration. We shall remind that the projects advanced by the Russian Federation Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Common Customs Space, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Common Economic Space (CES) appeared to be the most active and relatively successful examples of interstate partnership in the former USSR. There are several initiatives that serve as an alternative to these communities in the Eastern European region. Among others they include the organization “GUAM” created in 1997 (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)³, projects of regional integration initiated in 2005, namely “Guam – the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development”, “Community of Democratic Choice”, etc.⁴ The activity peak in the registration and actions of the given regional initiatives took place in 2005-2006 that proves the essential influence of democratization processes on the strengthening of regional partnership.

The third part of our work studies the degree of influence of the main foreign policy players on the development of the second stage of democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and projects of regional partnership. The West, the Russian Federation and various international institutions put essential pressure on the events and processes both in separate countries of Eastern Europe and in the whole region. In our study we shall concentrate on the analysis of influences of such foreign policy actors, as the USA, the NATO and the EU.

Uppermost, we are interested in several problems, important for the understanding of the democratization process and regional partnership in Eastern Europe. Firstly, we would like to find out what role the democratization process plays for the given region and what Eastern European states do for the advancement of democratization values. Secondly, it is essential to know whether democratic transformations aimed at the activa-

tion of regional partnership work and whether close cooperation between the countries in the condition of democratic transformations of their political regimes influences the reinforcement of the democratization process effect. Thirdly, we shall see to what degree foreign policy actors influence the processes of reorganization of political regimes towards democratization and whether the degree of influence of this or that foreign policy player varies? Finally, we shall study decide how consistent the second stage of democratic transformation in the Eastern European region in the first years of the XXI century has been?

When working at the article, we started with the assumptions that, first of, the generality of historical development and geographical affinity are important factors in the development of the given stage of democratic transformations. Secondly, regional partnership serves as a vital instrument necessary to strengthen the tendencies of democratization in certain Eastern European states. Thirdly, in its turn, democratic modification of political regimes affected the activization of regional partnership initiatives. Finally, foreign policy presence of the influential states and international organizations played an important role in the activization of regional partnership between interested countries and in the democratization process itself.

The main objective of this study is to understand the connection between the democratization process and "color revolutions" on the one hand, and activization of regional cooperation, partnership or allied relations between the countries of the Eastern European region on the other hand.

Problems of the given paper are outlined as follows:

- To define entry conditions, peculiarities of development and possible results of the second stage of democratic transformations in Eastern Europe;
- To analyze possibilities for regional cooperation, partnership and allied relations in the conditions of new "democratization waves" and to identify the moving forces initiating interstate policy in the region;
- To study features of influence of the main foreign policy players⁵ both on the democratization process in Eastern Europe, and on partnership activization between the interested countries of the given region.

Did New "Democratization Wave" Take Place in Eastern Europe?

If one is to understand mutual relations between the democratic modification of political regimes and the strengthening of regional partnership then it is necessary to define whether the Georgian and Ukrainian "color revolutions" can be seen as the components of the second stage of democratic transformations on the post-Soviet territory or only as independent examples of the political regimes correction towards democratization. However, the main goal of this section is the answer the question whether "the democratization wave" really took place in the Eastern European region at the beginning of the XXI century.

First of all, we shall agree with a widespread research opinion that, in a broad sense, democratization is the process of political and social changes directed at the establishment of a democratic system. We shall also agree that changes in society and political regime which can result in or lead to the establishment of a democratic system shall be identified as democratization.⁶ For example, a politological dictionary gives the following definition: democratization is a process of expansion of democratic principles in the life of society on the whole or in its separate spheres, institutions, or a transition from an authoritative or pseudo-authoritative political system to a democratic system. According to A. Madatov, democratization, as a rule, is the result of revolution, evolution, external influence or democratic transformation carried out from the above or through a mixture of these variants.⁷ The mixed model incorporating many variants of democratization has been the most typical for the regions of Central and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet territory.⁸

Let us remind that democratization problems, “democratization waves” and the phenomenon of “color revolutions” have been studied by many researchers, including R. Dal, S. Huntington⁹, D. Rastou¹⁰, A. Pshevorsky¹¹, H. Linz and A. Stepan¹², L. Whitehead¹³, Ph. Schmitter¹⁴, L. Diamond¹⁵, etc.

Interpretations of the political regime democratic transition in the form of “the democratization wave” appeared in the early 1990s; it was connected with the mass withdrawal from the practice of authoritative regimes in 1989-1991. S. Huntington’s monograph¹⁶ was the major word conceptualizing the problematic of democratization, the theory of “the democratic process waves” and the analysis of their modern stage. Let us use his definition: “The democratization wave is a group of transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic, taking place during a certain period of time the quantity of which considerably exceeds the quantity of transitions in an opposite direction during the given period”.¹⁷ Taking the given definition into consideration, we shall notice that examples of democratic transformations in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 became an obvious demonstration of more and more active tendencies of transformation of political regimes in the Eastern European region and that they correspond to a full-fledged “democratization wave” in S. Huntington’s understanding.

The global tendencies which became evident in the last quarter of the XX century and at the beginning of the XXI century testify to it as well. It was terminologically turned into “the third democratization wave” by many researchers among whom are S. Huntington¹⁸, F. Fukuyama¹⁹, J. Markoff²⁰, D. Shin²¹, M. McFaul²², T. Carothers²³, L. Way²⁴, S. Levitsky²⁵, M. Beissinger²⁶ and others. Researchers are convinced that the democratization concept, including its “third wave” is a complete theoretical-methodological base for the understanding and forecasting of similar phenomena. However, we shall say that there is no yet a common unified theory of “the third wave of democratization” as the majority of theorists have refused its idea of universalization.

The development probability of further stages of “the democratization third wave” depends on the processes in the post-Soviet states. The possibility of “the fourth wave” of democratic transformations is supported by F. Fukuyama²⁷, L. Diamond²⁸, M. McFaul²⁹ and

others. We shall use F. Fukuyama's opinion favoring the next "democratization waves". He believes that at the beginning of the XXI century something like "the fourth wave" or the second phase of "the third wave" of democratization was formed when the revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine took place.³⁰

Many researchers agree that "color revolutions" are similar to each other due to electoral falsifications and the support of the West.³¹ F. Fukuyama believes that these three democratic revolutions were similar to each other, while the external support was critical to the provision of elections monitoring.³² It is echoed by A. Schipani-Aduriz, asserting, that these three revolutions followed an approximately identical trajectory begun by the local elite, western defenders of democratization and Russian attempts of resistance to democratic changes.³³ According to M. McFaul, democratic breaks in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine have got four important features that distinguish them from previous democratic revolutions. Firstly, swindling served as a reason to change the regime when carrying out national elections in all three countries. Secondly, the democratic opposition used non-constitutional means to preserve the existing democratic Constitution. Thirdly, the opposition and the government declared that the sovereign power was in their hands (it is one of the main characteristics of a revolutionary situation). At last, all these revolutions were made without mass violence.³⁴

In the given work we will not go deep into the semantics of the term "revolution" that occupies an important place in the interpretation of the processes which took place on the post-Soviet territory. We shall adhere to the opinion that "color revolutions" are original democratic breaks and the end of the democratization process which began at the end of the 1990s. Now we shall decide whether there were revolutions in the direct or figurative sense of the word. To do this we shall take advantage of C. Fairbanks's works characterizing the classical revolution and comparing it to "color revolutions". In this particular case it seems necessary to agree with C. Fairbanks's opinion that revolutions cannot be legal or constitutional because they change the laws of the political regime using force. "The revolution of roses" and "the orange revolution" leant against the legal invalidity of elections, however, the cancellation of elections results could not be done without citizens going out to the streets. Thus, there is a similarity between classical revolutions and peaceful "color revolutions" when it comes to the use of violence.³⁵

Peculiarities of the democratic transformations development on the post-Soviet territory and the phenomenon of "color revolutions" have led to an active discussion among the researchers. Experts' opinions are divided regarding both the degree of achievement of democracy, and the results of changes concerning further development of democratic regimes. The idea of "color revolutions" as a considerable achievement of democracy is supported by V. Bunce³⁶, A. Karatnycky³⁷, M. McFaul³⁸ and some others. They claim that "color revolutions" strengthened democracy in the region with each successful "revolution" motivating the next one.³⁹ However, there is an opinion supported by T. Carothers, O. Herde and others that "color revolutions" had a negative effect on democracy advancement as the authoritative leaders in neighboring countries increased the pressure upon demo-

cratic movements.⁴⁰ Finally, there aren't common positions concerning the possible consequences of democratic transformations in these political regimes. According to A. Melville, possibilities for further transformation of the political regimes which have gone through the first stage of post-communist changes considerably vary depending on specific conditions. In other words, the political development of the post-communist countries can go in different directions.⁴¹

In order to answer the question whether these transformations had the characteristics of the full-fledged "democratization wave" or whether they should be considered only as original transformations of political regimes we shall address the experience of previous processes proceeding in similar conditions. We need to recognize that the present stage of democratic transformations has the results similar to the processes of democratic transformations in 1989-1991. Those changes appeared to be more successful for the countries of the former socialist block from Central Europe and less obvious to the majority of the former USSR republics. However, one shall keep in mind that post-communistic transformations led to phenomenal political and social shifts on the post-Soviet territory. Though these transformations did not generate consolidated democratic regimes, all of them still created a possibility for their further development.

When analyzing the period of democratic transformations, first of all, let us define the factors which produced the greatest impact on the reorganization processes of political systems. Firstly, the crisis of legitimacy of authoritative regimes in such states as Georgia and Ukraine appeared significant and led to the non-acceptance of the elections results. Secondly, "color revolutions" occurred in the conditions of the economic situation improvement, namely the rise of economic growth rates. According to S. Huntington, it is necessary to take into account a close connection between the level of economic development and democratization. It means that the transition to democracy happens in the countries with an average level of economic development or in the countries getting closer to the average level.⁴² Besides, the democratization social base in these countries extends through the middle class formation. However, according to the opinions of other researchers, there are no direct and unequivocal relationships of cause and effect⁴³ between the level of economic development and democratization. Thirdly, by then the active position of the leading world and European states concerning the necessity of democratic transformations had been defined. In addition, "the domino effect" also played an appreciable role in the course of the democratic regimes formation.

Thus, at the beginning of the XXI century there took place a number of democratic transformations of the political regimes possessing general characteristic features, peculiarities and consequences on the post-Soviet territory on the whole and in the Eastern European region in particular. In our opinion, this train of political transformations became the second stage of the change or modification of non-democratic regimes on the European continent. Examples of "the revolution of roses" and "the orange revolution" are indicative enough to allocate these processes into the system category and, possibly, the final stage of the post-communist democratic transformation. We believe that democratic

transformations of the political systems in the conditions of "color revolutions" should be viewed in the context of the universal "democratization wave".

Regional Partnership and Democratization in Eastern Europe

In this part of our work we shall concentrate on the problems of regional partnership in the course of the political regimes democratization.⁴⁴ Problems of regional partnership in the Eastern European region were repeatedly discussed in the works of T. Kuzio⁴⁵, R. Asmus⁴⁶, S. Celac, P. Manoli⁴⁷, G. Herd, F. Moustakis⁴⁸, V. Socor⁴⁹, A. Sushko⁵⁰, I. Matijchik⁵¹ and many others. The majority of authors agree that the region between the Baltic and Black Seas is continually acquiring more independent importance.

The organization GUAM (Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova) in 1997 (later with the introduction of Uzbekistan – GUUAM) became the first serious initiative of the regional association while the second was the reorganization of this initiative into "GUAM – the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development" and the third was "the Community of Democratic Choice".⁵² Since the setting up of the GUAM the political elite of the countries of the Eastern European region became aware of the advantages of forming an alternative unifying community on the post-Soviet territory. We shall mention that at the beginning the GUAM was quite an amorphous structure though the Charter was adopted at the summit in Yalta on June, 7th, 2001. In this respect it is worth mentioning A. Sushko's remark that it is the international organization in which Ukraine could become a regional leader.⁵³

The regional partnership of several Eastern European states became more active together with the success of the new stage of democratic transformations. Proofs of it can be found in the position of the Georgian leader in regional policy after the victory of "the revolution of roses" and in the operative initiatives of the Ukrainian president concerning cooperation in the Baltic-Black Sea region. However, as it was already mentioned, elements of close regional cooperation and allied relations appeared on the agenda long before "color revolutions" of 2003-2004. Partnership between these Post-Soviet regimes in the Baltic-Black-Sea-Caspian-Sea space was initiated by the search for new possibilities on the territory of the former USSR, by the affinity of personal positions of state leaders, by active foreign policy actions of the most influential world states and by a number of other reasons. The system search for new approaches towards the regional integration of the states began to be discussed after the victory of "the revolution of roses" in Georgia. We believe that the active partnership between these countries strengthened the effect of democratic transformations.

In order to understand specific influence features of the processes taking place in the environment of this or that regime on the peculiarities of regional processes, including democratization, we will make use of A. Pravda and J. Zielonka's⁵⁴ conclusions. According to these researchers, democratic values extend from one country to another, first of all,

through the expansion of the demonstration effect. Authoritarian regimes in those regions where democracy has received preference or is a dominant form, find themselves under the pressure of the democratic environment. According to T. Ambrosio, the classical example of such a situation could be found in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. After Poland has joined in the transition process, neighboring communist states came to the conclusion about the inability to resist “the democratization wave” that led to “the cascade effect” in the region.⁵⁵

Possibilities of close regional cooperation based on the adherence to democratic principles, essentially supplement other factors influencing the success of regional partnership. We shall agree with a popular belief that the formation of such a structure as the GUAM was connected with the expansion of the so-called geopolitical pluralism⁵⁶ in Eurasia that emerged due to the disintegration of the USSR. In this situation there appeared a possibility to take advantage of the geopolitical role “Eastern Europe communicator” in Ukraine.⁵⁷ According to J. Matijchik’s opinion, the future place of the organization GUAM and its role in the system of international organizations will depend on what this union can reach in its cooperation with the EU and to what extent it will be able to co-ordinate its policy with the strategy of the USA in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.⁵⁸ Though the creation of this organization met a lot of optimism, researchers in their majority agree that the role of Russia is very important for the activity of this regional structure.⁵⁹ In regard to the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) according to A. Sushko, the mission of this organization has both internal and external goals. Internal goals have to do with the strengthening of democratic institutions in the CDC countries while others provide for the transmission of democratic experience to all the countries in the Baltic-Black-Sea-Caspian-Sea region. Naturally, one can see here a cause and effect dependence of the second on the first. Only the successful experience of reforms in the countries-initiators of the Community can become a tool for the increased appeal of the democratic choice in the region.⁶⁰

It is well known that the main goal of Georgia and Ukraine is to integrate into the European Union and the North Atlantic alliance; this requires not only inner political and economic changes, but also some kind of region adjustment, namely, modernization of the regional policy for the purpose of expansion of democracy and human rights and introduction of norms and EU standards. According to the Ukrainian experts, at present two main tasks of Ukraine’s regional policy include the settlement of the Dniester conflict that will serve as permission to join the European club, and the transformation of the GUAM into an effective organization capable of effective introduction of European values.⁶¹ The conclusions made by G. Herd and F. Moustakis in their joint research are of interest to us as they analyze the major factors defining new geopolitics of the Black Sea region. In their opinion, these factors include integration into the structures of Western security, stability of projects of the Black Sea transformation, competitive influence of regional predominant forces and the role of the region in the transportation of energy from the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.⁶²

Thus, the regional integration of the states which have gone through "color revolutions" confirms our hypothesis about the interdependence between the second stage of democratic transformations and the activation of regional partnership.

Influence of the USA on Democratization Process and Regional Partnership in Eastern Europe

In this part of the article we will concentrate on a number of questions. First of, how successful and effective American and, on the whole, western strategy to democratize political regimes in Eastern Europe (using the examples of political transformations in Georgia and Ukraine) was? Secondly, whether the states of the West and, in particular, the USA, influence the formation of regional integration initiatives? Thirdly, what toolkit was used by official Washington to advance democratization values and regional partnership between the interested states?

At the beginning we shall say that the process of change or correction of any political regime in Europe is almost always connected with the USA influence. The American political elite does not even hide that one of priorities of the USA foreign policy is the spread of democracy. After the disintegration of the USSR the main efforts of the USA were directed at the democratization of the former states-satellites of the USSR, then the Russian Federation, and only later the attention was given to the former USSR republics. Since the middle of the 1990s the USA decided to attract the Post-Soviet states to western values. It was then when the American policy in the CIS regions was split.⁶³ In the European region the USA's main attention was given to Ukraine, while in the Transcaucasia region the greatest interest was drawn to Azerbaijan due the presence of oil on its territory.⁶⁴ The policy of the USA on the post-Soviet territory was formed within the framework of the "Strategy of involvement into international affairs and democracy spread in the world" offered in 1993. In the next few years the document was supplemented and clarified. The text in 1997, in particular, said, "The tendency to the establishment of democracy and the introduction of market economy everywhere in the world corresponds to advancement of American interests (...) the USA should support this tendency by the active involvement into world affairs (...) it is that strategy which will allow us to enter the new century".⁶⁵

At the beginning of the XXI century, after two expansions of the North Atlantic alliance and the European Union, the region remaining out of the all-European and North Atlantic integration of the countries appeared to be quite interesting for Washington for several reasons. First, the policy of the USA concerning democratization is connected with neo-conservatism as the main ideological base of foreign policy which calls for a permanent revolution to advance democracy.⁶⁶ According to T. Carothers as soon as it becomes obvious that a democratization process begins somewhere western governments and international organizations, as a rule, join it to facilitate new transformations. It is a very rare case when the West passes ahead of events and itself starts to push countries with steady

autocracy towards radical changes.⁶⁷ Secondly, researchers from Eastern Europe and western experts agree that the Black Sea region forms some kind of a centre for the emerging geostrategic and geoeconomic system of the extending North Atlantic Union from Europe to Central Asia and is extremely important for the anti-terrorist efforts of the USA.⁶⁸ R. Asmus and B. Jackson adhere to a similar position believing that when the region of Central and Eastern Europe joined the Euro-Atlantic Union, the so-called “wide Black Sea region” (coastal states include: Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) naturally appeared to be in the centre of attention of Western countries. However, in their opinion, the West did not develop a complete and distinct strategy in relation to this region. Neither the USA, nor the majority of the influential European states, made this region their priority and identified strategic targets in it.⁶⁹ However, many researchers agree that the Black Sea region can become the front line of the Euroatlantic agenda.⁷⁰ Thirdly, the questions of stabilization of territorial relations in Eastern Europe are also of interest to influential western states. According to V. Sokor, American and, in general, western interests in this region require stable states controlling their own borders, free from any external military and economic pressure, possessing safe energy transportation routes also capable of supporting operations of the USA or NATO coalition.⁷¹

The USA desire to secure the position in the region was dictated also by several geopolitical problems: the USA should not allow Russia to regenerate into an empire; the post-Soviet territory must have geopolitical pluralism; the West should find approaches to the Caspian energy resources.⁷² According to B. Parahonsky, the USA has certain advantages in comparison with Russia due to a higher level of economic influence on the political situation in the South Caucasian region. One of the long-term objectives of official Washington is (together with the strategic policy of the spread of democracy) is the restriction of political, economic and military influences of antidemocratic forces.⁷³ S. Samujlov believes that after terrorist acts on September, 11th, 2001 the intolerance of Washington towards the lack of democratization progress in many CIS countries in accordance with western standards, has considerably increased. According to American logic as democratization did not develop the Post-Soviet states remained internally unstable. However, one shall remember that the American congress itself has deprived the executive power of the most effective financial levers to achieve democratization purposes by allocating scanty amounts inadequate to the set objectives of the assistance to the CIS countries.⁷⁴

Now we shall decide whether there is a connection between the influence of external forces and the advancement of democratization values. The positions of researchers are quite inconsistent though. T. Carothers supports the opinion that external factors do not play a considerable role in the democratization development. T. Carothers believes that the role of external players is limited during the attempt to transit to democracy.⁷⁵ F. Fukuyama and M. McFaul also think that it is the internal, instead of external forces that advance the democratization process in the majority of states.⁷⁶ D. Arel asserts that “the orange revolution” to a greater extent was the result of the action of internal forces rather than Western interventions.⁷⁷ It was not carried out for the sake of the neoliberal economic

model celebration and not to protect the geostrategic interests of the USA.⁷⁸ D. Trenin is of the same opinion as he believes that the sources of shocks in every country that has gone through "a color revolution" can be discovered in the country's own problems. He thinks that the thesis about the export of revolutions unlike the export of political technologies is unfair and misleading as history in general contains no examples of successfully exported revolutions.⁷⁹ However, there is also a strong contrary opinion which does not deny possible influence of external forces.

For the USA democracy advancement is one of basic elements of the external state policy. Let us agree with numerous research opinions that for the policy of national security of G. Bush administration the advancement of democracy is the central goal.⁸⁰ F. Fukuyama believes that no country of the world has received more advantages from the universal process of democracy expansion than the USA.⁸¹ According to F. Fukuyama and M. McFaul, the transformation of strong autocratic regimes into democratic ones was in the interests of American national security.⁸² However, according to the opinion of the same authors, though the USA has strategic and moral interests in democracy expansion it does not mean that the USA has possibilities to promote democracy.⁸³ D. Adesnik and M. McFaul think that democracy advancement was not only a moral purpose but also the realized necessity of American national security.⁸⁴ When considering the context of the USA influence on democratization activation we shall see that democratization process conceals some latent dangers. According to B. Shaffer's opinion, the process of democratization itself is destabilizing as it does not provide any protection from non-democratic elements working on the destabilization of transitive regimes. He believes that the USA did not find an adequate formula that could connect into one whole the assistance to democratization, efficient management and preservation of stability in the region.⁸⁵ There is also a point of view that the USA interferes with the process of the political regime change only if it is sure of the success of such changes for the country, its political regime, liberalization and democracy consolidation, and also when there is a certain need in such an intervention in connection with the accruing threats for western values, priorities and interests. In connection with this approach M. Matsaberidze asserts that external forces cannot guarantee a victory of this or that revolution if the country is not ready for it.⁸⁶ Though there is also an opposite opinion according to which international influence in questions of political regimes transformations is quite important. Let us recollect A. Pravda's statement that the international pressure concerning democratization supplements and accelerates the internal pressure of democratic forces.⁸⁷ However, the majority of researchers agree that the USA cannot impose democracy to other countries unilaterally as well as to dictate types of governmental institutions.⁸⁸

The use of possibilities of regional integration projects is a powerful "engine" to advance American initiatives in Eastern Europe. Regional projects directed at the formation of geopolitical pluralism, are capable of promoting the construction of alternative cooperation and integration. Such partnership appears to be more effective if it is based on common ideological and civilization values. Among western experts calling "to bravely

open up” the Eastern European region is R. Asmus who underlines that the recovery of the Euroatlantic community is possible with the help of new eastern ”agenda” that will include the integration of Ukraine into the democratized world.⁸⁹ The character of the West’s participation in the events of 2003-2005 connected with democratization processes in the region states and the growing criticism of V. Putin’s authoritative regime prove that such an approach gets the support of various political forces in the West.

In the given context the role of Central and Eastern European states seemed to be quite symptomatic. Let us agree with P. Smirnov’s opinion that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are already included in western institutions have an opportunity to play a special role in “the new democratization wave”. Washington and its new allies get a chance to prevent the growing crisis in their relations which results from the formation of one-vector orientation of Central and Eastern European countries towards the EU. In this situation some of the new countries-participants of the North Atlantic alliance took upon themselves the role of “authorized representatives” of the USA in the question of democracy expansion and “struggle against tyrannies” within the framework of the mission that G. Bush proclaimed to be one of the most important issues for his second presidential term.⁹⁰ Besides Poland the USA assigned Rumania a very important role in “democracy expansion to the east”, especially after the coming to power at the beginning of 2005 of President T. Basesku. The main object of official Bucharest efforts is the Black Sea region the importance of which for official Washington after a series of “color revolutions” is increasing considerably. When speaking in March, 2005 in the USA in the Council on Foreign Relations T. Basesku’s declared that “Romania is ready to become the base for the expansion of values of freedom and democracy in the Black Sea area.”⁹¹ The importance of Romania and Bulgaria as similar bases was noted during hearings in the senatorial committee concerning international affairs and the issue of “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area.”⁹² Participants of these hearings unequivocally defined “imperial and authoritative Russia” as the main threat of democracy and called to unite the efforts of the NATO and the EU for inclusion in the system of Euro-Atlantic integration of the Black Sea region countries which had democratic revolutions and which are preparing for them in order to strengthen their independence from Russia.⁹³ Official Washington helped Ukraine in its efforts to form the GUAM to resist the Russian influence on the post-Soviet territory.⁹⁴ Thus, at the beginning of the new century the USA carried out a very active policy to activate the formation of regional initiatives called upon to provoke the transformation of political regimes in the region and to promote their development.

Now let us look at the research of J. Nelson and S. Eglinton to understand the possibilities of the influence of a state on the political regime in other countries. In their opinion, this toolkit is formed according to several factors; however, the most important is the power of the state and its economy. Governments in weak states with small economies based on external help are more subject to external influence than the countries with a considerable military and economic potential.⁹⁵ That is how “color revolutions” drew the attention of the American government. In November, 2003 during the Georgian “revolu-

tion of roses" President G. Bush addressed "The National Endowment for Democracy"⁹⁶ and said that it was the beginning of "a global democratic revolution". Since then the support of democratic revolutions in the Post-Soviet region and in other regions of the world has been shown through such non-governmental organizations, placed in the USA, as "Freedom House"⁹⁷, "National Fund for Democracy", "National Democratic Institute"⁹⁸, International Republican Institute⁹⁹, Soros Foundation¹⁰⁰. In October, 2004 G. Bush signed Belarus Democracy Act¹⁰¹ which legalized the help to democratic forces in Belarus for the overthrow of A. Lukashenka's regime. At the same time, representatives of the American political elite deny that the USA pursues the policy of "revolutionary business"¹⁰². M. McFaul believes that western programs in support of democracy played a significant role during "color revolutions" in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Though foreign assistance had no independent role in any of these democratic breaks it still made its contribution.¹⁰³ On the other hand, according to G. Sussman, advertised as democracy construction electoral intervention is crucial for the American goals of the global policy.¹⁰⁴ T. Carothers holds the opinion that during the transition to democracy, the role of external players, generally, is quite limited as governments, international organizations and transnational non-governmental organizations, as a rule, choose tactics of non-confrontational assistance to democracy. Western supporters of democracy advancement have supported hundreds of election campaigns in new democratic states or countries struggling for democracy, helping to carry out elections and organize the work of local and international observers, and also taking part in the training of activists of political parties.¹⁰⁵

Western researchers, including G. Sussman, do not hide the fact that after communist regimes began their self-destruction in the late 1980s, the West, and, especially, the USA, quickly penetrated their political and economic structures.¹⁰⁷ Methods used to manipulate foreign elections have been modified since the time of the CIA development; however, overall goals and operations procedures have remained invariable. Though, at the present stage the American government relies less on the CIA and more on rather transparent initiatives carried out by such public and private organizations as "National Endowment for Democracy"¹⁰⁸, "the U.S. Agency for International Development"¹⁰⁹, "Freedom House"¹¹⁰, "George Soros's Open Society"¹¹¹ and other well financed organizations, mainly American which promote neoliberal economic and political goals.¹¹² G. Sussman believes that some of the main objectives of the National Endowment for Democracy include transit states. Both republicans and democrats it consider necessary to continue the development of the strategy for the region of Central and Eastern Europe and even liberal democrat J. Kerry criticized G. Bush during the presidential campaign for insufficient financing of this organization.¹¹³ Though T. Carothers emphasizes that only in rare instances external actors play a considerable role, trying to provoke or somehow carry out democratic transformations. In particular, it happens when the USA chooses a rigid strategy providing active support to the oppositional movement in the country in which the authoritative leader (to whom the West is ill-disposed) tries to have the re-election. Besides, though the West tries to stimulate political changes in similar situations, the West does not aspire to have the elec-

tions if they are not planned, and, more likely, tries to affect the quality and/or results of the already planned elections.¹¹⁴

Despite the efficiency of the USA activities for the democracy advancement in the world, it is necessary to point out that post-communist democratization passes more successfully than the democratization based on other entry conditions. In this context we shall agree with T. Carothers's thesis that such strong world democracies as the USA and, on the whole, the West should reconsider their approach and obligations towards their assistance to democracy development. He believes that before any active stimulation of positive political changes in non-democratic societies, it is necessary to use all efforts to help these states consolidate the principle of government of law and to achieve effective functioning of state institutions.¹¹⁵ At the present stage the American government, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (as well as numerous non-governmental organizations); continue to use non-military methods for democracy advancement in many countries worldwide.¹¹⁶ Researchers D. Adesnik and M. McFaul claim that diplomacy is one of the most effective methods for the advancement of democracy. In their opinion, democratization actions should mean, first of all, the creating of democratic opposition that is a key component of a successful democratic break.¹¹⁷ The purpose of the democracy building is to strengthen democratic institutions in strategically important nations by assisting their reforms aimed at the establishing of steady relations with American and their coalition partners.¹¹⁸ A similar approach has already proved its efficiency through the realization of such initiatives as the State Partnership Program.¹¹⁹ This program has been developed since the presidency of G. Bush (senior) in the form of a joint experiment of the Department of Defense and State department to activate the integration of the former Soviet block into the NATO. Now the State Partnership Program includes 34 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and South East Asia.¹²⁰ At the same time, in many cases for a number of reasons the USA and influential European states support authoritative regimes.¹²¹

When speaking about American assistance provided to new democracies of Eastern Europe it is worth reminding that the general American help to Ukraine in 1992-2001 made up 2,82 bln. dollars (from the American department of defense – 661 mln. dollars, concerning the safety of nuclear power engineering – 330 mln. dollars, from the U.S. Agency for International development (assistance for political and economic reforms) – 1,28 bln. dollars¹²³). According to the law "About Freedom Support" only in 1996-1998 the USA annually sent to Ukraine 230–250 mln. dollars; thus, Ukraine was receiving the biggest amount of American funds among all Post-Soviet states. Russia was allocated about 100 mln. dollars during the same period, while Armenia was given 90–95 mln. dollars and Uzbekistan received 22 million dollars.¹²⁴ Thus, according to the volume of American aid Ukraine was the third biggest receiver in the world (after Israel and Egypt). Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA became one of the key relations in the region. In 2005 the Congress satisfied the request of President G. Bush's administration to allocate additional 60 mln. dollars to Ukraine. Together with the help provided for by the USA budget for

2005, the general sum made up almost 140 mln. dollars. Moreover, the USA has included Ukraine into the so-called Fund of Coalition Solidarity and will support it further.¹²⁵

However, M. Beissinger believes that this approach contains some dangers for the export of revolution and the general democratization strategy. First of all, there is a probability that democracy can be understood as a tool of external but not internal development. Secondly, the organizations which concentrate on the protection of human rights can be discredited if they are included in the political movement or are identified as revolutionary organizations. Thirdly, external efforts to provide for the provision of the democratic revolution can cause ethnic conflicts or even lead to a civil war. Finally, an imported democratic revolution can lead to a post-revolutionary situation when the presence of democracy in the country will be called into question.¹²⁶

Summing it all up, first of all, we shall underline the importance of democratization processes for the whole Eastern European space. Due to their geographical affinity and similarity of historical development democratic transformations in each of the region countries strengthened similar tendencies in the neighboring states and activated regional partnership. In this context leading foreign policy actors essentially influenced the transformation process of political regimes towards their democratization while they also encouraged the intensification of regional partnership through the formation of the so-called geopolitical pluralism and alternative regional integration. At the beginning of the XXI century the USA carried out an active policy of the democratization of the countries in this region to acquire additional dividends through the carrying out of their foreign policy in the Eurasian space. In order to achieve its goals official Washington applied a rather effective toolkit including non-governmental organizations. Thus, American foreign policy strategy concerning the second stage of post-communist democratization in Eastern Europe turned out to be quite successful; the proof is some electoral revolutions in earlier authoritative and badly controllable political regimes.

Notes

- ¹ When speaking about the Eastern European region, we, first of all, mean Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Southern Caucasus states, i.e. the former USSR republics which hadn't integrated into the NATO and the EU by the beginning of 2008. We also take into account "revolution of tulips" in Kyrgyzstan (geographically it does not belong to Eastern Europe) which due to its parameters fits into the second "democratization wave".
- ² We shall mention that the goals of this article do not include the identification of the causes, process and possible outcomes of the "third" or "forth wave of democratization" in the universal context.
- ³ When Uzbekistan joined the GUAM, the name of the organization was changed into GUUAM, however, upon its leaving they returned to the original one – GUAM.
- ⁴ Among other initiates the resonant speech of the US Vice-President D. Chaney during the Vilnius summit in Lithuania at the beginning of May, 2006 deserves special mentioning.
- ⁵ In this case we shall limit ourselves to the analysis of the USA influence.

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- ⁷ See, for instance, Madatov, A. Demokratizatsija: osobennosti ejo sovremennoj volny. P. 45-46.
- ⁸ See, for instance, Madatov, A. P. 46.
- ⁹ See, for instance, Huntington, S. Tretja volna. Demokratizatsija v kontse XX veka. M.: Rossijskaja politicheskaja entsiklopedija (ROSSPEN), 2003. 368 p.
- ¹⁰ See, for instance, Rastou, D. Perehody k demokratii: popytka dinamicheskoy modeli // Polis, 1996. N5.
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- ¹² See, for instance, Linz, J., Stepan, A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. P. 72-76.
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- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ See, for instance, Fukuyama, F. Do we really know how to promote democracy? // Romanian Journal of Political Science. 2005. Vol.5. N1. P. 161-173.
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- ²¹ See, for instance, Shin, D. On the Third Wave of Democratization. A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research // World Politics. 1994. October. Vol. 47. N 1. P. 135-170.
- ²² See, for instance, McFaul, M. Puti transformatsii postkommunizma. Sravnitelnyj analiz demokraticeskogo proryva v Serbii, Gruzii i Ukraine // Pro et Contra. 2005. Sentyabr-oktyabr. P. 92-107; McFaul M. The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World // World Politics. 2002. January. Vol. 54. N 2. P. 212-244.
- ²³ See, for instance, Carothers, T. Oshibka teorii “poetapnoj demokratizatsii” // Pro et Contra. 2007. Janvar-fevral. P. 85-102; Carothers T. Trezvyj vzglyad na demokratiju // Pro et Contra. 2005. Ijul-avgust; Carothers T. Western Civil-Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union // East European Constitutional Review. 1999. N4. P. 54-62; Carothers T. The End of the Transition Paradigm // Journal of Democracy. 2002. N 13. P. 5-21.
- ²⁴ See, for instance, Way, L. Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine // World Politics. 2005. Vol. 57. N 2. P. 231-261.
- ²⁵ Way L., Levitsky S. Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide // East European Politics and Societies. 2007. Vol. 21. N 1. P. 55.
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- ³² See, for instance, Fukuyama F. Do we really know how to promote democracy? P. 161-173.
- ³³ See, for instance, Schipani-Aduriz A. P. 87.
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¹²³ U.S. Department of State and European Union Web sites (www.state.gov/documents/organization/17714.pdf, www.state.gov/_documents/organization/2378.pdf, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/figures.pdf, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/Ukraine/intro/index.html).
¹²⁴ Samujlov S.M. Etapy politiki SSHA v otnoshenii SNG. P. 65.
¹²⁵ State Department worries about the condition of Ukrainian economy but the USA will allocate additional \$60 mln. to Ukraine. // *Zerkalo nedeli*. 2005. 30 July. N29.
¹²⁶ Beissinger M. Promoting Democracy. P. 7.

THE GREAT DUCHY OF LITHUANIA AS IDEOLOGICAL REALITY

This text is the exercising of the method, namely, the method of political analysis of historical knowledge and its power dependence. First of all, we are interested in this dependence; therefore, we shall not ask any question about “historical truth” and thus aspire to expose “pseudoscientific strategies” the way it is usually done by historians and popular writers of history. This text represents an opinion about the problem of the studies of the Great Duchy of Lithuania based on absolutely different disciplinary frameworks, i.e., from the point of view of political science allowing us to feel free from the framework of historical science.

History as a political discipline. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to find a discipline so connected in its practice with place and time as history. Any science (except, probably, for political science or sociology) is not so political, it is even better to say politically loaded. Moreover, history carries out the role of political science “in a traditional manner”, while political science and sociology are, to a great extent, new sciences¹. Such features of history are connected with the value of the knowledge it creates, specifically, the knowledge-about-the-past. The knowledge of genealogy of the statehood, centuries-old cultural tradition, wars and incorporations forms national (ethnic, cultural, etc.) identity, assists in acquiring *the right* (for power, territory), hence, it is a necessary element of political landscape.

If one is to address the initial meaning of the Greek word “*Historia*” one shall see that besides a number of other connotations, it has got the meaning *investigation* that best of all reflects the sense and content of political practices of a historian. Realization of a political task (for example, formation of national consciousness) requires investigation of the past and a corresponding sentence concerning it. This sentence (like any other sentence), naturally, depends not so

much on law but on the sense of justice. But the historian does not pass any judgment concerning the past, he/she is the investigator who directly collects proofs, analyzes facts, orders examinations and makes preliminary conclusions, preparing the case for trial in court embodied in the institutions of politics and power².

Historical knowledge exists as *historical* only when it is legitimized by power. However, such knowledge does not possess any integrity and breaks up into several isolated levels in society. The historical knowledge circulating in the academic environment, and the knowledge used by mass consciousness, is quite different in their content, political functions and other qualities. In the production of knowledge a historian is strongly limited by the academic framework: the use of certain methodology, aspiration to the truth, attention to the argumentation of opponents, verification of one's own conclusions which usually cannot be categorical. An author of a popular book on history (it is entirely probable that the historian-scientist and the historian-popular writer are one and the same person) finds him/herself in a totally different situation: he/she is not restricted by "scientific" frameworks and should be guided by a consumer's or customer's requirements (who, most likely, has political reasons and intentions). Education sphere has diametrically opposite requirements towards historical knowledge: a school textbook is, to a great degree, a means of forming consciousness rather than an information source.

The lower the scientific nature and, accordingly, the higher the availability, the bigger political importance is attached to historical knowledge. Politics is the art of the possible, and the less knowledge is limited by the requirements of "scientific nature", the wider are its "windows of opportunity"³. In social space historical knowledge is structured into the political hierarchy consisting of three independent levels, each of which is formed by its own texts and institutions and fulfils various political functions. At the top of the hierarchy one finds ideological and ideologically-symbolical knowledge of history, intended for the consumption by wide layers of society. This knowledge is concentrated in social mythologies, ideologies, school textbooks, national (state) symbolic of various nature and forms an integrated part of political space.

The following level is formed by popular scientific knowledge aimed at the consumption of it by certain public circles: teachers, students, and those who earlier were called "intelligentsia". "The body" of this knowledge is formed by training courses, historical magazines, popular scientific literature, TV-programs, etc. The level of interest in the second layer matters to politicians depending on how much it influences the consciousness of "the elite" with the consideration of different meanings of this word.

At the very bottom of the political hierarchy of historical knowledge one finds academic science. It possesses research autonomy and the right for "the independence of the opinion", but it is compelled to pay for it by its social isolation. The main symbolical (political) capital of academic knowledge with its high level of legitimacy constructed on the basis of "validity" and "reality" interests political subjects most of all. If academic knowledge corresponds to the intentions of power, it has a chance to get into the top layers of political

hierarchy; however, if it is not so then it quickly finds itself in isolation, having no abilities to grow and expand spatially.

Our research is devoted mainly to the bottom level of political hierarchy, namely, the historical science. To put it more precisely, it is aimed at finding out how political strategies and intentions are reflected in historiography using the example of the study of the Great Duchy of Lithuania in various national traditions. The knowledge-about-the-Great-Duchy for more than a century has been an important element of historical consciousness in the countries of Eastern Europe and, accordingly, an essential factor of ideological opposition. Political importance of this knowledge is still actual now, especially in Belarus and Lithuania.

The Great Duchy of Lithuania as a Political and Scientific Problem

Formation of the Great Duchy of Lithuania as a scientific problem and the object of study is inseparably linked with the political events of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries and, first of all, with the Russian-Polish opposition and formation of Belarusian and Lithuanian (to a lesser degree Ukrainian) national-liberation movements. If one is to analyze the historiography of the Great Duchy of Lithuania of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries then one shall notice a number of radical transformations which were, using T.Kuhn's terminology, real scientific revolutions⁴: the formation of the Great Duchy of Lithuania as the object of independent study, the formation of the Russian paradigm and of the Lithuanian and Belarusian paradigms, and, at last, a radical transition from the Russian historiography to the Soviet one cast by the Polish historiography. There is only one explanation for such radical transformations of knowledge about the Great Duchy throughout the last 200 years: the most obvious examples of revolutions in historiography (and, probably, in humanities in general) are those episodes which have been entitled "political revolutions". No events in the study of the past, such as the opening of records, analysis of archives, archeological finds, etc. changed the knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania to a such degree as the revolts in 1830-1831, 1863-1864, the revolution in 1905-1907, the First World War together with the Civil War in 1914-1920, and, at last, the disintegration of the USSR. Historians could for decades take no notice of or ignore historical facts, and only political events "suddenly" made them aware of the past. All this gives us a chance to speak about the dependence of the dynamics of the historical knowledge about the Great Duchy on the dynamics of the political sphere and, as a result, the presence of politics in historical concepts, theories and paradigms. What are some of the principles used as a basis for the political organization of the historiography of the Great Duchy of Lithuania? Analysis of national historiographies shows that there are three such principles: genealogy, presence and power (more exactly, the character of power). The formulation of these principles defines *the belonging*⁵ of the Great Duchy, and, consequently, the *right* to its heritage.

Genealogy. Politically it is very difficult to define the belonging of heritage without its legitimating in the past; it is for this reason the theme of genealogy of the Great Duchy of Lithuania was and still remains an important element of political-scientific opposition. The problem of genealogy which we here understand as a set of data about the origin was very seriously perceived and is still seriously perceived by historians. The solving of the problem whether Lithuania conquered Belarus in the XIII century or vice versa, has political importance which successfully illustrates the role of Belarus-centered concept of the Great Duchy of Lithuania in the destruction of the Soviet identity in the late 1980s.

Presence. It is natural, that national claims for state and cultural tradition cannot do without the appeal to “national presence” within the framework of this tradition and in this state. The role of appeal to the presence was increasing depending on the role in the political life of “masses” and ideas about the national will, democracy, etc., the legitimacy of which was based on the presence, in a counterbalance to feudal legitimating “by birth”. It was extremely important for the Russian historiography to establish the Russian presence through its identification with the Rusyn tradition and underlining the fact that the spiritual connection between Moscow and Western Rus’ was never interrupted. Polish historians spoke about mass resettlements of ethnic Poles into the Great Duchy throughout the whole middle Ages and indissolubility of cultural and political tradition of the Great Duchy of Lithuania with cultural and political tradition of Poland; special attention was paid to the minimization of the number of Rusyns among the Duchy population. Various historiographic traditions invented “national” or ethnic markers such as Catholic-Lithuanian, Catholic-Pole, Orthodox-Russian, etc. to define the presence.

Essence of power. From the political point of view the Great Duchy of Lithuania has the greatest importance as the tradition of statehood. For national movements at the beginning of the XX century to define their state tradition meant to become a “historical nation thus allowing to legitimize the movement for independence”. State tradition is the tradition of power, experience of national generality in domination over a certain territory, population, etc. According to it it was essential for the Lithuanian historiography to show an ethnically Lithuanian character of power in the Great Duchy: the Lithuanian origin of the dynasty, the majority of gentry, the priority of interests of ethnic Lithuanians in political cases, etc., that gradually led to their description of the Great Duchy of Lithuania as Lithuanian “national” state. Naturally, Belarusian researchers occupied absolutely different positions and appealed to the Belarusian character, power and domination in the Great Duchy.

In our opinion, these three principles are the basis of the political organization of the Great Duchy of Lithuania historiography. However, before moving on to the analysis of national historiographies, we shall once again return to the formation of the Great Duchy of Lithuania as the object of study in historical science.

The territory of the former Great Duchy of Lithuania throughout the whole XIX century acted as space, the knowledge about which created an instrument of the Russian-Polish political opposition. “Regional features” of this territory formed a scientific problem

(as a Polish suburb and a Russian province simultaneously), but not an independent object of study. For historians, Belarus and Lithuania were only the space between hostile mother countries. The knowledge which they produced could completely ignore local features⁶.

The school of history which developed at Vilna University in the first third of the XIX century is a certain exception from the mainstream as it made history of Belarus and Lithuania a separate object of study; that is why sometimes it is called the first episode of Belarusian and Lithuanian "revival". The researcher of history of law I. Danilovich, supporting the restoration of independence of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, emphasized the self-importance of the GDL statutes language and supported its revival; slavist M. Bobrovsky "opened" the integrity of old Belarusian literature and introduced the figure of F. Skorina into the scientific sphere; historian I. Lobjko identified the need to conduct a complex study of Belarus and Lithuania representing an integrated whole.

The destiny of "Litvin" schools (as a scientific phenomenon) once again confirms a close connection existing between power and historical knowledge. Because "Litvin" school did not receive any political legitimization, its concepts were superseded to the deep periphery and were again opened only due to the deployment of Belarusian and Lithuanian national movements. Concepts of "Litvin" historiographies were treated as some kind of anomaly which Polish and Russian researchers preferred not to notice until they were forced to do so by the political events of the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries. By this time the main principle of the research strategy of Polish and Russian historians had been the defining of *the belonging* of the territory (cultural and state heritage) of the GDL to the Russian or Polish political (cultural) field. For Russia it meant underlining Slavic, Rusyn (Russian) and orthodox character of the Great Duchy. For Poles, on the contrary, it meant Polish, Catholic and non-Rusyn nature of the GDL.

Geneza Państwa Litewskiego: Polish Tradition of the XIX – the Beginning of the XX Centuries

For a long time one of the most characteristic privileges of the Polish historiographic tradition was the monopoly of knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania. This monopoly was "traditional", consolidated by the ideology of the Polish multiethnic (political) nation and mature political practices, covering more than one century. The Polish tradition maintained its dominant position till the middle of the XIX century, or, to be more exact, till the revolt in 1863-1864 when a strong competitor, legitimized by the Russian imperial authorities, appeared.

The Russian-Polish opposition conditioned the political basis for research strategies of Polish historians, namely, the maximum decrease of the role of the Rusyn element in the Duchy history. Curtailment of Rusynness meant the decrease of the role of Moscow and rejection of its claims for the historical heritage of the Great Duchy of Lithuania that simultaneously created the knowledge of history that fit the Lithuanian national movement quite nicely.

Genealogy. The Polish historiography standard concerning the genealogy of the Great Duchy of Lithuania was the concept of the Lithuanian conquering of Rus' (the tradition began with J. Dlugosh's texts). Unlike later variants of history of the Great Duchy, the fact of making Russian princedoms a part of the Lithuanian state was given principle and crucial importance in the GDL formation. It is this joining that actually represents the act of a new state creation (Lithuanian and Soviet historiographies connected the genealogy of the GDL with the creation of a uniform Lithuanian state which carried out its further expansion to the south). Some researchers (in particular, J. Letkovsky) were inclined to expand time frameworks of the Lithuanian expansion and believed that the Lithuanian conquering of Rusyn lands took place in the XII century, though it did not change the essence of the matter. Their concepts assigned Rusyn lands a passive role. The lands were the object of external expansion only though it was partially recognized that Rus' influenced the formation of state institutions of the new state. The conclusions of the Polish genealogy of the Great Duchy were unequivocal: this state was not created by Rusyns.

Presence. The general strategy of Polish historiography aimed at the minimization of the role of Rusyn element in the history of the Great Duchy of Lithuania and compelled to describe a demographic and cultural situation in it in a certain way. At the beginning of the XX century Ya. Yakubovsky (this case is rather indicative), while studying the Lithuanian ethnic element in the state, came to the conclusion that in the middle of the XVI century it made up about half of the population⁷. Another well-known Polish historian G. Lovmjansky proved that ethnic Lithuanians made up no more than 20 % of the general population, but about 60 % of the knights (that is "the elite")⁸. Anyhow, in the Polish version of the Great Duchy of Lithuania history the ethnic Lithuanian element appeared to be a considerable demographic force. Moreover, Polish historians were inclined to ignore the assimilation of Balts by Rusyns though they paid a lot of attention to the processes of Polonization (self-Polonization) of the latter. A special emphasis was placed on the Polish presence in the region and the origin of local Poles. At the beginning of the XX century a significant amount of Polish researchers wrote about mass Pole resettlements onto the Rusyn lands in the middle Ages. Ethnic Poles appeared in the Great Duchy of Lithuania as prisoners of war (XII–XIV centuries), and after the Lublin Union there started a voluntary migration to the undeveloped lands of the princedom⁹. A considerable place in historiography was occupied by the issue of the Polish cultural presence and the process of colonisation connected with it. The Polish historiography introduced a thesis of voluntary self-Polonization in opposition to the thesis of Lithuanian and Belarusian historiographies believing in compulsory Polonization of the GDL elite. Polish researchers concluded that there was appreciable Polish presence in the Duchy emphasizing the big role of the Polish element in the political and cultural life that was supposed to confirm their rights to this territory.

It is necessary to emphasize that the thesis about mass Pole resettlements in the Middle Ages onto Belarusian and Lithuanian lands was gradually rejected by Polish histori-

ography (though it can still be met till now in the texts of Belarusian Poles); however, the thesis about voluntary Polonization of the Great Duchy gentry preserves its importance.

Power. The essence of power in the Great Duchy, from the point of view of Polish historians, is reflected in its name, specifically, the Lithuanian state. The Lithuanian ethnic domination was connected with demographic domination, genealogy and, at last, with the civilized youth of Lithuanians in comparison with Slavs (G. Lovmjansky). Such a description of the power essence, however, is characteristic only of the first and the oldest period of the Duchy existence¹⁰. The Union testified the creation of a political and military union that inevitably changed the character of the state power. The question about the Union, namely, whether it was a federal formation or a practically uniform state remained debatable; however, it was indisputable that from that moment the power in the Great Duchy began to belong to the Polish political (gentry) nation based on the devotion to republican freedoms and general mission¹¹. Accordingly, the power which originally was only politically Polish, gradually became Polish in the “national” sense as well. Moreover, a considerable number of Polish researchers did not distinguish the phenomenon of the Polish political nation of the Middle Ages from the Polish nation of their times constructed on the basis of lingvo-cultural principles. What was ethnically Lithuanian statehood soon became “nationally” Polish and remained such till the end of the XVIII century (naturally, no one could even speak about the Great Duchy of Lithuania as a form of Rusyn statehood).

The content of the Polish historical knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania had two bases: the historiographic tradition which continued uninterruptedly from the middle Ages, and the principle of the Rusyn element replacement. To a great extent it predetermined its destiny: the tradition assured scientific legitimacy while the curtailment of the Rusyn element guaranteed viability in various political contexts.

The Polish historical knowledge about the GDL was quickly adapted by the Lithuanian national movement and became an important part of the Lithuanian national historiography. Soon the strategy of the Polish tradition directed at the curtailment of the Rusyn element was intercepted by the Soviet historiography when there appeared political necessity to diminish the Belarusian statehood tradition in which the central place was occupied by the Great Duchy.

Finally, the Polish tradition among all historiographies of the region is most of all inclined to ignore the Belarusian element of the Great Duchy. If for Lithuanian researchers the defining of cultural and political borders together with Belarusians is an eternal problem, and for the Soviet historiography the issue of “oppressions of Belarusians and Ukrainians” was almost the main one, then for Poles it was sufficient to define the GDL as the Lithuanian (Lithuanian-Polish) state thus allowing in most cases to perceive Belarusians only as the background.

***Lithuanian-Russian State: the Russian Tradition
(the Second Half of the XIX – the Beginning of the XX Century)***

Manifested disloyalty of Poles and gentry of the GDL to the Russian empire, shown in the war in 1812 and revolts in 1830 – 1831 and in 1863 – 1864 considerably accelerated the process of creation of the alternative *Russian* knowledge about the past of the Great Duchy of Lithuania. The strategy of Russian researchers was completely opposite and based not on the Polish historiographic tradition but on Rusyn historical documents. The main goal was to maximize the role of the Rusyn (Russian) beginning in the GDL and the role of Rusyns in the country's political and cultural life. New historical knowledge was supposed to legitimize the Polish claims for the heritage of the Great Duchy. This transformation that began at the turn from the XVIII to the XIX century and was formed completely in the second half of the XIX century opened the way for changes in the vision of history of Belarus and Lithuania which acquired an absolutely different “national” character and a different state tradition at that moment.

The Great Duchy of Lithuania ceases to be Polish (Lithuanian-Polish) and becomes “the Lithuanian-Russian state”. The name “Lithuanian-Russian state” defines not so much the national character of the Duchy (like “the Belarusian-Lithuanian state” in modern domestic historiography) but mainly its official name equivalent to “the Great Duchy of Lithuania”. Legitimation of this change was found in the full official name of the state: “the Great Duchy of Lithuania, Rus and Samogitia”. There also developed another tendency that was later completely adopted by the Belarusian historiography; this was the tendency to use the name “the Great Duchy of Lithuania” instead of the term “the Lithuanian state” dominating the Polish scientific field¹².

According to its scientific and political goals the Russian historiography developed a new interpretation of principles used to define *the belonging* of the Great Duchy.

Genealogy. Already one of the first Russian historians of the GDL V. Antonovich emphasized close interaction between the Rusyn and Lithuanian element upon the emergence of the Great Duchy. He saw the connection with Rus’ as the source of political and military power which allowed Mindaugas to conquer the whole Lithuania and to become an absolute ruler.¹³ Another outstanding researcher N. Dashkevich called into question the stereotypic thesis about the conquest of Novogrudok by Lithuania and believed that the place of ancient Lithuania was in the upper course of the Neman River. The most significant Russian historian of the GDL at the beginning of the XX century M. Ljubavsky¹⁴ defined the Great Duchy of Lithuania as a territorial instead of ethnic formation that allowed him to draw a conclusion about the Lithuanian-Russian (Rusyn) origin of the state¹⁵. Thus, the genealogy of the Great Duchy was acquiring a totally different content in which the Slavic element occupied an equal (if not prepotent) position with Balts.

Presence. For Russian researchers Rusyn (it practically always meant Russian, Ros-siyan) domination in the Great Duchy was not to be doubted. Conclusions of Polish historians about the demographic importance of the ethnic Lithuanian element were not per-

ceived seriously; the Russian character of the population of the state seemed obvious and did not require a developed argument. The Russian historiography occupied an even more confident position regarding the issue of the definition of the state's cultural character. The Great Duchy of Lithuania had a developed Eastern Slavic culture which, in the absence of Balt alternatives, not only simply dominated but for a long time was the only influential one in the state. Rusyn literature, law, records, public thought, education developed in this space were dominated by the old Belarusian language (in the terminology of Russian historians it was "Western Russian"), the language of power and culture. Rusin tradition defined the cultural image and character of the Great Duchy superseding all other cultures to the periphery. The process of the Belarusian culture decline started only in the XVI – XVII centuries gradually conceding its life space to Polish culture.

Power. The new understanding of genealogy, together with the cultural and demographic domination of Rusyns allowed to overcome the Polish conception of power the Great Duchy and to give it an essentially different meaning especially because there was an abundance of examples of Rusyn participation in the political and military life. The power in the Great Duchy (in the first centuries of its existence) was interpreted as Lithuanian-Russian, based on the permanent struggle between Lithuanian and Russian elements for leadership (V. Antonovich)¹⁶. M. Ljubavsky asserted that the fact of Lithuanian "conquest" cannot necessarily mean an exclusively Lithuanian character of statehood which, undoubtedly, had some Lithuanian-Russian content. Russian researchers paid a lot of attention to the participation of Rusyns in the political life of the country, their role in the formation of the state policy and defined them as one of the communities having certain power. The decline of the GDL statehood was usually connected with Catholic expansion, the religious Union of 1596 and compulsory Polonization of the elite.

Thus, the Great Duchy is the Lithuanian-Russian (gradually more and more Russian) state which as a result of the external expansion became mainly Polish allowing the Russian imperial power make political conclusions acceptable by them.

The destiny of the Russian historiography, as well as its political importance, was rather unexpected. Throughout practically the whole XIX century the appeal to Rusyn and non-Polish tradition of the Great Duchy completely corresponded to the imperial strategy of the triune Russian people. However, already at the beginning of the XX century this strategy was failing as the Belarusian national-liberation movement began to form as a political subject treating the experience of the Great Duchy as its own (independent from Russia) statehood. In the Belarusian discourse the Russian historical knowledge of the Great Duchy became Belarusinized very quickly, the name of the state was changed from Lithuanian-Russian to Lithuanian-Belarusian though that did not contradict historical facts and coincided with the political intentions of Belarusian leaders.

It is interesting, that the authors of the Russian-Lithuanian statehood concept became the teachers of the national Belarusian and Ukrainian historiography founders or even took part in the national-liberation movement. For instance, M. Grushevsky and M. Dovnar-Zapolsky were the pupils of V. Antonovich, V. Picheta became the pupil of M.

Ljubavsky, while M. Dashkevich himself became one of the founders of Ukrainian historiography. At the same time, a part of Russian society more willingly accepted the concept of the centuries-old Lithuanian and Polish domination in Belarus and Ukraine.

Actualization of Rusyn (Belarusian) nature of the Great Duchy of Lithuania in new political conditions started to play against the idea of “Eastern Slavic unity”, therefore, when at the end of the 1920s the USSR began to return to the idea of Rus-centrism, nobody thought about the revival of the Old Russian historiography. New political reality demanded new historical knowledge, and no matter how paradoxical it seems it was found that the former opponent with its strategy of curtailment and “oppression” practice of the Rusyn element in the Great Duchy of Lithuania had exactly it.

Soviet Historiography: “Revolutionary” Turn at the End of the 20s of the XX Century

Immediately after the revolution of 1917 the emancipation by historiographies of the non-Russian people of the Russian empire began to be supported by the policy of “rooting in” in the USSR in the 1920s. But already at the end of the 1920s the situation changed, as the Soviet civilization became Rus-centered thus radically transforming the political-scientific strategy. Throughout 1934-1954 the Antimarxist (despite all declarations) scheme of interpretation of the past of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR¹⁷ was developed; some of its major principles included the following: 1) guardianship of Russia over political and cultural development of the non-Russian peoples; 2) history of the non-Russian peoples as history of oppressed masses; 3) evaluation of political leaders and historical events depending on their use for Russia. For Belarus it meant the revival of the idea of Eastern Slavic unity and renunciation of the non-Soviet statehood tradition. The term “Lithuanian-Belarusian state” used to define the Great Duchy of Lithuania completely disappears in the late twenties.

The main difference in the political strategies of the Russian and Soviet historiography was that the former defined the belonging of the lands of the Great Duchy of Lithuania through their non-Polishness which was enough to prove their “Russianness”. But if pre-revolutionary imperial historians had practically no need to reduce Belarusian subjectness because of its weakness and political plainness then for the Soviet power it became a vital necessity. The Soviet historiography faced the problem of not revealing Russianness but reducing Belarusian national subjectness, therefore, the experience of the Great principedom should be viewed as the history of “oppression of the Belarusian people”. It seems paradoxical, but in new political circumstances the actualization of Polishness and non-Slavness of the Great Duchy guaranteed Eastern Slavic unity and viability of the Soviet Rus-centeredness, created on the non-stateness of the non-Russian people. The vocabulary was changed accordingly: the Great Duchy again started to be called the Lithuanian state, while Rzechpospolita was again called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; this was supposed to reflect the “national” essence.

The canon of the Soviet genealogy of the Great Duchy of Lithuania was finally formed in V. Pashuto's works; first of all, in his monograph "Formation of the Lithuanian state", published in 1959. The concept used in this book, for several decades defined the development direction for the historiography of the GDL in the USSR and its satellites.¹⁸ The idea of the creation of the incorporated Lithuanian state even before the capture of Russian lands became the main characteristic of the Soviet canon. (Thus, a purely Lithuanian version of the GDL creation started to dominate). The political system of Lithuania went through the process of evolution from the confederation of lands to their union and at last was turned into an early feudal monarchy¹⁹.

Soviet historical science did not deny the demographic domination of Belarusians in the Great Duchy, but reduced their status to the repressed community afflicted with an insatiable desire to reunite with Muscovian Rus'. Belarusian presence in the GDL was defined by silent existence, and the social history of Belarusians was reduced to the peasantry history. The cultural tradition of the Belarusian Middle Ages was recognized, but it was never presented as something whole, completed and was described only in the form of separate fragments not connected to each other.

The Soviet research strategy consistently divided ethnic and cultural communities of the Great Duchy into "imperious" and "subordinated" tightly closed classes. The imperious ones formed political space, the oppressed formed a community alienated from the state which had to develop in a hostile environment, under "the power and oppression" of Lithuanian feudal lords.

One more peculiarity of the political organization of the Soviet historical science was the existence of the actual ban on Belarusian knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania as a state. Belarusian historians were engaged in the study of peasants only, and the research of political institutions, social structure etc. was forbidden. The Great Duchy of Lithuania simply could not be the object of Belarusian history in the context of the domination in the BSSR of the peasant concept of nation (ethno-) genesis and declaration of the full absence of Belarusian ancestors among "dominating" classes.

The destiny of the Soviet historical knowledge about the Great Duchy was inseparably linked with the evolution of the Soviet power due to which this knowledge was also created. Already the late 20s of the XX century saw bloody Sovietization of the Belarusian historiography that ended in the acceptance of the historical paradigm corresponding to a new political situation. The Soviet state system blocked the development of various concepts of the past; therefore, for a long time such concepts developed only among historians-emigrants who refused to accept the Soviet version of the Great Duchy of Lithuania history. The USSR disintegration substantially shook the Soviet historiographic tradition and gave a push to the restoration of national historiographies in the majority of the Post-Soviet countries. Nevertheless, the rest of the Soviet historiography managed to retain its influence; in particular it continued to affect Belarusian official historical science.

Genealogy of Belarus-centeredness

Since the First World War, Belarus, as well as the whole Eastern European region, has been experiencing deep political changes. The traditional knowledge-about-the-past constructed on the basis of the Polish state tradition or Rus-centeredness, begins to disintegrate under the influence of a new political situation. A new knowledge is being formed, having the mission to produce, multiply and induce to the growing of national-liberation movements. Ideas of the revival of the multinational Great Duchy of Lithuania or federal Rzechpospolita are quickly being transformed into the political practice of constructing mononational states. The formation of the national identity of Belarusians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians is based on ethnolinguistic principles. It is the development of this monoidentity that becomes the main political function of historical science.

Political revolution meant revolution in historical science: the formation of the Belarusian knowledge about the Great Duchy independent of neighboring national traditions began. The national-liberation movement which was consistently subjected to repression by the authorities of Poland and the USSR became the political “body” of the new-old knowledge.

Not having received any political legitimization, the perception of the Great Princedom as a Belarusian state had to face a number of political problems. To some extent it managed to exist even in the BSSR up to the end of the 1920s and in Poland till 1939, but later it continued to be developed only in emigration²⁰. The renewal of the Belarusian knowledge about the Great Duchy of Lithuania became again possible only after the disintegration of the Soviet political system.

The Belarusian version of history of the Great Duchy at the beginning of the XX century was based on the Russian tradition with its practice of deconstruction of Polishness and actualization of Rusynness (in new terminology – Belarusness) of this state. It is possible to speak about the formation at the beginning of the XX century of the transitive, Russian-Belarusian version of the Great Duchy development which most indicative example is “Short history of Belarus” by V. Lastovsky published in Vilna in 1910²¹. V. Lastovsky still closely connected in his narrative with the Russian historiographic tradition and terminology, talks about Lithuanian dukes (instead of about Lithuanian-Belarusian dukes or dukes of the GDL), the Lithuanian state, the Lithuanian army though his understanding of the word “Lithuania” is of the territorially-historical value rather than the ethnic one. V. Lastovsky calls the Great Duchy within the framework of the Russian tradition *the Lithuanian-Russian state*²² and only occasionally he uses definitions such as “Lithuanian-Belarusian boyars, ambassadors”, etc.

After the collapse of the Russian empire the Belarusian historiography starts to free itself from the Russian tradition. “Osnovy gosudarstvennosti” (“Bases of statehood of Belarus”) by M. Dovnar-Zapolsky and “Kratky ocherk istorii Belarusi” (“Short Sketch of History of Belarus”) by V. Ignatovsky (both books were published for the first time in 1919) contain an absolutely different terminology, while the political-symbolical organization is

in an expressive contrast with “Istorija” (“History”) by V. Lastovsky²³. The Great Duchy of Lithuania is called “the Lithuanian-Belarusian state”, “Lithuania and Belarus”; texts talk about the Lithuanian-Belarusian army, Lithuanian-Belarusian magnates and dukes, etc. Such terminology was still in use until the end of the 1920s.

Gradual “Belarusinization” of the Great Duchy genealogy is also taking place. Already V. Lastovsky spoke about the mixed ethnic Belarus-Lithuanian origin of ancient Lithuania inhabitants²⁴ and that it was specifically Polotsk dukes-exiles who gave rise to the Lithuanian state which, on the basis of its inhabitants nationality was to be called Lithuanian-Krivichansky or Lithuanian-Russian²⁵. In his turn, M. Dovnar-Zapolsky denied the thesis that Belarusian lands were conquered by Lithuanian dukes²⁶ and claimed that from the very beginning the Great Duchy of Lithuania was the Lithuanian-Belarusian state.

Belarusian historians of that time did not doubt that Belarusians not only participated in the creation of the GDL, but also occupied dominant positions in the new state, that they made up the majority of the population, that they were present in the machinery of the state and that from the very beginning they determined political practices of the Great Duchy (certainly, not only as oppressed peasants). Special attention was given to the actualization of the old Belarusian cultural tradition of the Great Duchy: in particular, M. Dovnar-Zapolsky claimed that the old Belarusian language was not only the official language, but also the colloquial language for ethnic Balts²⁷. In such conditions even certain “lowering” in the positions of V. Ignatovsky (the latter adhered to the concept of the capture of Rus’ by Lithuania) did not deny the Belarusian (Lithuanian-Belarusian) essence of the Great Duchy.

The next logical step was the formation of completely Belarus-centered paradigms of the creation and development of the Great Duchy which, on the one hand, was vitally essential for the Belarusian national-liberation movement; on the other hand, it simply meant consecutive “Belarusization” of well-known historical traditions. The Belarus-centered version of the Great Duchy history was created in the 1930-1940s by historian N. Shkjaljonok and by linguist J. Stankevich (in the popularized form) when the Belarusian national movement was having difficult times. Collections of their historical essays have been recently published as separate books²⁸.

In a new historical paradigm the Great Duchy of Lithuania genealogy had Belarusian essence from the very beginning. M. Shkjaljonok²⁹ defined duke Mindaugas as the sovereign of Krivich duchy which later began its expansion to the east, the north and the south with Krivich lands joining the new state voluntary and Samogitian ones by force. N. Shkjaljonok named the dynasty of grand dukes Balt-Polotsk according to the origin; their Balt element had a local substrate origin which had nothing to do with Samogitians (ancestors of Lithuanians). Ya. Stankevich was even more radical³⁰ as he saw the reason for the creation of the Great Duchy in the aspiration to unite all Belarusian lands. From the point of view of the ethnic origin he considered the GDL “the Krivich (Belarusian)-Lithuanian state”, showing who created this state and that it had a national character, and thus the GDL was only the Krivich state (Belarusian)³¹. Ya. Stankevich also considered Mindaugas to be a

Belarusian duke and believed Novgorod lands to be the place from which the expansion of the new state began. Ya. Stankevich used an additional argument in favor of the Belarusian genealogy, namely, the placing of the Great Duchy capital in the “Krivich” city of Vilna, the Slavic origin of the arms “Pursuit”, and the use of the Belarusian state and political terminology.

According to this version the essence of the GDL power was also Belarusian for the interests of Belarusian lands were the basis of the grand Lithuanian (Belarusian) dukes’ policy. That was the reason for N. Shkjaljonok to consider not Svitrigajla and Cossacks to be national heroes, but those who fought against them, defending the integrity of the state, specifically, Sigismund I and Yan Radzivil III. He especially emphasized the fact that after Jogaila not Polish but grand Lithuanian (Belarusian)³² dukes were the owners of Belarusian lands. When defining Belarusian power in the GDL Ya. Stankevich appealed to the domination of Belarusian law and perception of this state by Belarusians as their own. In the 1960s he decided that the “Belarusian” (Great Lithuanian) character of the GDL had to become the basis for national identity and came with an idea to rename Belarus into “Great Lithuania”.

Lithuanian Historiography

For society which members’ identity is based on ethno-linguistic principles – namely, the Lithuanian Republic proclaimed in 1917 was such a society – the ethnic basis of its own political tradition has a great value. Despite a certain interest of the Lithuanian national movement in the idea of the multinational Great Duchy of Lithuania, the basis of the new Lithuanian statehood was the ethno-linguistic community. According to this idea there was new historiography, called upon to clear the political tradition of the GDL from Slavic (first of all, Rusyn) elements.

Common understanding of the Lithuanian domination in the GDL in the Polish historiography eased the situation for the Lithuanian historiography. The formula laconically formulated by G. Lovmjansky in 1935 was accepted as the universal historical knowledge. He believed that, “[In the Great Duchy] the ethnic Lithuanian community was dominating and it was to be identified with the state; politics was in its hands, and its interests were defining for the policy formation”. This concept, best of all, suited the national Lithuanian state. The power was *ethnically Lithuanian*, the policy was carried out in the interests of ethnic Lithuanians, and the Rusyn element was only a resource for the Lithuanian ethnic domination. Naturally, Rusyn lands were occupied by Lithuanians, and the dynasty of Lithuanian dukes were of Balt origin. Due to the fact that during the joining of Lithuania to the USSR in 1940 the Soviet historiography recognized an exclusively Lithuanian character of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, this version of knowledge of the past existed practically without changes until the restoration of Lithuania independence in the early 1990s.

This concept's important feature is the evaluation by Lithuanian historians of the ethnic Lithuanian element in the GDL making up not less than 1/3 of the total population. Nobody doubted the fact that the Lithuanian ethnic element was the major base for the GDL formation (the Soviet version of the GDL genesis was especially convenient); attempts of some researchers to place Lithuania into the upper course of the Neman did not change anything as this territory was recognized as ethnographically Lithuanian.

Perception of history after 1596 was somewhat different. Here the Polish historical knowledge began to differ from the political requirements of creators of new Lithuanian identity. First of all, Lithuanian historians did not accept the unitary interpretation of Rzeczpospolita when the federal character of this state either was ignored, or the loss by the GDL of its statehood after 1569 was postulated and the Polish-Lithuanian state was represented as a whole country³³. Lithuanian historians underlined an independent character of the GDL development after the Union of 1569 and consistently appealed to the tradition of "Lithuanian separatism" which blossomed magnificently even in the middle of the XVIII century the tradition of which helped to prolong the history of the Lithuanian statehood for some centuries.

The Lithuanian historiography negatively treated the concept of the Polish political nation and considered it to be just a means to polonize the GDL elite; while Poles themselves throughout the whole XX century were treated as an alien and hostile force³⁴. Accordingly, Polonization, from their point of view, had a compulsory and aggressive character. When interpreting the cultural heritage of the Great Duchy of Lithuania historians are inclined to name everything that is Litvin Lithuanian. The Great Duchy itself was defined as a multicultural and multinational, but not as a multipolitical state, and all ethnoses in it, except for the Lithuanian one, were considered to be national "minority"³⁵. According to it the Lithuanian state represented itself as the trustee and patron of the Rusyn cultural tradition which could develop only due to this policy of preference. As for the old Belarusian language, it was accepted to call it "gudų kanceliarinė kalba" (the Rusyn formal language), "senoji slavų kalba" (the old Slavonic language) or "kanceliarinė slavų kalba" (the formal Slavonic language)³⁶. The two latter variants were more wide spread but they reduced it to a faceless lingua franca such as Latin.

One more feature of the Lithuanian historiography is its "state centeredness" revealed in the integration of ethnos (nation) history and statehood history³⁷. It has to do with the steady identification of concepts of Lithuania and the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Such connection between history and the institute of state developed at the beginning of the XX century and, probably, genetically goes back to the Polish historiography of the GDL.

Today history of Lithuania can be described in the following way: Ancient Lithuania – the Great Duchy of Lithuania (XIII–XVIII centuries) – ethnographic Lithuania (it includes the northwestern part of Belarus together with Grodno) as a part of Russia – independent Lithuania 1917-1940 – the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic – modern Lithuanian Republic. All listed state and territorial formations are as Lithuanian as the modern Lithuanian Republic.

Great Duchy of Lithuania and Political Reality

The Great Duchy of Lithuania disappeared from the European political map at the end of the XVIII century, but its political history did not end, and in the late eighties of the XX century it experienced a real revival of the political capital. "Revival" of the memory about the Great Duchy became an important means to destroy the Belarusian Soviet identity and played a significant role in the argumentation of the national movement at the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s. Practically, all political symbolics of the Belarusian national movement, from the arms "Pursuit" to the battle near Orsha was somehow implanted in the historical experience of the Great Duchy.

History as a means of receiving knowledge-about-the-past expressively reflects "the spirit of the epoch" but through its appeal to the truth it masks its own political nature.

The Great Duchy of Lithuania as a historical image was always an element of political consciousness and evolved together with it. In the days of the Polish-Russian opposition it was an arena for the infinite struggle of Catholics and Orthodox. Now, when tolerance has become a political standard, political history of the GDL is used to search for and find the standard of religious tolerance. In the first half of the XX century when national movements were formed and it was necessary for them to strengthen their statehood, the formation of the Great Duchy was perceived as a number of conquests and violent expansion. When political relations between the countries stabilized and confrontation was replaced with conversations about the European integration and good neighborhood, concepts of synthesis, symbiosis, consent and mutual benefit as the basis of existence of the Great Duchy of Lithuania started to develop.

Together with the political fashion for multiculturalism there appear concepts of the Great Duchy as an ideal multicultural state of the middle Ages³⁸. Special attention is paid to the democratic tradition of the state which at the beginning of the XX century was perceived more likely as "gentry anarchy". The image of the Great Duchy was always different and always reflected "the spirit of the age" that interpreted it.

We know the Great Lithuanian, Russian and Samogitian Duchy as the Lithuanian, Lithuanian-Russian, Lithuanian-Belarusian, Belarusian-Lithuanian, and, finally, Belarusian state. Each of the mentioned images of the Great Duchy sends us to its own political context and scientific canon. We tried to understand this difference, but not to decide how legitimate it is. In this paper we perceived history as political knowledge and, more exactly, as politically important. If there are no political practices then there are no cognitive ones. Unfortunately, throughout its whole development historical science to a greater extent depended on the geopolitical landscape of the present rather than on the facts of the past, studied by it.

Notes

- ¹ Political science in general for a long time developed within the borders of historical science or was closely connected with it. It is sufficient to mention scientific practices in the USSR where political research disciplinary managed to mimicry as historical, or one can recollect N. Machiavelli's political-scientific activity whose contribution to the development of political theory was substantially based on historical material.
- ² When we use the word "power" in this context we actually mean any political power and not necessarily state power.
- ³ "Windows of possibilities" (English).
- ⁴ Let us remind that, according to T. Kunn, scientific revolutions should be considered as revolution only in relation to the sphere the paradigm of which they refer to.
- ⁵ Defining the belonging actually means defining the "national" character of the phenomena of the past. Even though this procedure may seem incorrect from the point of view of "science", it is of great importance for politics.
- ⁶ For more details see: Kazakievich, A. *Pra Kaljonij/Fragmenty*. N 11 (<http://frahmenty.knihi.com/11kazakievich.htm>).
- ⁷ Jakubowski J. *Studia nad stosunkami narodowoscowymi na Litwie przed Unia Lubelska*. Warszawa. 1912. P. 6.
- ⁸ Lowmianski H. *Uwagi w sprawie podloza spolecznego i gospodarczego unii Jagiellonskiej// Ksiega pamiarowa kuuczzeniu litniej rocznicy wydania I Statutu litewskiego*. Wilno. 1935. P. 247.
- ⁹ Smalyanchuk, A. *Palyaki Belarusi I Litvy XIX – pachatku XX st. jak etnakulturny I satsyjalny fenomen//Belaruski gistorychny aglyad*. T.7. 2000. Cherven. P. 154-155.
- ¹⁰ The question about which of the Unions (Krevsky, Gorodelsky or Lublin) began "the power shift" was debatable.
- ¹¹ Valitsky, A. *Intelektualnyja elity I zjmenlivy ljos "vymysljenae natsyi" u Polshchy // Fragmenty*. N 7. P. 159.
- ¹² The use of the official name "the Great Duchy of Lithuania" instead of the adjective "Lithuanian" in the Belarusian historiography is observed later as well. In particular, in the 60s Belarusian researchers used the name "Statutes of the Great Duchy of Lithuania" instead of "Lithuanian Statutes".
- ¹³ Antonovich, V. *Ocherki istorii Velikogo knyazhestva Litovskogo do poloviny XV stoletija*. Kyiv. 1878. P. 16-18.
- ¹⁴ M. Ljubavsky's conclusions concerning the history of the Great Duchy of Lithuania maintained their dominating importance till the end of the 20s of the XX century when the Soviet historical tradition was in the process of formation.
- ¹⁵ Ljubavsky, M. *Oblastnoe delenije i mestnoe upravlenije Litovsko-Ruskogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdanija pervogo Litovskogo statute*. Moscow, 1893. P. 2-4.
- ¹⁶ In general, the emphasis of the Lithuanian-Rusyn and Polish-Rusyn political opposition can be considered a prominent feature of the Russian historical tradition, which, undoubtedly, had a political basis.
- ¹⁷ Velichenko, S. *Perebudova ta minule nerostjiskih narodov//Ukrainskij istorichnij zhurnal*. 1992. N 4. P. 93
- ¹⁸ Krautsevich, A. *Stvarenne Vyalikaga Knyastva Litouskaga*. Rzeszow, 2000. P. 55.
- ¹⁹ Pashuto, V. *Obrazovanie Litovskogo gosudarstva*. Moscow, 1959. P. 364.

- ²⁰ Certain growth of activity of the production of knowledge about the GDL as the Belarusian state is observed in the 1940s during German occupation.
- ²¹ It was the first review of Belarus history in the Belarusian language.
- ²² The use of the term “state” (“gasudarstva”) (but not “empire” – “dzyarzhava” or “gaspadarstva”) reflects the transit of the narrative of V. Lastovsky from Russian to Belarusian tradition very well.
- ²³ In spite of the fact that Ignatovsky “reduces” the role of Belarus in the creation of the GDL.
- ²⁴ Lastovsky, V. Karotkaja gistoryja Belarusi. Mensk, 1992. P. 11.
- ²⁵ Accordingly, the dynasty of grand Lithuanian dukes was believed to be a continuation of the Polotsk duke dynasty.
- ²⁶ Dovnar-Zapolsky, M. Asnovy dzyarzhavnasti Belarusi. Mensk, 1994. P. 9.
- ²⁷ Ibid. P. 17.
- ²⁸ Shkjaljonok, M. Belarus i susedzi. Gistarychnyja narysy. Belastok, 2003. Stankevich, Ya. Gistarychnyja tvory. Mensk, 2003.
- ²⁹ N. Shkjaljonok’s historical heritage is quite big, but the central place in it is occupied by a series of articles “O metodologii istorii Belarusi”, published in the newspaper “Ranica” in 1942-1943.
- ³⁰ Denying the name “Belarus” as colonial, he aspired to replace it with quazihistorical “Krivja”, “Krivija”.
- ³¹ Stankevich, Ya. Quoted publ. P. 145.
- ³² Shkjaljonok, M. Quoted publ. P. 143.
- ³³ Bardah, Yu. Kreva i Lublin. Z prablemau polska-litouskaj unii//Shtudyi z gistoryi Vyalikaga knyastva Litouskaga. Mensk, 2002. P. 68.
- ³⁴ Smalyanchuk, A. Quoted publ. P. 149.
- ³⁵ National minorities in accordance with their status but not number.
- ³⁶ See, for instance, Antonau, A. Belarus i belarusy u litouskikh shkolnyh padruchnikah gistoryi // Belaruskі gistarychny aglyad. T. 8. 2001. Snechan.
- ³⁷ This situation differs greatly from the Belarusian one as for the Belarusian historiography history is, first of all, the history of “the people”.
- ³⁸ In this case national identity is dissolved and the GDL is a Belarusian-Polish-Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish-.. etc. and so indefinitely state.

LOCALITY

To stand, I should hold on to the roots
B.Grebenshchikov

Locality

One of the major plots which have shaped our history is the departure of Abraham and Sarah – inhabitants of Mesopotamia – from the native town of Ur. Abraham and Sarah leave their environment, or at least, do not anymore take this environment into consideration, – to go to an entirely different place, unfamiliar to them. In essence, they move to the world provinces to find something they believe is very valuable to them; it is something that cannot be found in their home country. In this particular plot Abraham and Sarah serve as representatives of an alternative world which is not universal as Mesopotamia remains with its nice kingdoms where it is, so does China, Egypt and many other civilisations. However, Abraham and Sarah give birth to one more world. They do not put in a claim for being on the same level with any kingdom; they build their own universe without any correspondence with other worlds. When passing through them, Abraham and Sarah abide by external circumstances, but these circumstances do not determine their way; it is obvious, that for Abraham and Sarah only their own world represents an absolutely exclusive value irrespective of all other worlds.

Regardless of what the newest scientific research can tell us about the life of Mesopotamia and peoples from which the family of Abraham originates, the plot of this leaving exists in history independently, justifying local worlds and dividing the main line of history into separate segments, each of which, with all its scantiness, possesses a potentially global value. Abraham and Sarah offer no resis-

tance to the environment, but at the same time they do not become isolated in themselves either as they radically oppose themselves to others, acting not as passive objects, but as subjects of history. They are not only the result of the action of external forces and thus can penetrate history through independent personal existence. In the given example we face what N. Luhmann defines as the effect of segmentary differentiation:

“Segmentary differentiation arises due to society’s division into essentially equal private systems mutually forming external worlds for each other. But regardless of what forms it takes, the formation of families is always presupposed. The family forms an *artificial* unity over *natural* gender and age distinctions; it happens due to the incorporation of similar distinctions. Before families actually appear, society is always already present. The family is constituted as a distinction form in society; however, it is impossible to say, that, on the contrary, society is formed by families” [15, p. 52],

and simultaneously as something more significant because the family of Abraham and Sarah is not only the segmental result of Mesopotamia society development. The process of segmentation itself is much more complicated than the formula offered by N. Luhmann. Abraham’s personal action becomes the reason for the emergence of a different community and a different tradition outside of the parent Mesopotamia society.

Local is not a society segment, it is not formed by society, but it is entirely connected with the social action of the subject that, undoubtedly, can occur only in society. Therefore, locality is not created outside of the subject; it is caused by the need of an individual to form personal structures of communication and relations, both with other people and the whole material world. Locality is created by live *personal* practices of the subject, it is formed everywhere where the individual operates on the basis of personal interests, norms and principles. Locality can arise even in prison or depressive areas where the action of external forces becomes ultimately defining for the individual. S.Weil paid attention to the personal character of the social action underlying localization:

“It is absolutely useless to try to turn away from the past to completely concentrate on the future. It is a dangerous illusion even to assume that such a thing can be possible. The opposition of the future to the past or the opposition of the past to the future is absurd. The future does not bring and does not give us anything; if we are to build it then it is us who should give it everything, even our whole life. But to be able to give everyone should also possess something; and we do not possess any other life, any other riches, except for what was received from the past and was apprehended, assimilated, and created anew by us. Of all the abilities of the human soul there is no more vitally important one than this perception of the past”. [5, p. 51]

In A. Platonov's novel "Chevengur" a nameless old man in proletarian, cosmopolitan and socialized Tchevengur as if it gave him a multitude of variants of life organization, sings a strange song on the barrow, "himself becoming disturbed by it":

Who will unlock the
doors: other birds and
animals for me?... And
where are you, my
parent, Alas – I do not
know... [18, p. 34]

In the absolutely determined and abstracted away from all the personal space Chevengur questions about the condition of the individual and his/her destiny are just as actual, and, consequently, the old man endeavors to transform the Chevengur world into *his own* world. Localization is the very answer to such questions, to the process of the domestication of the world and one's own status thus simultaneously representing the mythologization of the world.

It is possible to assume that the story of Abraham and Sarah is the prototype of any locality; it is that independent existence that does not ontologically depend on mega social structures, such as, for example, an empire, a state, a nation or a community. At the same time this process is not less significant than the formation of states and the building of nations or empires.

Social Place

What can be called "local"? Let's assume that locality represents a certain organization of the social, or, rather, a certain **social place** included into the social structure and determined by it, but, simultaneously, to some extent, independent from it; this introduces a moment of uncertainty to the social place with this uncertainty not provided for by the social structure itself.

How does the local differ from macrosocial and political structures? The local is a social organization model constructed without its correlation with the principle of the supreme public power and general order, with the personal action of the subject on the basis of his/her own principles and norms becoming a defining moment. The local represents horizontal elements of society, while the public power represents social structures and public order.

At the same time, the local exists within the borders of a certain social and political order losing its specificity and value outside of it. Connection between **the local and public order** is one of the most important problems demanding clarification when forming the idea about the existence of the human world.

N. Elias creates his theory of the individual and society on the assumption of the fact that these concepts belong to the same process described from two different points of view:

“The method of choice and action of a separate individual is formed in the relation to other people, in the public reprocessing of his/her own nature. But what “is minted” as a result is not something static; it is not a standard coin identical to thousands of other coins, but the centre of activity of a separate individual, personal orientation of his/her personal aspirations and will, so, in one word, it is his/her original identity. What is minted here is simultaneously in the process of minting itself: it is the mechanism of individual self-management of a separate individual in his/her relations with other people that connects his/her self-management and creates borders for him/her”. [23, p. 87]

We can say that we do not notice the local when we discuss society as something whole entering into relations with its members as the whole ... But from the subject's point of view society is never something defined once and for all; it is always contextualized by the very practices of the subject.

The local requires the material for the construction of itself. S. Weil believes that this material is the past which acts in various forms: myths, norms, dreams... R. Merton in his book “Social Theory and Social Structure” [16] described the results of the observation of influential people of a typical American small town. For his research purposes he chose a small town called Rover, the state of New Jersey, where he found a stable structure. The layer of influential people of the small town Rover turned to be accurately divided into “*cosmopolitan influential*”, those who considered themselves a part of the big world and correlated themselves to the phenomena of the whole world, and “*locally influential*” considering themselves to be only a part of their native town in correlation with local phenomena only. Let us specify now that Merton did not use the term “cosmopolitan” to name those who possessed influence in other cities, as, apparently, none of them had any influence outside of Rover. “Cosmopolitanism” or “localism” was defined through the system of co-ordinates traditional for the given individual. In conversation on any topic cosmopolitans appealed to what happened in the world, placed the majority of discussed themes into a global context while locally influential citizens mentioned mainly town events and formed their opinions in the context of local realities.

Merton's research showed that “cosmopolitans”, as a rule, aspired to achieve success on the basis of the acquired knowledge whereas “localists” relied more on friendly, kindred, and other connections. However, it would be wrong to oppose these groups as “implanted” and “not implanted” or possessing locality and not possessing locality. Cosmopolitans' feeling of “home” and the necessity to have it are not weaker than that of the supporters of the local. However, their “houses” are built from a different material and are placed into a different location. Localists' homes are constructed from the material available to them;

the erection of houses of cosmopolitans requires serious efforts as the process of their construction includes wide social connections going far beyond the community directly surrounding them. Probably, the third group of social marginals not really implanted, experiencing shortage of material for the house construction or shortage of means and tools for such a construction exists in Rover. This group was not identified by R. Merton.

Local and private

It is possible to make an assumption that groups of localists and cosmopolitans just like the group of marginals are formed under the influence of various factors of structural and functional differentiation. However, the very bases of the local lie beyond the borders of problematics brought into the social by differentiation, be it structural or functional differentiation. Groups of localists are not a party that forms "locality". The study of differentiation and structures arising as a result of it is not the simultaneous study of locality. [17] The local does not fulfill any certain social function. Abraham and Sarah pass through states and civilizations, without dissolving in their life. The local does not belong to the public and social order, it is not connected with the public ontologically, it is not generated by it and it does not depend on it ontologically. It is equally actual for the subject in any social situation and represents a possibility for the subject "to grow roots" in a social place.

At the same time, locality should not be confused with the private. Locality cannot exist becoming isolated in itself. We learn about the local only because it presents itself in the public and somehow co-operates with it, and, obviously, cannot exist out of correlation with this order. The place cannot hide away from the social order. M. Heidegger believes, that

"... The so-called "private existence", from its part, is not necessarily genuine, i.e. free human existence. It stagnates becoming isolated in fruitless negation of publicity. It remains its dependent branch and feeds on empty evasion from everything public. In this way it testifies against its own will about being publicity's slave. The latter, however, is also metaphysically caused for it arises from the domination of subjectivity acquisition and command of the openness of things in existence in the forms of absolute objectifying of everything in the world." [20, p. 15]

Local and Geography

It would be a mistake to search for a geographical measurement or the conditionality by the geographical factor in the local. The local itself mainly represents the social and, consequently, it is not identical not only with that phenomenon which in the work devoted to the theory of the Border zone we named "the primary (segmented) social communities", [10]¹ but also with any territorial communities. Certainly, localities and local communities

maintain a certain position in physical space, but their main feature (what makes them communities) is not related to physical space. Their existence is based on certain subject practices and is connected with the will powered actions of subjects. Therefore, locality is deprived of being conditioned by territorial measurement: it is connected with the place, but this place is formed by the subject itself and its practices; locality cannot be created from without the subject. When the subject disappears, the place formed by it disappears too. L. Genijush has a poem vividly illustrating this situation:

Voupa.

The streets I am used to are no longer there.
Like wax a candle-shaped church has melted away.
The village was raised to the ground. It didn't bare
The final act of the enemies' stay.

But, as before, the field is dressed in green,
There still runs a path, inviting me home.
On the edge of the sky clouds are seen,
Taking rest for their fatigue to be gone.

As I pass by my village, the field lies ahead.
My fantasy draws a ploughman,
And suddenly I hear a voice in my head
It's my father calling us, children, home.

Because of pain with hands my heart I hold.
I am all numb as I walk towards the road.
It's only the wind telling me something
About the youth in the village once followed.

I'll ask the wind and the trees,
Even the stones I will ask and the grey sky:
Where are all those people to whom, like in a dream,
I walk in my despondent state of mind? [11, c. 280]

The person also dies in that locality which is only his/hers and is nobody else's. Who hasn't felt it? Zholibozh, Vilno, Voupa or any other forlorn settlement – in it an individual can remain all his/her life, even having left it forever.

In search for lost civilizations we search specifically just for what is impossible to find, i.e. places which are not connected in any way with geography. Marcel Proust more precisely defines this problem as the search for lost time. Museum pieces and ruins of cities

represent only a skeleton of vanished places; they only hint at the communities that have disappeared. Ruins and museums are included into new structures, into new communities where initial artifacts frequently radically change their purpose and functions. Surely, any gladiator or his owner would have been surprised by the fact that the fastener from their sandals was attentively studied by a person and was included into the list of the nation's treasures, while an ancient imperial mace or a scroll of laws could form the basis for the creation of new communities. However, material culture and geography themselves are not capable of restoring the full context of the past. A. Losev identified the essence of what locality is in the following way:

“... I have already said that there is no Native land. It is not only territory, it is not only nationality, it is not only social life... it is something bigger, greater, common to all humankind; I know that it is something beautiful, desired and ennobling; I know, at least, unconsciously, that if the consciousness has not developed, people suffer and struggle for it. I know that suffering, and struggle, and death for those whom it concerns, are desired, and they are full of sense. <...> and I could say much more about the Native land. I could speak about it infinitely. But is it necessary to do it? This one word contains all possible and numerous definitions, all inexhaustible riches of the possible points of view and shades of thought. If this word says something to you then it is possible to speak about it infinitely; if this word itself without any explanations does not mean anything to you then is it really possible to help the matter logically, with exact definitions? It is not logic. It is human life. It is human blood.” [14]

It would be a mistake not to consider the subjective nature of locality. Locality is the world, primarily substantive; this distinguishes it from the space of the public order built as a pure structure.

Thus, locality is a certain social place that arises as a result of private practices, somehow co-operating with public space. This interaction is the major question, the answer to which throws light both on the nature of locality and its place in the general social order, while also making the local the major category in the Border zone theory.

Locality in the Context of the Borderzone Theory

In the work devoted to the Border zone theory [10] we state that the public order is a set of public statuses, and this order is always configured within the limits of the political boundary (border). In the English language the concept **border** means, basically, a really existing political border which was specifically created, equipped with a corresponding infrastructure for the control, admission, registration, etc. In Slavic languages the outdated word “mezha” (“border”) corresponds to the word “border”. This word remains in the Belarussian language, but has disappeared from Russian (only the noun “demarcation” con-

tains its stem in Russian). *Mezha* ("border") requires a physical display in the form of a line, a hedge, a fence, landmarks It is not thought of as an abstract border. Therefore, it is possible to cross or break the *border-mezha*, it is material, and does not belong to a certain subject. Crossing *the border-mezha* does not involve any change of the subject. Simultaneously, it is possible to consider each public status as a border. It is also specifically designed and is an expression of a social requirement and of this or that social function. *The border* organizes a special kind of space. In our work we call this kind of space *border-space*². It is inseparably linked with the space of public authority and the principle of sovereignty. However, "pure" *border-space* is only a theoretical model; actually, it is refracted through a number of localities used to contextualize it. We define the borders of local communities as *boundaries*, i.e. the borders understood as the zone of exhaustion and simultaneously as the manifestation of the subject, a mythical line created by the subject, and, in essence, inseparable from the subject. It is a mental line objectively fixing the existing division between subjects. Its crossing is possible only with the change of the subject.

The boundary indicates the existence of the subject participating in social processes, but not determined by *the border* and its own status. The example of such a border is a real-life distinction between confessional, historical, economic, ethnic, and cultural communities, and families. *The boundary* can also appear as an effect of differentiation of society and formation of subjects possessing the public status [4], but at the same time retaining other, rather than general, identities. *The border* forms space, *the boundary* does not render such influence on social space as it is always the result of the formation of the subject of social space, and not the reason, but the consequence of the existence of the subject and its inclusion into public space³.

Locality as Environment of Contextualization

Locality can be understood as the condition of the subject forming *boundary* in public space. In social relations such a subject experiences a number of difficulties if he/she cannot operate without the support of locality which is both the basis and means and result of his/her social action. It is locality formation that precedes a successful social action of the subject. Therefore, the social action is broken up into two components: formation of the context and direct action. A. Giddens writes:

"The concept of the scene of action (locality) presupposes the use of space for the purpose of provision of *the environment of the interaction behavior*, necessary to define contextuality. Formation of localities definitely depends on those moments special importance of which was underlined by Hagerstand: a body, its means and possibilities of mobility and communication concerning physical parameters of the surrounding world. Localities to a great extent guarantee "steadiness" (or "stability") of social institutes though it is not absolutely clear how they "cause it." [12, p. 185]

So locality “refracts” public order in itself. Certainly, locality connected with material things, does it much more successfully. As a matter of fact, the social meaning of subjectness is set only in such a boundary situation in which the general order enters into an interaction with the local.

Locality confirms concreteness and unconditional value of *specific* human worlds. Such local communities are formed on the basis of certain subject practices. Any social form can act as some kind of locality: a house, a plant, a factory, a firm, a corporation, a city, even a state which in this case acquires the meaning “country”. These social structures turn into the “place” by means of dual practices: they affect the subject while the subject affects them; consequently, both the subject and the place change leading to the emergence of third realities; for instance, the concept “trade” appears in the field of economics, the concept “citizenship” appears in the field of politics and so on and so forth. Properties of locality are constantly used by subjects of interaction for the organization of communications, both inside and outside of local communities. Locality allows to provide social interactions with sense and meaning clear not only to systems and structures, but also to an individual. Locality turns out to be space “within *boundaries*”. However, simultaneously, public space frequently happens to be accessible for the subject only in a certain context set by localities.

The subject in a social action is surrounded with several “covers” allowing him/her to use the social action with a certain degree of protection most effectively. (Subject))) local))) boundary))) status))) border-space).

Any public action of the subject, apparently, occurs only in a certain local context, by means of a boundary and within the borders of his/her social status.

Presentations of the subject in the border-space are possible only in the context of the local, outlined by boundaries and within the borders of the valid social status. Boundary formation happens only when there is some interaction and communication between the subject and the public order even if this communication possesses only a negative character and consists of isolation and silence of the subject⁴. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to spend much more energy on isolation and silence than on communication⁵. Throughout almost the whole history of humanity local structures have been quite isolated from central establishments and aspired to protect themselves from the influence of external forces. But, thereby, they also formed the context in which central establishments operated almost throughout the whole history⁶.


Autonomy of Local Communities

Local structures possess certain autonomy from macrostructures of border-space. But the result of locality formation can be the emergence of local communities based on a certain type of locality. Changes occurring in macrostructures concern the local as well but they demand separate change and adaptation. M. Foucault believes that local structures are rather conservative and invariable:

“Behind the swift history of governments, wars, misfortunes, and hunger one can see history as really immovable, history characterized by a weak curve of development, history of sea ways, history of change of productivity, history of balance between hunger and reproduction created by people.” [1]

Local communities are not seen on the surface of world history except for those cases when the coincidence of circumstances put them forward to the leading edge⁷. Local communities are, apparently, a direct product of locality. External institutions such as monarchy and church could represent these communities and make interventions into their way of life⁸. In its turn local communities constantly influenced the life of external institutions. So parties appeared in politics, monastic orders and communities appeared in church, local government appeared in the political system of the state. It becomes possible to observe one more important process of interaction of locality with general structures on a different level, namely when locality is institutionalized into a certain community cooperating with the social organization.

In a functionally different community local communities are also influenced by functional systems, which are subject to localization process too. Functional systems are capable of ignoring locality to a certain degree but they cannot but feel its influence on themselves. Eventually, even global players see ordinary people as their final consumer but not global players. If it were possible to invent a social device free from localization, it would be an absolutely new phenomenon in social space. However, localization proceeds, even if it is based on practices of atomized and a-social subjects.



Interaction between external institutes aspiring to form border-space and localities is seen as the decisive factor in history of Eastern Europe. Changes in structure and functions of megastructures do not occur without the participation of local structures, even when locality is suppressed and collapses. For example, the institute of recruiting conceived and

carried out by the imperial administration and the recruiting that was endured and felt by Belarusians in songs sung by mothers and brides is a range of effects caused by a certain action in social space. But altogether it is the same history. This history does not have any meaning outside of the context which can be represented by personal existence, as only a specific subject can deliver sense to it. What sometimes seems to have been dead forever and vanished in the past, suddenly gets a new life. When singing a sad and ancient Belarusian song about recruits,⁹ V. Teretschenka builds a new locality using the old material. Or when I. Baranovski with an air of mystery and in awe shows me a brick with the figures 1658 in the base of the monastery razed to the ground in the destroyed Berestije...

Locality and Recognition Mechanisms

Locality demands not only that an individual has an idea that he/she belongs to a certain place, but also expects a reciprocal recognition from the public order of “the right to locality”. So, the acquisition of a certain trade does not turn an individual into a professional, his/her status can only be the result of his/her own efforts, rewarded with recognition. Similarly, citizenship acquisition does not turn an individual into a “citizen”. Outside of the original political society and without the support of locality, one may never even become a citizen. Locality’s own borders are always a problem; they require the activity of the subject. Besides, they exist in rather aggressive environment of the public, not deprived of the ability to contextualize both the individual and human life.¹⁰

Thus, locality can arise within the borders of any social organization – from very amorphous network communities to the crystal structures based on personal membership and a rigid standard system¹¹. Recognition mechanisms form natural borders of the local. Their overcoming means moving from the outside into the inside of locality. Such a move can become possible only as a personal action, one’s personal entrance into a local structure and acceptance of its structure and measurement.

Temporal Measurement of the Local

The local appears, first of all, as certain duration in time. Rooting in time is one of the important locality attributes. Perhaps, it is much easier to fix the local specifically in time, and time mainly represents the space of the local. Temporal approach to the problem of locality is the problem of opening and preserving the tradition.

This problem can be analytically conceptualized or it can be empirically investigated. Empirical research of temporal rooting of the local shows that here it is impossible to separate time testimonials from the material ones, that the time of tradition gets into the subjects of the material world and settles in history in the form of certain subjects and things. Each thing stays alive only in the context of the tradition: from locks on doors to nails in soles and their specific pattern. Historical bases of locality are the reference to locality itself

as it cannot be deduced from the social structure or *border-space*. Locality can be deduced only from itself; it has no extraneous bases.

An individual is inclined to build time borders and prospects. Temporal measurement registers a reference point which sets a direction of his/her movement or forms a sacral (semantic) centre of his life. For example, a wedding is both a reference point and the centre round which the family life is built; this event never remains “behind”; it is constantly renewed, recollected, and it acquires feelings, associations, histories and so forth. It is the major factor of identification for the family and the factor causing recognition from the “big family”, society and public sphere.

However, time forms a three-dimensional space: it has the past, there is the future, and there is the present. The locality typology depends on the typology of social time. It can be linear time, opened into the future while there can be cyclic time coming back into itself; at last, there can be certain frozen time remaining in the present and incapable of forming history.

Locality can be formed in all these measurements and time types with each one of them serving as appropriate material for locality construction. Prescription as a means of forming temporal borders of the local¹², future as a means of maintaining the tradition, urgency of an everyday life – merging into one Big Day-Night – they all represent variants of the same mastering of time, its environment and life transformation.

The change of social time and the influence of this factor upon locality create a lot of interest. When social time changes from “yesterday” to “tomorrow” the appeal to prescription ceases to work and provide stability of temporal borders.

However, the change of social time, apparently, should be understood in its correlation with local practices. Thus, a certain process can develop. This process represents chronological discrepancy, namely the life of different segments of society in various spaces which practically never cross and are independent from each other. In this case the problem of social consolidation cannot be solved if such society is represented as the society placed only in geographical space. These chronological discrepancies lead not only to the crisis of public space, but, obviously, to the crisis of the local as the emergence of the local requires a stable public sphere in which the local could be presented.

At the same time, local consolidation is impossible if it is conducted only through the active imagining of the past acting as a building material, as well as the imagining of the future, which in itself is also quite a good material¹³ but which is also insufficient for the construction of the local. Both, in the first and in the second case we can observe the activity of cultural bases of locality. However, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, even when imagining the future, it is necessary to speak about the inheritance of values and institutions. This strange time past in future was described by G. Chesterton in “Napoleon from Notting-Hill”. The King-joker turns the past into the future:

“Is the ancient London spirit really doomed to death? Will that light which we so often see in the eyes of our tram conductors and policemen, grow dim, that dreamy light that talks

About ancient grieves and pleasures,
About ancient great fights, –

as a certain little-known poet who was my childhood friend once said. I repeat, I have made up my mind to maintain the dreamy light in the eyes of our tram conductors and policemen. For what good can the state without “reveries and dreams” do? The medicine offered by me is the following: tomorrow at ten twenty five in the morning if providence saves my life, I intend to issue an appeal to the people ... Tomorrow my people will get familiar with it. All cities in which you were born and in which you dream to rest your old bones, should be restored in all their ancient magnificence – Hammersmith, Natebridge, Kensington, Bayswater, Chelsea, Battersee, Clapham, Balham and hundreds others. Every one of them should be immediately surrounded with a city wall with the gates locked after sunset. Every one of them should get city guards armed to the teeth. Everyone should create himself a banner, a coat of arms and, if it is possible, a war-call. I will not go deep into details now as my heart is too full. You will find the details in the appeal. I only want to say that all citizens, every one of them, will be included in the lists of city guards and should a need arise they will be convoked by the thing called “tocsin”; I intend to thoroughly research and explain the meaning of this word. I personally believe that “tocsin” is a sort of official receipt of a big salary. And if anyone has something like a halberd at home, I advise its owner to practice with it in the garden” [22, c. 469-470].

Thus, temporal extension appears to be a certain normative system demanding its realization and acknowledgement in public space. Any tradition is a code of rules, subordinating and ordering all changes which provide consolidation and mobilization of tradition. In tradition chronology is not so important. It is the mythical experience of time, turning time into place that is important. The tradition can also be actualized only through norms which justify the status or procedure. Therefore, the main problem for any tradition is ensuring that obligatoriness corresponds to its own norms. In time locality exists as a certain actual normative system.

Geographical Measurement of the Local

The geographical approach to the problem of locality concentrates on singling out the local community from its environment, both institutionally and axiologically. Society should be based on institutes, structures and practices. When placed in the material world, any community builds a number of relations with this world's subjects and structures.

Questions of the preservation of community borders in this world are essentially important. In the context of functionally differentiated systems community should take care mainly of its status borders and preservation of internal structures.

Z. Baumann defines time as space of dwelling for people who have overcome spatial restrictions. [9] This thesis requires some more precise definition as any tradition mainly stays in time, instead of in space. Z. Baumann believes that people-tourists, when grounded in time, free themselves from the power of tradition. Z. Baumann endows space with the qualities of the tradition carrier, while the local is considered to have only one – geographical – measurement. Does it mean that “tourists” are deprived of any norms and do not form locality?

Indeed, local communities build their place using not only norms and relations as the building material but also from the substance of this world which occupies certain space. To legitimize the place borders it is necessary to refer not only to the past or to the future but also to space and geography. This house, this meadow, this city, this table, everything connected with my life can be a legitimizing element for the local. The material world as if confirms the tradition; its norms are reflected in uncountable subjects and form a single whole with them. There is an abstraction process of the thing both from the norm and from the legal relationship¹⁴. However, it occurs until material things keep their ability to represent the subject. Things which are not representing of the subject cannot be a locality element.

As all acquisitions are eventually paid for with your own time then all things bears its stamp. Time is the main content and the basis of the nature of things. Consequently, things “cannot be carried” as they represent time. It is possible to perceive and to love only the timeless. The flight from the local is also the flight from time. Things are an individual’s witnesses, and if they do not die they become “impudent”. The cap of the deceased grandfather in his house in Repehy emphasizes the orphanhood even more. But only for those who knew the grandfather because this cap means nothing to a thief or to a stranger ...

Geographical borders of local communities are formed as a result of the collision of the state strategy of spatial development (the administrative-territorial structure) with various social strategies of local communities which have their own notions of good neighborhood or appropriate structure of public places. These local traditions of vision and the use of borders can be either a positive or negative factor for the government. When applied towards Eastern Europe the given circumstances could be ignored entirely by the power which pursued the policy that did not consider local circumstances.

Symbolical Measurement of Locality

Liberation from the power of space strengthens not only the mobility of people; it also reduces the life span of things and compresses the space of representation of the subject. Things become anonymous, they do not manage to enter the tradition and become an ir-

replaceable part of an individual's life. A modern person is inclined to consider old things to be "lumber", hindrance and junk reducing the degree of life comfort. However, does it mean that the importance of artifacts in social life declines? It is possible to assume that it is not so; it is the typology of artifacts that changes. They acquire a symbolical character.

In general, histories of things are surprising. Let's say, it is typical of modern Europe to get rid of old things in practical life though a part of them remains to fulfill a symbolical function ... A wooden wheel of a cart, an iron heated by coal, an oil lamp, kryosna, having passed through total dematerialization, become an important part of our symbolical world just like many subjects of a lux-class which carry out not so much direct functions connected with their consumer cost but indicate the status of the owner. It is also possible to make an assumption that locality also is capable of getting a non-space symbolical character. [8]

Transformations of space into a nonfunctional symbolical structure allow to see even more clearly that the local is not an ordinary part of the national or in general a part of anything. The local co-operates with the national, the global, and the corporate; however, it is not absorbed either by space or time or functional systems. But for the interaction between the local, on the one hand, and the spatial, temporal and functional, on the other hand, to take place the universal order should be convertible into local practices. History of total institutions testifies that such converting does not always take place. School should not be localized, it is difficult to imagine prison in the form of locality unless we recollect C.Dickens's sad history about the man who was released after his 20-year-old imprisonment for debts but came back to prison voluntarily as it had become his home. [13] It is also difficult to imagine a hospital localized by patients. If such localization occurs, it causes horror.

Thus, on the one hand, locality co-operates with social organizations of a different degree of organization: from network communities to crystal structures. On the other hand, locality acts as a normative, symbolical and geographical place. These parameters set numerous models of locality.

Localization Restrictions

For the thought about locality one needs to have the borders of the local marked and constantly supported by boundaries which point at the social action of the subject. It is them which allow to define the local and to place a certain local community on the social map.

Borders of the local constantly go through various metamorphoses. However, these changes are neither only positive, nor only negative. Globalization strengthens functionalism and "emotional" relationships causing the erosion of directly organized local structures and local communities always geographically and norm implanted; still, globalization and complication of the social structure do not remove the problem of locality. Therefore, it is

necessary to ask questions about new forms of the local and their participation in modern social and political life. Another important question to take into account is how new localities can influence social and political life.

It means that though the differentiation of society in the course of globalization is accompanied by the expansion of locality and local structures, a whole number of newly created structures oppose localization as differentiation itself does not lead to the formation of localities.

Locality experiences time resistance (because “roots” simply do not have enough time to sprout) and space resistance which acquires more and more symbolical character that demands new efforts to localize it and especially to retain. Besides, the symbolical character of space provokes its frequent change; it loses its direct connection with the subject and is inclined to transform into a decoration. But as soon as it happens, it turns out that it is convenient to play in decorations but impossible to live in. For this reason during very fast social changes it is possible to observe the crisis of local structures and shortage of locality in repeatedly created institutes and structures.

None of these statements is absolute; every one of them defines only one direction of development. General space or time can be built in various ways including the destruction and suppression of the local or its isolation.

In their turn, local practices cannot always be adapted for the interaction with the functional and the temporal. We can observe this using the example of total institutions, isolation and depressive existence of seminary primary structures (for example, village extinction, and impossibility of reproduction of rural practice in cities).

Change in Character of Locality

From the point of view of an individual processes of globalization and destruction of old local structures help the individual move outside the borders of social segments as their borders now appear to be more penetrable. However, it is not the possibility of exiting the borders that matters. It is more important what world the individual enters, what structures he/she builds, and whether he/she can localize that world which he/she enters. This is that specific moment when the need arises for transition and border zone mechanisms and for localization of the new space emerging outside of borders of primary segmentary social structures. N. Luhmann believes:

“But the following question is much more interesting from the sociological point of view: what volume of expansion into the inside is thereby produced by society, how much monetarization, legalization, scientification, politicization can be made and mastered by society, and how much space it can produce and manage simultaneously (instead of, for example, *only monetarization*); on the other hand, what influences

can emerge during the reduction of functional systems when the matter concerns demonetarization, deregulation, etc.” [15].

This is when the revealing of the essence of locality and local communities takes place; one can check whether they exist and whether they can incur a part of social responsibility.

We shall use the development of network communities and the Internet as an example of the need for locality. Modern network communities require an absolutely different geography: they do not need lands, waters, rivers and sea ways; they demand networks, servers, meeting places, books, etc. It appears that the infrastructure is precisely the same resource like land and just like land it is capable of being a material for the formation of social place.

It is possible to see the displacement of locality towards more dynamics in the variety of resources and bases of locality presenting the modern world. For instance, 90 % of visitors address their own locality on the Internet. The rule of *zemlyachestvo* (association) is applied for the operation in this process. This tendency is so strong, that the quantity of the English-speaking Internet has decreased from 90 % to 70 % for the past 5 years at the expense of the formation of local sites oriented towards local users. [2] Today the Internet facilitates the creation of local structures, promotes the emergence of absolutely strange communities entering real life from role games. It becomes possible through the use of the Internet which acts as the catalyst of communication for people who are similar in their way of life and outlook, but at times separated by long distances.

The Internet creates a new neighborhood [2] without general material borders. The infrastructure and the communication based on it become a part of social reality and cause social consequences. In Eastern Europe the importance of the Internet has a revolutionary significance. Perhaps, without its information influence political regimes in this part of Europe would be more rigid and severe.

At the same time, the Internet, while expanding neighbors' communications, makes them less formal; the number of firm social forms decreases. For example, A. Giddens notices that only 50 years ago a marriage was a firm form, and now, when an individual gets married, he/she knows that 50 % of all marriages break up. Social communications are becoming more functional. An individual can hide in locality; it allows the individual to move beyond the limits of the functions clearly designed for him/her.

Besides all other things local networks allow to avoid the effect of “*calcutization*” in the functionally differentiated society, i.e. they complicate the process of transformation of the lowest classes into pariahs. In the late forties it became extremely clear for S. Weil that there is something bad happening to the identity problem, for example, of peasants or workers: “Peasants say: We are this way because we are not teachers, not people with higher education.” [4, c. 51] Local networks provide an individual with a place and a status outside of his/her functional communication sphere. Using the metaphor of Abraham it is possible to say that for external community Abraham could look like the leader of the tribe, as the

head of the family, as a rogue, a nomad or a tsar, but his real meaning was clear only to the members of his clan.

Wellman and Hampton note with a surprise the contrast observed in the modern world between chaotically pulsing locality and immobilized functional and public structures. [6] Locality without the limit increases the quantity of new unforeseen by any plans factors influencing base structures of civilization. All new inventions support a variety of locality, and in case with the infrastructure they support the existence of social communications. Therefore, no unification is observed during global expansion and spreading of mass culture contextualized by means of a million of localities.

It is the global infrastructure that allows to carry out transactions which presuppose the participation of social and human capital, creating immeasurably more channels of its realization. Besides, the expansion of a variety of localities and contexts is accompanied by the formation of the basis common for all of them; due to this they can interact while it also makes it possible to acquire social capital from these various relationships. Something emerges that can lead to the interaction of various lives, cultures and ways. Let us use two examples. The first is the film “About Schmitt” (dir. Alexander Pane, 2002) showing how the destinies of an American pensioner and a boy from some African country converge. They have never met each other, they are separated by thousands of kilometers of land and ocean, but they write letters to each other. Schmitt has much more in common with this boy than with those who surround him directly. The second example is the possibility of evaluating the actions of political authorities on the basis of universal criteria (it extremely irritates politicians). If there was no transition zone and contact between private histories and public histories then the film “About Schmitt” would be impossible just like wide criticism of politicians’ actions. Today the quantity of “neighbors” and “counterparts” increases both for politicians and for ordinary people.

Borders of the Local

Thus, the local appears in three measurements:

1. Tradition (time of the local). The tradition is expressed in a specific local way.
2. Geography. The geographical local is the place of development and action of the subject. Local geography can be not only physical and political, but also symbolical.
3. Practices (norms). Practices form a local normative order.

These are obligatory forms, but, apparently, other forms of the local are impossible. Identified forms produce various types of local communities – temporal, spatial and “societies of practice”.

The principle mechanism requiring studying when comparing the model of the local is the localization of the national, functional and temporal. The indicator of the occurring localization is the regionalization of space. Regionalization is the subject able to contextualize the general order. Examples of such regionalization can include accurate periodiza-

tion of the world or national history, CV, official history of a people, regional policy, functional duties, social capital, and ability to use the status with all of them serving as indexes of the occurring localization. These processes are accompanied by the actualization of the subject's meaning and separation of the meaning from the status as well as realization of what we call "subject ability", for example, endowing local communities with legal personality in the process of regional policy.

N.Luhmann confirms:

"In any case, it seems absolutely unrealistic to treat the primacy of functional differentiation as self-realization guaranteed due to this principle. If we were to interpret it following the example of hierarchical domination then it would lead to the incorrect description of these relations as more or less successful forms of public self-management. More exactly, it would be correct to suppose that functional differentiation conducted on the level of world community allocates structures which set conditions for regional conditioning. In other words, we talk about complex and flexible conditioning of conditionings, about inhibitions and deinhibitions, about one of combinations of restrictions and suitable possibilities; however, these combinations depend on further numerous conditions. From this point of view, functional differentiation is not a condition for the possibility of system operations, but, more likely, possibility for their conditioning. At the same time we talk about the system of dynamics that leads to extremely non-uniform developments inside the world community. Therefore, regions find themselves far from the balance of the whole community; this is their chance to have their own destiny not reduced to some kind of a microversion of a formal principle of functional differentiation. However, if the primacy of this principle did not operate on the level of the world community, everything would develop differently, but no region can avoid this law." [15, p. 134].

There can be situations when borders of the local are not supplied with the vocabulary and mechanisms of the border zone. Then locality becomes isolated and co-operates only negatively with the general order. A remarkable example of such isolated locality is the unreal Feodor-Kuzmichevsk, created by T.Tolstaja as a picture of Moscow 200 years after a nuclear accident. [19] There are some artifacts of the vanished world in this city, but there are no relations between the artifact and the subject that created it. Therefore, they invent the already invented in Feodor-Kuzmichevsk, each artifact's history is created but this history does not have anything in common with the original history of the object:

"Smart guys crowd, ask the price, and discuss: to take, not to take, yet what the book is about, what the plot is, whether there are a lot of pictures. And it is not allowed to look inside: first you pay, and then look as much as you want. Small murzas (traders) shift feet in valenki, pat mittens, praise their goods highly in frost:

- And here is a novelty, and who wants a novelty! “Poslednij zov”, a huge novel!
- And who wants “Basics of differential calculus”, the most popular brochure, great interest!
- And another brings his hands to the mouth forming a mouthpiece for him to be heard louder, in a stentorian voice calls:
 - “Koza-dereza” (a fairy-tale name of a she-goat), last copy! A fascinating epopee! I repeat, the last copy!” [19, c. 87].

In this case local structures are segmented and treat the external world as hostile and incomprehensible environment, representing unclear environment themselves to the external world. Then the etiquette can seem to be pretence, politeness is seen as subservience, and freedom represents only danger.

Localities and their presence in the world make temporal-spatial distinctions possible; they also make possible the existence of different communities in different time and space. This difference can be caused by a way of life, a place or norm system. Therefore, it becomes impossible to avoid the influence of the locality factory. The local place is settled in time; it dissipates in social structure and influences norm orders. It operates through communities, and also through individual practices of an individual. In the world there are always points of support for the process of delocalization.

Antithesis of globalization, modernization, nationalization is not nationalization, not traditionalism, not individualism, in particular, not localities and local communities. Locality represents a really different world with communities existing during different times which possess very strong relations. Locality is also a part of social structures which represent themselves in public space while also forming their own norm and value order co-operating with the general norm order.

It is possible to present locality problematics in the form of consecutive questions:

Participation
Communication
Refuge
Freedom
Autonomy
Presentation
Daily occurrence
Contextualization

Probably, modern world does not face total globalization; vice versa, it is on the threshold of global localization of the public, new mythology, a new way of living and new forms of social relationships.

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Notes

- ¹ These are the communities limited by geographical and social functions.
- ² Thus, it differs both from public space which also includes private structures and from space of pure power as it is connected not with the displays of will, but with the system of statuses.
- ³ It is essentially important to keep in mind that the formation of the subject can occur only publicly. Even if such a subject is a hermit, the subject's action has a public measurement and a public effect. Every intellectual and cultural accomplishment is public as it presupposes a spectator sharing either beauty, or sense, or suffering. There, where there is no such break to public life is “sour”. In Russian literature the melancholy of such a life isolated from public space was remarkably portrayed by Vasily Shukshin in stories about provincial social reformers, who all their lives devoted to writing “into a suitcase”, about inventors of planes and bicycles, about untalented writers ... Everything that they invented, wrote or thought up was equally good as nobody needed it, and not because these strange people “were ahead of their time” but because

they both had not entered and were not entering. They were isolated in their own world that did not have any exit ways to public space (it was not their fault, of course).

⁴ N. Luhmann is inclined to consider history of locality to be history of isolated communities using a number of resources to maintain isolation.

⁵ See Milofsky C. *Community Organizations: Studies in Resource Mobilization and Exchange*. New York Oxford University Press. 1988. An accurately built border, a standard system, and a status system are necessary for isolation. All this requires a huge amount of energy and density of interaction inside locality.

⁶ That is why any empire before the new time is quite a strange formation in which it is never possible to define for certain what prevails in it: whether it is the central power or local orders. See A. Miller (he mentions the fact of the shortage of bureaucracy in the Russian empire) and Giddens (he identifies the specificity of the Chinese empire which does not have precise borders)

⁷ Such are the revolts ; they differ greatly from revolutions, such are any predatory movements as well as folklore

⁸ Florovsky writes about the night and day culture of Russia. This is the recognition of the fact that there is a certain incomprehensible life which is not described by the dictionary of day culture at all.

⁹ Tsyareshchanka. V. *Pesni/V. Tsyareshchanka*. Minsk, 1991.

¹⁰ It seems that the XX century proved this ability of public space to contextualize human life.

¹¹ Classification of the organizations has been borrowed from Milofsky / Milofsky C. *Community Organizations: Studies in Resource Mobilization and Exchange*. New York Oxford University Press. 1988.

¹² Legitimizing of borders through reference to history and tradition is only a reason to more expressively define general or subjective interests and values not necessarily having a rational character. Sometimes it happens so that an individual or individuals do not have convincing connections with the past, and then they create history themselves and try to realize it. This is what happens to the search for a family tree of all modern nations of Eastern Europe. They search for themselves in the Zaporizhian Sich, in the Great Duchy of Lithuania, in ancient Sarmatia. These common interests are expressed by individuals showing high public activity. The activity of such auto-leaders means much as it makes possible the emergence of the situation when not only the leader but also the whole local community acts as the partner of authority. When such things happen, not only the power but also the community is transformed. Locality shows the presence of leaders and very active people capable of social actions and presentation in public space.

¹³ Example of Belarus allows us to observe the collision of “time-yesterday” of Belarusian “Adradzhennye” (Revival) with Lukashenka’s “time-tomorrow” and his groups in the 90s. Time-yesterday of the Belarusian opposition has been restructured since 2000 into time-tomorrow with the use of the image of Europe and Eurointegration of Belarus.

¹⁴ This is how law and its institutions historically develop: from buying and selling from real transactions presupposing the transfer of subjects from hands to hands and in nature – to wholesale trade and future transactions.

FROM BESSARABIA TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: MENTAL MAP TO CONSTRUCT SYMBOLICAL SPACE

In 1973 K. Girts, who questioned anthropological methods of culture description, paid attention of scientists to the conventionality of the ethnographic texts which are, in his opinion, only *representations*, and, consequently, the *interpretation* of reality they are trying to reproduce. The same also concerns the maps, no matter how exact they were considered to be earlier. It turns out that space is capable of changing its identity and symbolical outlines, and, accordingly, has the potential for a number of configurations. Against local time space is represented as one of those “eternal” constants the creation of which is done at the expense of events, activities, traditions, collective memories and expectations as space borders are capable of supporting the image of collective identity, as well as the visibility of its legitimacy, in order to unite and mobilize people in their general living of a life.

In this context the Prut-Dniester interfluvium is one of those new spaces which emerged as a result of political and military collisions in the southeast of Europe at the beginning of the XIX century. According to Bucharest agreement of 1812, Bessarabia was annexed by the Russian empire, thus turning the discourse of description and self-description of “newly produced territory” into an important component of political projects and practices.

The objective of this research is to analyze the discourses of identity of the Prut-Dniester interfluvium. In particular, the study is concentrated on the aspects of intellectual tradition, world outlook constructs and narratives entered into the process of perception in conformity with the collective experience and institutional norms during the last two centuries (from 1812 till 2005).

We are especially interested in the ideological patterns of identification and space organization that are different in their content and

form but that produce main characteristics. The discourse of identity itself in the context of historical and political realities of the Republic of Moldova is ambiguous, mythologized and is full of political and other connotations. In the light of traditional approaches, the deconstruction of ideological projects and narratives seems to the majority of the Moldavian researchers risky enough or even an inadmissible activity; the most frequent research prospect is still the identity formation according to the schemes set in advance. This article offers the analysis of identification and space organization as a tool of social construction, the consolidation of the mechanism of power and cultural hegemony, the factor of “imagined community” in the interaction with “imagined space”.

Within the framework of variable borders and different spatial organizations Bessarabia¹ as an administrative division, originates only in 1812. Annexation by the Russian empire of the Prut-Dniester interfluvium that did not have independent territorial identity earlier conditioned the necessity to form a new administrative unit, as well as a new discourse of identity of this Empire suburb which due to the border transfer extended on the West and stretched along the frontier line for some hundreds of kilometers. Before Bessarabia, being a part of the Moldavian state was only its southeast part. For example, in “Opisanije Moldavii” (*Description of Moldova*) (1716) by Dimitry Kantemir, in the section “O geograficheskom polozhenii Moldavii, ejo drevnih i novyh granitsah, o ejo climate” (*About the geographical position of Moldova, its ancient and new borders, about its climate*) it is mentioned as one of the border regions: “Moldova is partly occupied by mountains, especially in that part where it adjoins Transylvania, a part of it passes into the plain which faces Polish Ukraine, Bessarabia and the Danube.” Further the author specifies that “from the east the Black Sea served as the ancient border of the country; but in due course, when the Turkish weapon tore away Bessarabia and Bendery, the border of Moldova was moved to the north.” Bessarabia subdued by Turks earlier than the whole Moldova, “fell under their power and now does not use the laws of Moldova though on the Danube coasts there are cities and villages occupied by Moldavians who profess Christian belief but who undergo the tyranny of two barbarous peoples for Bessarabia is partially occupied by Tatars, partially by Turks who obey the serasker orders. At present this area is divided into four parts: Budzhak, Akkerman, Kilijsk and Izmail lands”.²

Manifest (The Manifesto) of Tsar Alexander I and *Pravila ob obrazovanii vremennogo pravlenija v Bessarabii* (*Rules about Formation of Temporary Board in Bessarabia*) (1813) proclaimed the granting to the newly created area of a special administrative and legal status as an exception and with the intention “to specify civil management in accordance with its customs, traditions and laws”.³ *The Charter of Formation of Bessarabia Region* adopted April, 29th, 1818 specified its *border status*: “the borderland is the position of the region (oblast) and a deliberate number of fortresses which in such a contingency of other important circumstances, require that according to its civil management the region was a part of the main department and under the supervision of the Military Heads”.⁴

Despite the additional efforts necessary to preserve annexed territories, they seemed to be an important acquisition of the empire in respect towards the advancement of its borders to the south, to the mouth of the Danube. F. Vigel who was in Bessarabia as the member of the Supreme Council wrote in his "Zapiski" ("Notes"), that "Russians found themselves again on the coast of the well-known to them and never forgotten Danube where the Russian dukes used to reign a long time ago"⁵. Apparently, geopolitical priorities defined also the choice of the name of the new area using the name of its southern part adjoining the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube, namely Bessarabia.

However, though at first sight it seemed quite ordinary, the transfer of military borders opened the borders of differences of life styles and systems of values. In September, 1823 the same F. Vigel informed the General Governor Vorontsov: "Bessarabia is the area, similar to Ostzee provinces adjoined back from Poland to Russia as it possesses special rights, but like the Polish Kingdom and the Great Finnish Principedom it has its special existence. It lies between three Empires, and is separated from Austria and Turkey just like from Russia with the help of quarantine and customs lines". The author describes the society, "in which one can see the rest of Eastern customs and the beginning of the European erudition. This can be seen now in Kishinev and other small cities of Bessarabia just the way it was in our fatherland about a hundred years ago. Similarity between the way of life of the richest Moldavians and our ancestors is, to our shame, striking and, consequently, Kishinev deserves even more attention of Russians. The name of Boyars, their long clothes, long beards, high caps, and rich furs which they use to be covered, their ignorance, roughness, everything reminds of our ancient courtiers". Reflexion over cultural differentiation and that "that distinguishes it (Bessarabia – V.B.) from other possessions" is understood by the author with the help of (re)projection of the strategies of power legitimating over "the local non-educated land" already tested in other Empire suburbs. "To install seven times more order, education, justice, it is necessary to arm the deputy with an iron warder". The question of autonomy and the rights of local nobility which was acute for the Russian administration became an incentive motive for the formation of mythologeme thus, placing autochthons outside of the symbolical power line: "People of good families and not a lot of educated people the number of whom is rather limited evade from service, and other Matadors of Bessarabia were not a long time ago Moldavian servants, Greek subjects who in turn were slaves to Turks. One cannot expect from the people who recently stood on the last slave step any noble feelings, knowledge of laws and assiduous fulfillment of duties". Contrary to the official policy of the imperial power, ordering to avoid conflicts with local institutions and have minimum interference with the area internal affairs, Vigel believes that the only and inevitable means to terminate the increasing harm is "the destruction of this, not so much useless but also harmful Council (which is under the influence of the local nobility – V.B.) and the establishment of the supreme body in the capital ...".

Sent in 1820 to "the damned city of Kishinev" A. Pushkin saw a city of multi-colored caftans, Turkish drawers, fezs, turbans, European dress coats and military uniforms. Having visited Bessarabia, the Polish nobleman Yu. Krashevsky wrote that in 1843 Moldavian

was still the language of Kishinev streets, and local residents wore traditional hats made from sheepskin, long caftans and smoked tobacco using long Turkish tubes. Perceiving the city as “Eastern” and only a bit civilized, he, meanwhile, notices, that the local nobility already started to order clothes in Vienna; it patronizes boutiques while organ-grinders play Strauss’s waltzes in the streets.⁶

Realized by the imperial power the *mission civilisatrice* at the new borders of the Empire⁷ put into the forefront the practical problems of turning the conquered space into the imperial one with its inhabitants becoming the Empire citizens. Within the several next decades there was a certain concentration of space round a new administrative centre. The city of Kishinev (Kishineu), mentioned in historical documents for the first time in 1436, prior to the beginning of the XIX century was an ordinary village of Lapushnjanskaya pyrkhlabija. However, according to some information, by 1821 the quantity of its inhabitants had already reached 50 000.⁸ This city was put forward as the centre of the Bessarabia region in 1818 with the purpose to organize and control the life of the local population and to carry out the empire political and cultural senses through practices by power rituals and symbols. Officials from St. Petersburg, including L.S. Baykov, P.P. Svinjin, and P.D. Kiselyov were sent to Bessarabia to study the situation developing there. Up to the reforming of the Bessarabia region into the province in 1828, the imperial power repeatedly came back to the question of its autonomy, introducing charters, making amendments in and additions to local laws.

Discourse practices, from travelling notes⁹ and ethnographic-statistical research¹⁰ to topographical research and construction of railways, symbolically build new space by means of the imagined statement or removal of differences as well as through the carrying over into the general categories system of the unique sense of imperial presence. The province gradually becomes the object of scientific discourse, trying to prove why this territory is Russian and does not belong to anybody else.

“The dominating belief in the Bessarabia region is Greek-Russian. [...] customs and traditions of local inhabitants cannot be identical due to the existence of different nations making up the population of the Bessarabia region, but as Moldavians are the major part of inhabitants, all others (except yids (Jews)) get used to their customs. Customs of a simple Moldavian people in many respects are similar to Little Rus’ ones [...] Main and native inhabitants of the land are, in essence, Moldavians or Vlachs, who as it has been said above, the descendants of Roman colonists. They still speak Semiroman or decayed, spoilt Latin dialect. Moldavians got their name from the name of the small river Moldavy; however, Poles, Hungarians and other neighbors call them just the way all Italians are called – Vlachs. This name has different origins: some believe it is from Roman commander Flakka, while others think it is from valick (*val-lis* the valley), but it is more probable that Vlachs, originally, are natives of Italy and they received their name from the name volski – Volsks, inhabitants of a part of Italy,

called Latium located between the mouths of the Tiber and the Circei. The word Volsks changed into the word Volhs, and then Lochs.”¹¹

The geographical space, its ideological and physical conquest and “successful integration” into the empire mechanism is entered into the focus of attention of a similar sort of historical literature.¹² Topographical research developed by the imperial power was supposed to promote the mental perception process of space. A.Veltman¹³ who served in Bessarabia in 1818-1830 as a military topographer, within the limits of his main employment duties in the area in 1828 created one of the first “Nachertanija drevnej istorii Bessarabii” (“Sketches of Ancient History of Bessarabia”) with the attachment, namely, a historical map of Bessarabia and lines of Trajan embankments – Upper, Lower, Prut and Snake.¹⁴ Cartography, having created the conditions to transfer real space into the framework of the imagined, partially promoted its reduction, concentration and alignment in relation to the rest of the imperial discourse.

Unlike physical maps which to a greater extent are intended to display reality, historical maps gave a chance to describing and comprehending. From the whole list of historical monuments, apparently, especially relevant in the importance for the imperial discourse were the signs of former glory of another empire. The guidebooks published in the second half of the XIX century retained numerous descriptions of Trojan embankments as one of the boundaries of the Roman Empire. The name “Trajan embankment” reminded P. Andreev “of the name of the sovereignty epoch of Romans in ancient Dacia, which is now Bessarabia”.

“When and who built Trajan embankments is not known; but archeologists tend to believe that they were erected by Bastorns who lived there till the III century of Christian era. The use of the name “Trajan” which has remained hitherto in national memory, very probably indicates the time of the embankment construction when Roman emperor Trajan, at the end of the I century and the beginning of the II century A.D., waged wars against Dacians, inhabitants of Bessarabia. The name was so adopted by the natives that they turned the name “Trajan” into a common noun for all ancient embankments that could be met in many other places of Bessarabia”.¹⁵

Construction of railways, symbolical embodiment of modernization and development of new spaces by the empire played a significant role in representations of Bessarabia spaces as the empire parts. One of *Illustrirovannye putevoditeli po zheleznym dorogam imperii* (*The Illustrated Guidebooks to Empire railways*) marked the following in the description of Bessarabia: “surrounding conditions were far from usual, pictures passing by before the eyes are new, however, at the same time one can hear Russian speech though from time to time it is incorrect, occasionally one can come across purely Russian types and one can feel that it is a part of Russia, a part of that powerful organism which filled half

of Europe and Asia, united into one whole and assimilated a whole number of tribes and peoples.¹⁶ Imperial ideological patterns became the most accessible answers in various situations of ordinary practice. However, the adaptation process of ideological mythologeme in the empire suburbs was determined not only by the state policy, but also by the traditions of autochthonous population.

The next stage in the development of Bessarabia province¹⁷ is connected with the program of reforms promulgated in 1856 by Alexander II. The provision of Bessarabia peasants¹⁸ with land in 1869¹⁹, with the inconsistency and discrepancy typical for the Russian empire, raised a relative density of small proprietors, but did not manage to completely legalize the private property of peasants over the land and kept some elements of communal relations of land use. Conducted institutional reforms reflected the ideas of the principle of separation of power, equality of citizens before the law, new bodies of local authorities – *zemstva* – selected once every three years following the principle of three boards of city citizens, individual land owners and peasant communities established on the level of districts and provinces. Provided with rather limited rights and abilities, local authorities, nevertheless, made their contribution to the modification of social life. Reforms revived some actions of power and administration; however, they lowered the status of the privileged province and, starting in the middle of the XIX century, strengthened ethnopolitical contradictions.

In this respect it is necessary to mention that the population of Bessarabia, mainly incorporated as the orthodox people, was perceived by the central power as an equal subject and did not attract any special attention to itself up to the second half of the XIX century. Moreover, the Russian national project was in a latent condition for a long time so the problem of Russification of “foreigners” was not on the agenda till the middle of the XIX century.²⁰ However, the amplified Rumania influence of the national discourse aroused suspicions of the imperial authorities.²¹ Earlier “problem free” Moldavians became now the object of “steadfast attention”. In spite of essential efforts undertaken against the Rumanian influence, imperial officials of all levels repeatedly noticed that the problem’s essence is the borderiness of the province closely adjoining the Rumanian state. It became even more complicated due to the disappointment of Russian politicians as Bessarabia still did not play the expected role for which it had been called upon as a part of the Russian empire. After several decades after its joining it became clear that Bessarabia would not become the base “for further conquests on the Balkan peninsula that it would not serve as a transition stage in our offensive movement to the Bosphorus”.

“Even though during this time there was a certain change in the general direction of our Eastern policy, the care for all Christian citizens of Porta stopped being the center of attention as the protection of Slavic interests on the Balkan peninsula began to be put forward; from this point of view the Roman population of both parts of Moldova (one half is Bessarabia, the other is Prut) and also Walachia (all of them together with Bukovina and Transylvania make up modern Rumania) as though sepa-

rating northern Slavs from Southern, could only interfere with their brotherly merge in the future”.²²

Thus, fresh political trends and moods led to the creation of ideologeme of *other* space in the empire suburbs. “This people – Rumanians – has a special trace and I cannot conceal the feeling that when looking at the map, I become disappointed that these eight millions of the tribe alien to Slavs settled here on the charming slopes of the Carpathian Mountains, creating as though a wedge between Slavic tribes and interfering with their joining”.²³

Meanwhile, behind the Prut the Rumanian national project that began in the middle of the XVII century, in the second half of the XIX century made a swift jump having moved according to M. Hroch’s classification²⁴, from phase “A”, that meant the awakening of interest of a small group of intellectuals in the ethnic language and culture, to phase “C” when the national idea acquires mass public support. Intellectual and political initiatives aimed at the construction of national statehood, came to the end with the formation in 1859 of the Rumanian state. Historical science, being not only a fascinating activity, but also an argument in political disputes, involved the whole generation of intellectuals in the working out of the Rumanian national history discourse. Its internal disagreements were minimized, and almost the whole discourse was submitted to the unifying principle. The unitary historical concept offered the uniform national space geography which was defined by the rivers Danube, Dniester and Tisza. Political mythology relied on sacral bases of *unity* and *destiny* of the nation. However, if the destiny of the nation is predetermined, then there should exist certain historical and geographical predefiniteness of its space, “rallied round the ridge of the Carpathian mountains”.²⁵ Thus, in the spirit of intellectual romanticism which introduced the question of national borders on to the political proscenium and produced its “ideal map” of the national state²⁶, the Rumanian discourse of Bessarabia irredenta was formed in the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX century.

Poet M. Eminescu, one of the national project architects, stated: “I believe that since the fourteenth century Bessarabia has not been entirely Turkish or Tatar but has been a part of the state that formed itself, that was independent, though weakened and trampled in its possessions, namely, Moldova”.²⁷ In his opinion, since the most ancient times of the Rumanians existence on the face of the earth, “our Bessarabia, this *lambeau de terre*, had had the honor to be a component of, though transient, but, nevertheless, great state of Shtefan Voivoda, the son of Alexander Dobry. Such it will remain for centuries, an integral part of either Walachia in the fourteenth century or Moldova in the fifteenth century before its capture by Russians”.²⁸ “Our rights to Bessarabia are long-standing and are very well grounded [...] Bessarabia was ours when Russia did not even adjoin to us, Bessarabia was ours by right, having been won with ploughs and protected with weapons, from the fourteenth till the nineteenth centuries”.²⁹

Trends of the new time defined the trajectory of changes in the mythological content of the national project, having moved the accents from the historical mission of separate heroes as nation founders to the defining role of broad masses. The literature of the histori-

cal romanticism epoch created the image of “people of the land” who managed to defend the continuity of national history.³⁰ “Rumanian peasants everywhere, from the Tisza to the Dniester, are identical”³¹ “there are no other differences than the existing forms of state organization and elite culture between the peasants in the valleys of the rivers Dniester, Reut, Byk and the left bank of the Prut and the peasants from the right bank and valleys of the rivers Siret, Moldova and Bystritsa”.³² The image of the Eastern borderland of the Rumanian civilization under the alien power focused attention on the untouched sources of traditional Bessarabia culture. “In this patriarchal world everyone always remained what he always was”. Besides, the one who lived between the rivers Prut and Dniester always happened to find himself “on the way of all troubles” and was in constant threat of extortionate attacks from the North and the East. “Just like Rumanian history, the national song and, together with it, everything that is represented as the cultural legend of the people is waiting for us (researchers – V.B.) behind the river Prut. Let’s not delay!”³³

Inspired by professional inquisitiveness, well-known Rumanian historian N. Jorga undertook his first trip to Bessarabia in 1905. What he saw there strengthened his concept of the remaining traditional culture of the Moldavian population, but it also showed him a different image of Bessarabia. “Kishinev is a big military center. [...] The barracks are placed in all parts of the city with orchestras playing military hymns, officers in bright groups and on their own [...] this captured Bessarabia is now a well protected area”.³⁴ There is an invisible border between city and rural life and it divides the inhabitants into two different worlds. On the one hand, “a peasant, unshakable in his proud Moldovanism (‘moldovenie’ – V.B.). Nothing in the existing conditions can make him doubt it”. On the other hand, there is the city where “Jews and rogues find food through intermediation and contraband”, where there is “official administration” and “the landowner if not Russian then is Russified”. “Peasants know nothing about political life. They recognize themselves, just like a hundred years ago, only as the people of their village, neighboring vicinities or connect themselves with a small river nearby”.³⁵

Modernization processes that influenced the empire’s western part at the end of the XIX – the beginning of the XX century, in the conditions of cultural borderzone and social and economic periphery of Bessarabia aggravated contradictions and problems connected with the marginal status of the area. In spite of the fact that almost half of the population of Kishinev consisted of Jews, this city appeared to be one of the main Anti-Semitic centers of the Russian empire³⁶. Duke Sergey Urusov appointed by the Imperial government in May, 1903 to serve as the governor of Bessarabia (after the Jewish pogroms) “on the one hand, had to take up one part of the responsibility for all the negative sides of the Russian state life of the last decades, while on the other hand, he had to make efforts in order to start building it using new principles”³⁷. Duke Urusov was considered to be quite liberal and until his trip to Bessarabia knew about it “as much as he knew about New Zealand”. He was sent by the imperial government to the western suburb of the Russian empire that without “sentimental Jewphileness” “to deeply understand and eliminate the reasons of the Kishinev pogroms. Conclusions of the new governor were unexpected and undesirable

for the imperial government and that subsequently led to the unexpected discharge of Urusov from the governor's post (they even filed a case against him for the publication of his "Notes of the Governor"). "As I saw it soon the main consequences of the pogrom were to be found not in external damages but in the broken regular labor, in the stagnation of industry and trade, but mainly, in the mood that encouraged discord and enmity among the population"³⁸. The governor saw Bessarabia province as "a pear". Its oblong part adjoining the river Prut that "separates Russia from Austria and Rumania" presented him with a variety of special qualities in relation to other parts of the Russian empire. "Russians, people of Small Rus', Poles, Jews, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans-colonists, Swisses from the village Chabot, and some Gagauz people and, at last, in a large quantity, Moldavians – absolutely stunned me the first time"³⁹. Urusov emphasizes the special position of Izmailsky district in Bessarabia, "which was again attached to Russia in 1878 after the war with Turkey. Earlier this district was a part of Rumania and was divided into three prefectures – Izmailsky, Bulgarian and Kagulsky with the main cities of the same names. [...] There were no noble establishments, no zemstvo, no volost and rural administration with zemstvo chiefs in Izmailsky district as it maintained the Rumanian municipal communal structure. [...] and that is how Izmailsky district till this moment managed to remain an exception in the Russian district system; it is probably destined to wait for the general reform of our local administration if it again, due to some international combination, does not become a part of Rumania stretching to it its parent embraces through the boundary river Prut"⁴⁰.

However, the prolonged process of the international acceptance and recognition of the Rumanian national state in the second half of the XIX century complicated and delayed the prospects of the return of these territories. Diplomatic and political collisions of the First World War made Rumania face the dilemma of annexation of Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina or Bessarabia in case of joining the Entente forces. On August, 27th, 1916 Rumania decided to support the Entente. The subsequent situation was as dramatic as unpredictable. By the beginning of 1917 the southern part of the front had overflowed Bessarabia with meetings carried out under the slogans to overthrow the imperial government and to stop the war. The first mass actions of Bessarabians in the spring of 1917 led to the emergence of political associations which formulated the programs of sociopolitical transformations in independent Bessarabia. In April, 1917 the Moldavian National Party was created; in May of the same year the Moldavian central committee of soldiers and officers and in August the Bessarabia Peasants party were also created. But quickly enough, and to a great extent under the influence of Transylvania battalion soldiers, the concept of transformation of the province into an autonomous republic was turned into the idea of the association of all Rumanians. The new legislative body Sfatul Tsarij proclaimed the creation of the Moldavian Democratic Republic on December, 2nd, 1917. However, due to an extremely complicated internal and external situation in the Moldavian Republic Sfatul Tsarij adopted the *Declaration of Union with Rumania* on March, 27th, 1918.

At the same time, not everyone in Moldova accepted the idea of the union with Rumania positively. For example, during the congress of teachers in May, 1917 the main speaker P. Gore, when calling the audience "Rumanian brothers" heard screams in response: "We are not Rumanians, we are Moldavians!"⁴¹ The reserved attitude of Bessarabia Moldavians towards the Pan-Rumanian national project was caused by their estrangement after 1812 from the main stages of its realization: Antiturkish revolts of 1821; standardization and Latinization of the language in the middle of the XIX century; formation since 1859 of the Rumanian statehood, political class and royal dynasty (1866). When one considers linguistic and cultural Russification of the bigger part of Moldavian society, a high degree of political repressions and a considerable level of the population illiteracy, national movements before the beginning of the XX century simply could not be an influential force in Bessarabia. The Revolution of 1905 witnessed only the embryo emergence of the national movement in Moldavian associations at universities of the western part of the Russian empire though political excitement and publicist activity of 1905 did not last long. The reaction against the national movement that followed kept only some of its veterans. Before the First World War the national movement in Bessarabia was limited only to the magazine *Cuvânt Moldovenesc* ("Moldavian Word") published by P. Halip.

Naturally, after February, 1917 the Moldavian revolutionary movement, painfully regenerating into the national one in a sharp competition with the ideology of Bolshevism and nostalgia feelings about "old Russian days" was not able to continue independently without the military and political help of Rumania.

Bessarabia, after uniting with Rumania in March, 1918, was soon compelled to make concessions to the office of the conservative government of A. Margiloman and to limit its independent status initially stipulated in *the Declaration of Union*. As an incorporated province, after March, 27th, 1918 Bessarabia maintained its wide administrative and political autonomy⁴², and till November, 1918 it still had its elective authorities. The functions of Sfatul Tsarij and the Board of directors as authorities were fixed in *the Declaration of Union* and consisted of "budget formation, control over employees of zemstvo and cities, appointment of local administrative executive bodies officials". After the adoption of the royal decree on May, 23rd, 1918, Sfatul Tsarij was abolished, and the post of the general commissioner of Bessarabia was created on June, 13th. In April, 1920 the Board of directors was also abolished.

Resolute actions of the central government on unification of administration standards, as well as some of its actions "to enforce law and order" infringed on the interests and defined the motivation of counteraction of certain Bessarabia social segments. First of all, it concerned the provincial zemstvo Kishinev. Apparently, during that period the process of the definitive political identification of two basic passionate groups was coming to an end; there were two oppositely focused discourses either towards Rumania or towards Russia (the Soviet Union), and in relation to them there was the third one relying on the idea of regional self-identification. The act of union found both its apologists and critics among the intellectuals. Historian Sh. Chobanu, who devoted several monographs to Bessarabia,

asserted, that “the national movement in Bessarabia emerged as the deep excitement of the whole people, as the great breath of masses and a collective action”⁴³. The author believes that the national movement of Bessarabia Rumanians naturally penetrated into the general aspiration of the people of the western part of the Russian empire (Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, Poles and Ukrainians) for independence. They “possess inexhaustible reserves of energy and creative forces, their culture surpasses Russian culture, despite resourceful efforts of the imperial government to denationalize them”⁴⁴. The image of Bessarabia as *interstitio*, that is a certain cultural space which since 1812 had been between Rumania and Russia but had torn away imperial expansion became a new explanatory image of the whole political discourse.

After the union Bessarabia, having reached certain improvements in the economic and social life,⁴⁵ on the whole in its development considerably lagged behind the level of other historical provinces⁴⁶. From the undeveloped province of the European part of the Russian empire it turned into a backward Eastern province of Royal Rumania with the prevalence of the agricultural sector. Even the supporters of the union were compelled to ascertain the complexity of the province integration into the general Rumanian context: from the economic problems caused by the backwardness of the infrastructure and communications, adapted for the strategic requirements of the former empire, to the social and cultural ones caused by the special structure of its population⁴⁷. The situation became even more complicated due to the ineffective political system and affinity of the border with the USSR that represented a constant Bolshevik danger⁴⁸. The latter made the Rumanian administration use rigid tactics of forced measures and interdictions thus, leading to collective consciousness disappointment in the union⁴⁹.

The province's uncertain political status as a part of Rumania was also a source of constant instability. Bessarabia turned out to be the only territorial acquisition which was not supported by any international contract. The union was not recognized by the Soviet Russia and, unlike the former Austro-Hungarian territories, by Western countries. The border of Bessarabia was the most disputed of all the questions discussed at the Parisian peace conference. The American delegation, and, in particular president W. Wilson, was confused by the absence of any plebiscite on this problem among the local population; while the plans of the delegations of Great Britain and France, concerned about the struggle against the Soviet Russia, did not include territorial changes in those regions which still supported the former imperial power.⁵⁰

The failure of the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations pushed the process of Moldova transformation into the ideological direction. Embodied by Stalin in the 1920-1940s the Bolshevik program of modernization assumed the transformation of the multinational empire into the state of the nations. Each republic received its own communist party and its own government, while the title nations were also provided with additional rights. However, the ideological orientation towards the world revolution and territorial expansion left its mark on the configuration of national projects. The latter was used as the basis for the setting up in 1924 on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the Moldavian

independent Soviet Socialist Republic which, in accordance with the plan of the project initiators was “to play the same role of the political-propaganda factor, as the Byelorussian republic did in relation to Poland and Karelia in relation to Finland. It was supposed to draw the attention and sympathy of Bessarabia population to, therefore, strengthen the arguments in favor of the reunion of Zadniester with it (i.e. Bessarabia – n. n.)”⁵¹

The pact Molotov-Ribbentrop on August, 23rd, 1939 served as the foundation for the re-annexation of Bessarabia in June, 1940 when the Soviet government categorically referred to “a century-long unity of Bessarabia occupied mainly by Ukrainians” and “the fact of violent tearing Bessarabia” away from the Soviet Union⁵². On August, 2nd, 1940 the VII session of the Supreme Council of the USSR passed the law on the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic creation. Though the Soviet pseudo-statehood did not allow to have the real rights, the formal symbols, including the flag and the arms and the state opera, were supposed to support the image of the Moldavian republic as a part of the Soviet Union in political consciousness⁵³.

The Moldavian national project of the Soviet power confirming as the basic principle the condemnation of “bourgeois nationalism” and deification of the domination of “proletariat”, nevertheless, inherited a number of contextual signs from the old imperial order. The search for Slavic roots in the historical and ethnic measurement and elimination of border characteristics of the Prut-Dniester space became mythological constants of the new national project. Treatises on history actively began “to establish” the national past in response to “the party and government appeal”. The times of the Middle Ages which gave enough operative open space to the new ideological scheme of Moldavian ethnogenesis turned to be quite helpful though the information is vague due to written sources. We shall give only some of the incarnate literary myths in the texts of the Moldavian history of the 60-70s. *At the beginning there was nothing* as “after the devastating invasion of the Huns in the last third of the IV century the territory of the Dniester-Prut interfluvium was almost completely deserted. The V century in this territory is presented only by very few archeological findings”⁵⁴. Moreover, according to the logic of the cosmogonic scenario develop, there appears the first of the subjects personifying the founders of a new paradigm. “The end of the V – the beginning of the VI century in history of the Dniester-Carpathian lands witnessed a new stage connected with the mass advancement of Slavs to Southeast Europe. They moved from Central and Eastern Europe and by the end of the VI – the beginning of the VII century, having destroyed the system of defensive works on the northern border of the Byzantine Empire – the Danube, turned to the south, having occupied the whole territory of the Balkan Peninsula. In the Dniester-Carpathian lands Slavs moved from the north to the south through the valleys of the Siret, Prut and Dniester”⁵⁵. Then the basic action of *overcoming chaos* begins. “Unlike the fast advancement of nomad tribes, Slavs due to their agricultural, settled character of economy moved more slowly, therefore, the process of settling was going simultaneously with the process of the territory’s economic development. In the VI–VII centuries Slavs occupied a considerable part of the territory of the Dniester-Carpathian lands”⁵⁶. The name of Moldavian forefather was supposed to add

sense and legitimacy both to the sources and the subsequent events. "Gradually, a uniform Slavic flow occupying the lands in Central and the Eastern Europe was divided into Eastern and Western Slavs. The Old Russian annals "Povest' vremennyh let" ("The Russian Primary Chronicle") talks about the settling of Eastern Slavic tribe unions in Eastern Europe. The farthest southwest of the territory of this settlement was occupied by Tiverians and Ulichs. [...] There are about 100 Eastern Slavic monuments of the end of the IX – the beginning of the XII century known on the territory of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic."⁵⁷ By the middle of the X century Kiev state united Eastern Slavic tribes while "Tiverians and Ulichs were the last to enter it" "having become a component of the culture of the Eastern Slavic world". As a matter of fact, we can talk about the re-projection of the Prut-Dniester space from the periphery of the Roman world into the periphery of the Slavic one. Later, by the IX century the formation of the ethnocultural community Vlachs had taken place as a result of "movements of Slavs in two streams, bypassing the Carpathian Mountains and partially settling in the deserted Dniester-Carpathian lands, to the west and to the south of the Carpathians where there was the Romanized population (the second participant of the creative activity – V.B.)", as well as "long and close contacts of the Romanized population and Slavs". However, the "brightest" moment of the given narrative is the episode of the emergence of *Moldavian ethnogenesis*. "The Vlach population which settled in the XII–XIV centuries on the territory to the east of the Carpathians formed the basis for the formation of Moldavian nationality. Having moved to new, poorly populated areas, Vlachs found themselves in the natural-economic and political conditions differing from the places of settlement of other Vlach branches in the Carpathian-Danube territories. These new conditions and contacts with Eastern Slavs encouraged the emergence and development of original ethnic lines in comparison with the rest of Vlachs". The main ethnic distinction of Moldavian nationality from other Eastern Roman communities consisted in its forming through the contacts of Vlachs in the XII–XIV centuries with the remaining Eastern Slavic (Old Russian) population on the territory of the Dniester-Carpathian lands⁵⁸. Thus, according to Marx-Lenin theory, the general ancestors of Rumanians and Moldavians – *Vlachs*, *Voloachs*, were divided into two branches through their interaction with Southern and Eastern Slavs during the stage preceding the ethnogenesis.

The reduction of complex ethnic processes in the ideological activity gave the Prut-Dniester space the role of the historical borderzone between the Slavic and Roman world. Certainly, Moldavians "deduced" through double Slavization of the Eastern Roman population, according to the Stalin theory of the nations, at the end of the XIX century were supposed to be ready to form "Moldavian bourgeois nation" and later "Moldavian socialist nation"⁵⁹ which was to generate its own statehood⁶⁰. In a new political context cultural distinctions acquired paramount importance and were used to mark ethnic differences and borders between Moldavians and Rumanians. Historical material once again became a battle field for "the possession of the past". Rumania, according to the Soviet ideological conceptions, was assigned the role of *other*. This otherness was fixed, in particular, in the

practice of Soviet historiography which treated Rumanian historical sources after 1812 as “foreign”, including the interwar period when Bessarabia was a part of royal Rumania.

V. Petrus van Myers, the researcher of Dutch origin, in his monograph devoted to the historiography of Bessarabia during the Soviet period, comes to the conclusion, that at that time journalists, historians and politicians abused the duality of terms “Moldova” and “Bessarabia”. Just like in the case with the concept “the Soviet people”, one could observe the substitution of the definition “the Moldavian people” when it came to the issue of the republic’s territory. According to the constitution of 1978, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was “the republic of the Moldavian people” with this definition specifying that all other minorities of the country belonged to the Moldavian people and, consequently, the territorial component of this concept dominated over the ethnic one⁶¹.

At the beginning of the 90s, after the USSR disintegration, the reconstruction of the image of the national past at a mass level was actively done under the influence of new political processes and social practices. In the majority of the Post-Soviet states where the project of national construction had been started, history was assigned the role of “the catalyst of ethnic Renaissance processes” and the theoretical base of the idea of statehood. Apparently, the scope of political projects directly affected the scale of references to mythological components of mobilization narratives. In the Republic of Moldova a new political class dissatisfied with professional historians in the construction of the Moldavian nation, undertook it upon itself to create history⁶². The invention of the past in the Republic of Moldova became a political activity directed at “mass mobilization”. Therefore, the country’s territory was quickly turned into the sacral space of the Moldavian nation. As the historical centers of medieval Moldova remained outside the republic’s borders, this obstacle was overcome by the transfer of the discourse from the scientific-historical one into literary-ideological. “Here is our Moldova!”⁶³ The phrase used by the first hospodar of the Moldavian land is now used as an antithesis. “We actually know very well that all of us are Bessarabians, a special, restless tribe in the space of Europe. It is our great “national secret”. We are not going to convince anyone of our loyalty because we are located directly in the middle of this old continent for the freedom of which our ancestors time and again sacrificed their lives. We shall not be at all ashamed of our “provincial “origin”⁶⁴.

The political game dealing with the history theme showed the charm of the myth of “the Golden Age” as against the randomness and confusion of the present; the past was seen as the storehouse of unity and consistency. The integrity of the constructed identity could only be shown as the one that has continually been around since old days while the presence of eternal symbols added special importance to each stage and any fact of history. The former president of the Republic of Moldova, P. Luchinsky uses the archetypical template of the sacral centre to present his reflection over Moldova’s identity: “Moldova really was and is, as they sing in a well-known folk ballad, “a heavenly spot”, “the country with the most fertile land”⁶⁵. Spatial conception of the Moldavian nation-formation project offered its own spiritually-organic model of space to the political-geographical borders.

V. Stati wrote in his *Istoriia Moldovy* ("History of Moldova"): "The eye sees the Prut valleys in which pure fields spread up to the Dniester are reflected, wide plains is hazy space in the size similar to the ocean. The majestic Dniester washes high coasts in the shade... If the Greek goddesses had learnt about these places, they for certain would have settled here, having left their mountains. And the Prut, a rich river, winds among boundless steppes with fertile fields on the banks..."⁶⁶ Myths of the heroic past generated the images of "the nation's Golden Age" and its founders: "It happened so that from the XIII century, but especially in the XIV century, the Carpathian-Dniester Romanized population in order to differ from others and to protect the territory, was called Moldavians. Under this name, and only under it, it was immortalized in the national creativity, in the documents of the State office, in all Moldavian-Slavic chronicles and Moldavian annals in the language of Moldavians..."⁶⁷

V. Stepanjuk in his aspiration to build symbolical legitimacy of the Moldavian statehood, confirms: "The population formed as a result of the merge of radical free Dacians with Romanized Dacians who came from the West, and with the Slavs who came from the East" in the Carpathian-Dniester area and on the lands to the east of the Dniester call themselves Moldavians, and the country Moldova is called the Republic of Moldova⁶⁸.

The most disputable question about the identification of collective "I" in relation to cultural space remained without the unequivocal answer, having broken a harmonious system of ideological monolith: tradition, territory, nation, indivisibility, and sovereignty. P. Luchinsky also confirms this: "We, Moldavians, are kind of settled somewhere in the suburb [Balkan – V.B.] peninsula, however, Balkanism concerned us too. It is possible that here one talks about Balkanism which, according to some experts, shall be understood as politics, false shine, idle talk, requisitions, squandering, tolerance. [...] but in my opinion, Balkanism is not a metaphor, rather it is the reality. It is similar to a family in which there is no harmony and all its members cannot reconcile in any way and are ready to blow up any minute; where nobody listens to anybody ..." ⁶⁹ The author believes that it is sufficient to track the names of settlements, rivers, last names and nicknames, to understand, how much we are mixed. " ... It is risky and even ridiculous to speak about pure "Latins", pure Slavs, when you have got a huge demographic hearth that the north and the south of the Danube have been for almost one thousand years; the hearth in which a great number of kins, tribes, ethnoses and peoples mixed and melted. Thus, what pure Moldavians, Russians or Romanians is it possible to speak about?" ⁷⁰

Political analyst D. Chubashenko when answering the question about the existence of one nation as an obligatory attribute of the state gives the following answer: "It is difficult to say what kind of nation lives now in the Dniester-Prut interfluvium. Officially it is "the people of Moldova" but this people is so mixed and the people's thoughts are so confused that it is too early to speak about the formation on its basis of the political nation". Even among Moldavians there is no unity, let alone Ukrainians, Russian, the Gagauz, Bulgarians ... And just among Moldavians there are disagreements concerning the questions of who they are, what language they speak and what they shall do with the state that actually fell

down on their heads. "There are Moldavians who consider themselves to be Moldavians, and the language is Moldavian. There are Moldavians who consider themselves Moldavians and their language is Rumanian. There are Moldavians who consider themselves Rumanians, and the language is Rumanian. There are Moldavians who consider themselves Rumanian-speaking Rumanians, but they still support the preservation of the statehood of the Republic of Moldova (variants – including the Dniester region or without it)". According to this author there are also Bessarabia Rumanians who are convinced, that sooner or later this silly game with the Moldavian statehood will, in their opinion, end and everything will return to a normal condition, that is Bessarabia (or whatever is left of it) will reunite with Rumania⁷¹.

Rumanian researcher L. Boja in the book devoted to Rumania as the country of the southeastern border zone, notices, that due to its nature this country is both Balkan and Eastern and Central European simultaneously, thus not belonging completely to any of the listed paradigms. The author asserts that in the context of stereotypes about the inhabitants of three historical provinces, Bessarabians most considerably differ from all other Rumanians. "Are they still Rumanians? At least, they call themselves Moldavians". But on the whole, Rumanians do not understand why Bessarabians cannot be Rumanians as earlier they used to be a component of historical Moldova and then of Rumania. Moreover, they also speak the Rumanian language so there cannot be any doubts concerning their national identity. Such interpretation, however, assumes the reevaluation of some factors (language and history) at the expense of others. In national construction, the question of utmost importance is the desire to be (or not to be) a Rumanian or a Moldavian⁷². Only the minority of the population of the republic at the moment openly supports the idea of the union with Rumania. The former Rumanian elite receded to Romania after the loss of Bessarabia or had been destroyed by the Soviet power. The past cannot be restored. Rumania concluded treaties with Moldova and Ukraine, having recognized new political configurations and borders. The author concludes that as a consequence today there are two Rumanian states; it will be even more exact to say that there is one Rumania and one Moldova⁷³.

According to American researcher C. King, the Republic of Moldova is a unique country in Eastern Europe where the discussions about national identity between the political class and cultural elite are still being conducted⁷⁴. Throughout the whole XX century for Moldavians the nationality was the subject of coordination with the constantly changeable cultural and political borders. "The territory of modern Moldova was always a border zone challenged and divided by external forces, wishing to transform Moldavians according to the forces' idea"⁷⁵. Rumanian historian A. Zub believes that there is nothing more unstable than the identity of the population existing in the border zone with such convulsive history and such tragic destiny.⁷⁶

In our research we are especially interested in ideological patterns of identification and space organization, different in their content and form, but reproducing basic characteristics of the developed political projects of delimitation, development, submission

and control. This aspect considered in terms of cultural senses and rituals can be comprehended within the framework of collective views and attitudes, transferring the most significant events and values of the past used as the basis needed to form world outlook structures of the community.

Processes of the symbolical construction of the Republic of Moldova space throughout last centuries were developed within the context of forming norm practices of collective identity political projects. Each of the mentioned periods left its special marks of *identity* on collective consciousness and configuration of knowledge. However, the search for collective “I” gave the space the role of the symbolical constant forming precedents and legitimacy models. Consequently, political projects, besides their reference to ethnic solidarity, often enough treated the territory as a steady dimension of collective experience and used this as the basis of their attempts to construct regional, cultural and political self-sufficiency. In this sense the last decade of the XX – the beginning of the XXI century turned out to be critical for the Republic of Moldova. The models existing by then represented Moldova as the crossroads of the opposite political projects focused on the West and the East. On the one hand, Moldova was seen as a part of the former Soviet empire, while on the other, it was a part of western civilization. In this situation the borders of the new political identity which were supposed to become the factor of the community construction coincided with the lines of invisible frontiers underlining the borderiness of its political, social and cultural space. The borderiness of the new collective identity of the Republic Moldova and the geography of its discourse at the crossroads of, at least, two meganarratives – imperial and national, – generated ambivalent mythology. As a consequence, in the early 90s the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was divided into two parts, having generated along the river Dniester an additional border between the Republic of Moldova and the not recognized Dniester Moldavian republic once again raising some urgent questions connected with political legitimacy, statehood and collective identity.

Notes

- ¹ The given geographical area belongs to the space between the rivers Prut and Dniester with the total area of 45 630 square km annexed by the Russian Empire according to Buharest agreement of 1812.
- ² Kantemir, D. *Opisanije Moldavii* / D. Kantemir. Kishinev, 1973. P. 8,9, 25-26; See also: Ion Chirtoaga, *Din istoria Moldovei de sud-est pina in anii 30 ai secolului al XIX-lea*, Ed. Museum, Chisinau, 1999.
- ³ Russian State Historical Archive, F. 1286. Op. 2. D. 70. LL 57-58.
- ⁴ Full Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection 1. Volume 35. 1818. SPb., 1830, p. 222-227. Historical documents in the Central military-historical archive prove that when discussing the border position of Bessarabia the military heads of the Russian Army always spoke in favor of its turning into a special military district. (See Stepan, Bulgar, *Istoriija i kultura gagauzov*, Izd. Pontos, Kishinev, 2006. P. 128).

- ⁵ Vigel, F.F. Zapiski / F.F. Vigel. Izdaniye Russkogo Arkhiva, Moskva, 1891; and also: F.F. Vigel, Zamechanije na nyneshnee sostoyaniye Bessarabii, sentyabr, 1823., Moskva, 1892;
- ⁶ Ștefan Ciobanu, *Chișinăul*, Editura Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice, Sectia din Basarabia, 1925. P. 52.
- ⁷ "This deserted country/ Is sacred for the poet's soul/It is praised by Derzhavin/And is full of Russian glory./Still Nazon's shadow/is searching for the Danube's banks..." (A.S. Pushkin, "To Baratynsky, from Bessarabia")
- ⁸ See Skurtu, I. Almash, D., etc. Istoriya Bessarabii (ot istokov do 1998 goda) / I. Skurtu, D. Almash; izdaniye 2-e. Kishineu, 2001, P. 39-40.
- ⁹ See Yakovenko I. Opisanije Moldavii i Valakhii i Rossijskoj Bessarabii // I. Yakovenko. SPb, 1828: N. Nadezhdin, Progulka po Bessarabii, Odessa, 1840; A.S. Afanasjev-Chuzhbinsky, Poezdka v juzhnuju Rossiju, tom III, chast 2, Tipografija Vozunova, SPb, 1863.
- ¹⁰ See A. Zashchuk, Materialy dlya geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami generalnogo shtaba. Bessarabskaya oblast, SPb., 1862; Idem, Etnografija Bessarabskoj oblasti // Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostej. Odessa, 1863, tom V, P. 491-586.
- ¹¹ P.P. Svinjin, Opisanije Bessarabskoj oblasti // Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostej. Odessa, 1863, tom VI, P. 357, 361, 355.
- ¹² See Mark von Hagen, Imperii, okrainy i diaspor: Evrazija kak antiparadigma dlya postsovetskogo perioda // Ab Imperio, nr. 1, 2004, (<http://abimperio.net/scgi-bin/aishow.pl?state=showa&idart=897&idland=2&Code=>)
- ¹³ Veltman, A.F. (1800-1870) is a Russian writer. He was sent to Bessarabia to serve as a military topographer. When in Kishinev he became a friend of A.S. Pushkin and V.F. Raevsky. He was interested in archeology and history of the area. In 1842 he became the Director Assistant in the Armory and later the Director (1852). He became a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences in 1854.
- ¹⁴ Idem, Nachertaniye drevnej istorii Bessarabii, Moskva, 1828.
- ¹⁵ Illustrirovannyj putevoditel po jugo-zapadnoj zheleznoj doroge, 3-e izd., ispr. 1899, P. 434-435. Depending on the political context, later the problem of the origin of the Trajan embankment was many times reviewed by researchers but there is still no uniform answer to this question. To study history of reserch and discussion see: Radu Vulpe, Valurile antice ale Basarabiei, in „Cuget Moldovenesc”, Bălți, an. 12, nr. 11-12, 1943. P. 79-86; George Postike, Valurile lui Trajan shi arheolozhija (sek. VI-XI), Literatura shi Arta, Kishineu, 8 septembrie, 1988.
- ¹⁶ Andreev P.N., Illustrirovannyj putevoditel po jugo-zapadnym kajonnym zheleznyim dorogam / P.N. Andreev. Kyiv, 1898. P. 409.
- ¹⁷ In 1828 the status of region (oblast) for Bessarabia was changed into province (gubernija).
- ¹⁸ Liberation during the reign of hospodar Constantine Mavrocordatas in 1749. After 1812 the Russian authorities did not dare to introduce the institute of serfdom in Bessarabia.
- ¹⁹ In southern zones of Bessarabia starting in 1864.
- ²⁰ The Law of 1854 provided the Russian language in Bessarabia with the status of the official language. (See Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1991. P. 189)
- ²¹ "After the war in 1856 when the Danube principedoms acquire the representative model of ruling Bessarabia started to show some week features of a new political direction... A young generation especially those young people who had received higher education dreamt about the single Rumania and though these dreams took the form only of cordial conversations they still gave an impetus and this new direction began to receive certain compassion.[...] This direction that was especially strong at the of the old and the beginning of the new year before the gentry elec-

- tions when the rumors started to spread that all transformations in Russia were not widespread in Bessarabia because Bessarabia was once again supposed to become a part of Moldova due to some political agreements”, (the National Archive of the Republic of Moldova, F.2, Op. 1, D. 7573, L. 65-66 verso; apud: Gheorghe Negru, *Țarismul și mișcarea națională a românilor din Basarabia*, Ed. Prut Internațional, Chișinău, 2000. P. 123-125).
- 22 L. Casso, *Rossija na Dunae i obrazovanije Bessarabaskoj oblasti*, Moskva, 1913. P. 229.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Miroslav Hroch, *Socail Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smallest European Nations*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
- 25 In representations of Rumanian historiography in the second half of the XIX century the mountaineers united while the rivers separated the national space (Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, Ed. Humanitas, București. P. 199).
- 26 “There is no such state in Eastern Europe as there is no country from the Adriatic to the Black Sea that does not cover a part of our national territory (Mihai Eminescu, *Românii peninsulei Balcanice*, in „*Timpul*”, III, nr. 211, septembrie 1878. P. 1-2; apud: Gheorghe Ghimpu, *Conștiința națională a românilor moldoveni*, Ed. Litera, Chișinău, 1999. P. 250.)
- 27 Idem, *Basarabia*, in *Basarabia română. Antologie*, (ed. Florin Rotaru), Ed. Semne, București, 1996. P. 3. The article was written on April, 7th, 1878.
- 28 Ibid. P. 23.
- 29 apud: Tudor Nedelcea, *Eminescu apărătorul românilor de pretutindeni*, Craiova, 1925. P. 74-75.
- 30 Lucian Boia, *Două secole de mitologie națională*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 2002. P. 39.
- 31 Mihai Eminescu, Op. cit. P.3.
- 32 Nicolae Iorga, *Însemnătatea ținuturilor de peste Prut*, in *Basarabia română. Antologie*, (ed. Florin Rotaru), Ed. Semne, București, 1996. P. 54. (The report was presented at the session of the Rumanian Academy on May, 12th, 1912).
- 33 Ibid. P. 61.
- 34 Idem, *Neamul românesc în Basarabia*, Editura Librăriei SOCECU AND Co, București, 1905. P. 135.
- 35 Urusov, S.D. *Zapiski gubernatora / S.D.Urusov*. (Kishinev, 1903-1904). M., 1907; pereizd. Izd. Litera, Kishineu, 2004. P. 227.
- 36 Charles King, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica culturală*, Chișinău, Ed. Arc, 2002, p. 23.
- 37 Urusov, S.D. *Zapiski gubernatora / S.D.Urusov*. (Kishinev, 1903-1904). M., 1907; Izd. V.M. Sablina, M., 1907; pereizd. Izd. Litera, Kishineu, 2004. P.9.
- 38 Ibidem. P.28.
- 39 Ibid. P.44.
- 40 Ibid. P. 206-207.
- 41 (apud: Irina Livezeanu, *Moldavia, 1917-1990: Nationalism and Internationalism Then and Now*, // *Armenian Review*, Summer/Autumn 1990, Vol. 43, No. 2-3/170-171. P. 153-193.)
- 42 The second point of the union declaration introduced the following clarification: “Bessarabia maintains its provincial autonomy led by Sfatul Țării selected by general, equal, direct and secret ballot, with its own executive body and its own management”. (*Declația Sfatului Țării Republicii Democratice Moldovenești*, in „*Cuvânt Moldovenesc*”, 10 aprilie, 1918; translation: John Skurtu, D.Almash, etc., *Istoriia Bessarabiei (ot istokov do 1998)*, izdanije 2, Kulturnoe obshchestvo “Onisifor i Oktavian Gibu”, Kishineu, 2001. P. 91.)

- ⁴³ Ștefan Ciobanu, *Unirea Basarabiei. Studiu și documente cu privire la mișcarea națională din Basarabia în anii 1917–1918*, Ed. Universitas, Chișinău, 1993. P. 32.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.* P.18.
- ⁴⁵ John Skurtu, D.Almash, etc., *Istoriya Bessarabii (ot istokov do 1998) / I. Skurtu, I., D. Almash // izdaniye 2, Kulturnoe otshchestvo "Onisifor i Oktavian Gibu"*, Kishineu, 2001. P. 140-180 see also, for instance, I. Agrigoroaiei, Gheorghe Palade., *Basarabia în cadrul României întregite (1918–1940)*, Ed. Universitas, Chișinău, 1993.
- ⁴⁶ Irina Livezeanu, *Cultură și naționalism în România Mare, 1918-1930*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1998, (*Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995).
- ⁴⁷ Bessarabia remained a province with a diverse structure of the population. In 1930 there lived 352000 ethnic Russians, 314000 Ukrainians, 205000 Jews. 87 % from the general number of the population lived outside city settlements, the majority was comprised by ethnic Rumanians that created additional difficulties for Rumanian administration in its efforts to modernize the province. (Charles King, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica culturală*, Ed. Arc, Chișinău, 2002. P. 40–44.)
- ⁴⁸ "Public opinion of the country formed an erroneous opinion regarding Bessarabia. When the Eastern province is mentioned, just for fun is or seriously, then someone necessarily says the word Bolshevik". (From the speech of politician Dimitrij Bogosh on November, 10th, 1938; Dimitrie Bogos, *La rasparantie: Moldova de la Nistru. 1917–1918*, Ed. Știința, Chișinău. P. 183.
- ⁴⁹ See Iulian Frunțasu, *O istorie etnopolitică a Basarabiei, 1812–2002*, Ed. Chișinău, Chișinău, 2002, p. 138–140.
- ⁵⁰ Charles King, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica culturală*, Ed. Arc, Chișinău, 2002. P. 37.
- ⁵¹ From the memorandum of the initiative group headed by G. Kotovsky about the necessity to create the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. The memorandum described in detail the reasons for the necessity to create the Moldavian Republic; the main ones included the decision regarding the fate of Bessarabia, its return into the USSR and further spread of the revolution in the Balkans. (Skvortsova, A. Yu., Smirnova, I.G., Bomeshko, B. G., Lisovina, A.P., Repida, L.E., Shornikov, P.M., *Istoriya Pridnestrovskoj Moldavskoj Respubliki*, T. 2, ch. I, RIO PGU, Tiraspol, 2001. P. 83-84).
- ⁵² The telegram of the people's commissioner of the foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov to the authorized representative of the USSR in the Kingdom of Rumania A.I. Lavrentjev, June 27, 1940, the Archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, F. 059. Op. 1. P. 319. D.2194. L. 89-90.
- ⁵³ Iulian Frunțasu, *O istorie etnopolitică a Basarabiei, 1812–2002*, Ed. Cartier, Chișinău, 2002. P. 218.
- ⁵⁴ *Istoriya Moldavskoj SSR. S drevnejshih vremjon do nashih dnei*, Izd. Shtiintsa, Kishineu, 1982. P. 32.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.* P. 33.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.* P. 44-45."The main ethnic difference between the Moldavian people and other Eastern Rumanian communities is that it formed due to the contacts of Vlachs with the remaining (ancient Russian) population on the territory of the Dniester-Carpathian lands in the XII-XIV" (*Ibid.*, P. 45).

- ⁵⁹ Ibid. P. 217-220; "The main ethnic territory where the formation of the Moldavian bourgeois nation was taking place included Bessarabia province as well as the districts of the left bank Podniester covering a part of Podolsk and Kherson provinces. At the end of the XIX – the beginning of the XX century the Moldavian bourgeois nation formed on the identified territory. Its main characteristics were formed as well during the same time period. They found their reflection in the national self-consciousness of the Moldavian people. The formation of the Moldavian bourgeois nation in the structure of Russia took place in the conditions of a multinational state". (P. 219-220).
- ⁶⁰ See Lazarev, A. *Moldavskaya sovetskaya gosudarstvennost' i bessarabsky vopros* / A. Lazarev. Kishinev, 1995; Aftenjuk, S. *Leninskaya natsionalnaya politika Kommunisticheskoy partii i obrazovanie sovetskoy gosudarstvennosti moldavskogo naroda* / S. Aftenjuk. Kishinev, 1996.
- ⁶¹ Wilhelmus Petrus Van Meurs, *Chestiunea Basarabeiei în istoriografia communist ă*, Ed. ARC, Chisinau, 1996. P. 138–139.
- ⁶² For the given problem: Tereshkevich, P. *Konstruirova proshloe: Istoricheskije resursy sovremennyh gosudarstvennyh ideologij (Ukraina i Moldova)* / P. Tereshkevich // *Perekrestki* № 1–2/2005, *Zhurnal issledovanij vostochnoevropejskogo pogranichja*. P. 5–20.
- ⁶³ Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovy*, Vitar-Editor, Chişinău, 2002. P. 15; Victor Stepanjuk, *Gosudarstvennost' Moldavskogo naroda. Istoricheskije, politicheskije ii pravovye aspekty*, FEP "Tipografia Central ă", Kishinev, 2006. P. 19.
- ⁶⁴ Borshevish, V. *Bremjanashejmifologii: «Kain, gdetvojbratAvel?»* / V. Borshevich. // "Nezavisimaja Moldova", ot 28 fevralja 2007; <http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2007/02/28/0301.html>.
- ⁶⁵ Luchinsky, P.K. *Moldova i moldavane* / P.K. Luchinsky. Kishinev, 2006.
- ⁶⁶ Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovy* / V. Stati. Kishinev, 2003. P. 13.
- ⁶⁷ Idem. *Shtefan Velikij, Hospodar Moldovy*, FEP «Tipografia Centrală», Kishinev, 2003. P. 56.
- ⁶⁸ Victor Spepanjuk, *Op. cit.* P. 23.
- ⁶⁹ Luchinsky, P.K. *Moldova i moldavane* / P.K. Luchinsky. Kishinev, 2006. P. 65.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid. P. 46-47.
- ⁷¹ Chubashenko, D. *Plan «1D» – devoronizatsija vsej strany* / D. Chubashenko // *Moldavskije vedomosti*. № 37 (934)/23.05.2007. P. 1.
- ⁷² Lucian Boia, *România: țar ă de frontier ă an Europei*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 203-206.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Charles King, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica cultural ă*, Ed. Arc, Chişinău, 2002. P. 231.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid. P. 5.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid. P. XVI.

DREAMS ABOUT BYZANTIUM.

Place of Civilization and Cultural Heritage of Byzantium in the Region of Central and Eastern Europe Border Zone

In May, 1921 in Vilna Belarusian thinker Ignat Kanchevsky who took the pseudonym Ignat Abdziralovich finished his essay “Vechnyj put’ (Issledovanie belorusskogo mirooshchushchenija)” (“Eternal Path (Research of Belarusian World Perception)”. The specificity of the historical way and the problem of culture genesis of Belarusians and Ukrainians were defined by Abdziralovich through civilization division:

“If the Belarusian people did not create expressive culture it was because the people’s historical heritage had a big tragedy of the national spirit which was borne only by two or three European peoples: since the X century Belarus has been and still is a real battlefield of two directions of culture, namely, Aryan, the culture of the west and the east. The border of the two [centers] of influence, dividing Slavic peoples into two camps, passes through Belarus, Ukraine and is lost in the Balkan lands”.¹

Abdziralovich believes that a ten-century “hesitation” proves that Belarusians, Ukrainians and the Balkan Slavs could not sincerely “join” either of the directions. He claims, “We neither became the people of the East nor accepted the culture of Western Europe. Because of this they began to call us dark, wild peoples”.²

What is hidden behind these words of the text that turned into a cult text for Belarusian intellectuals at the end of the 1980 – 1990s? Is it hyperhistoricism with its biased attention to traumas of the past or search for adequacy? In any case, the starting plot here is the Byzantine heritage and its reception in the region that due to historical circumstances was called the Border zone by political scientists and culturologists.

Problem of Cultural Influence/Dialogue in Border Zone

Cultural border zone can be understood as the space of regular and long-term contacts of different cultures that leads to the emergence of new cultural forms. A similar process occurs through loans, creation of new preservation variants and conversion. It also happens so that intercultural contacts cannot have any effect.³

The latest research shows that the discredited concept “*influence*” should be replaced with the term “*dialogue*” as in a wide historical prospect the interaction of cultures is always dialogic. After the first stages with an alternating activity of the transferor and the acceptancee, the other becomes one’s own, being transformed and frequently radically changing the image.⁴ The dialogue of cultures is accompanied by an increase in hostility of the acceptancee towards the one who dominates over him. There comes the stage of an acute struggle for spiritual independence. The moment when the one who kept accepting a stream of texts, suddenly changes the direction and becomes their active transmitter accompanied by a flash of national consciousness and the growth of animosity towards the participant of the dialogue who used to dominate before.⁵ Then the periphery revolt against the centre of the cultural area takes place.

One of the typological features of the cultural dialogue is the asymmetry of dialogical partnership. Binarity and asymmetry are the obligatory laws of construction of a real semiotics system.⁶ At the beginning of the dialogue the dominating party, choosing itself the central position in cultural space, imposes the periphery position on the receiver. This model is acquired by them, and they have to evaluate themselves in a similar way. However, when approaching the culmination moment, the “new” culture starts confirming its “antiquity” and applies for the central position in the cultural world.⁷ It is also essential that when passing from the condition of the receiver into the position of the transmitter, culture should throw out a considerably bigger number of texts than it absorbed in the past and, besides, it begins to expand its influence space. Thus, the intrusion of external texts plays the role of the destabilizer and catalyst, activating the forces of local culture, but not substituting them.

It is even more so as the culture of the border zone is mainly defensive, internally focused on confrontation, sometimes even aggressive.⁸ At the same time the border zone is also the space for competition between cultures, and not just the territory of “power: confrontation. In this space there also exists a specific culture of “transitive” character.⁹

Kiev as New Constantinople or New Jerusalem

In the image-symbolical situation the meeting of Byzantium and Eastern Europe was very appreciable. Already in “Tale of Bygone Years” (“Russian Primary Chronicle”) there is an idea of the divine calling of Kiev, namely it is a question of the apocryphal story about the visit by apostle Andrey of Kiev heights and the prophecy, that “God’s grace will

shine on these mountains; a great city will be there and many churches will be erected”¹⁰ Another classic declaration of the special Kiev status in the early chronicles are the words of prince Oleg said after his successful campaign against Ascol and Dir in 882: “This will be the Russian mother city”.¹¹ The majority of researchers find this metaphor to be a loan translation of the Greek μητρόπολις (metropolis) – “mother of cities”.¹² Kiev itself in many respects copied the centre of Eastern Christianity Constantinople as the city space of Kiev was formed following the image of Tsargrad, and stone construction was conducted in the imitation of the Byzantium capital. In Kiev there were gates similar to Constantinople Golden gates, the temple of St. Sofia, monasteries of St. George and St. Irina.¹³

However, Constantinople itself was built up “in the name of” Jerusalem and this allowed to underline the continuity of a new Christian capital to rescue the mankind, i.e. the role lost by “old” Jerusalem. Constantinople became the spiritual and secular center of the Universe as representatives of eastern Christianity understood it, namely, Constantinople was “New Jerusalem” and “the second Rome”. The structure of the Constantinople city space was also brought into accord with this idea. The most indicative examples include the construction of the Golden Gate – “in the name of” the Golden gates through which Christ (the Tsar of the world) drove into Jerusalem, and the temple of St. Sofia-God’s Wisdom – “in the name of” the main relic of ancient Jerusalem of the old Judaic Temple.¹⁴

Rus’ knew very well that Constantinople was New Jerusalem. This is proved by the coincidence of “plots with crosses”. Just like emperor Konstantin Veliky together with his mother Saint Elena brought a cross from Jerusalem duke Vladimir with his grandmother Olga brought a cross to Rus’. The christening of Russia was likened to the Empire conversion.¹⁵ In this case the organisation of the Kiev city space “in the name of” Constantinople could also be perceived by contemporaries as the claim for the right to become a new capital of Lord chosen or Lord promised land if one is to use the language of the Bible; it is already a “Jerusalem” plot described very clearly in the Old Russian books.¹⁶ For example, in “The Word about Law and Divine Grace” metropolite Illarion wrote about similarities between the construction of the Jerusalem temple and the Kiev Sofia cathedral¹⁷, while “Memory and Praise” by Jacob Mnih directly proclaimed, “What a wonder! Like the second Jerusalem Kiev appeared on the earth.”¹⁸

As researchers note, the perception of Kiev as a New Jerusalem, probably, existed until the moment when the concept “Moscow – the third Rome”¹⁹ was finally formed. The latter is traditionally connected with the name of monk Filofej.²⁰ However, Filofej himself never called Moscow “the third Rome” (“there were two Romes, the third is standing, and there won’t be the fourth”).²¹ One talks not about the capital, but about the kingdom. Moscow was named Rome only in the so-called “Kazan History”, written in the mid-sixties of the XVI century: “Here has appeared the capital and glorious Moscow, like the second Kiev, I will not be ashamed and I will not be guilty to say that its the third new great Rome that began to shine last summer like a great sun in the capital of our Russian land.”²² For us this citation is important because it says that the author of “Kazan history” associates Moscow not only with the third Rome, but also with the second Kiev which is, actually, called the

New Rome and, hence, the New Jerusalem as for the inhabitants of Rus' these concepts were inseparably linked to each other.

Accordingly, it is possible to assume, that already in the 30s of the XI century the idea of Kiev as the New Jerusalem and the centre of rescue of Orthodox mankind started to be formed. The thought about "Byzantine heritage", not even developed yet at that moment, could have arisen quite long before the falling of Constantinople under the Turkish attack in 1453.²³

The idea of "Kiev is the second Jerusalem" went through its rebirth at the beginning of the XVII century in connection with very specific circumstances, namely, the consecration in 1620 of the Kiev metropolite and the episcopate by Jerusalem patriarch Feofan. The consequence of this was intellectual enthusiasm and the dissemination among the educated circles of Kiev of the idea of close connections between Kiev and Jerusalem.²⁴

However, Moscow masters as the importance of their city and principedom grew started to bend towards a reverse tendency, i.e., desacralization of Kiev. After the resettlement from Kiev to Moscow, Rus' metropolites, when visiting Kiev, every time took out valuable books and church utensils from there. This practice was criticized by the grand Lithuanian duke Vitautas who in 1415, aspiring to elect a Kiev metropolite aware of the situation and having power in the Great Duchy of Lithuania declared that Moscow metropolites "took away all church honor of Kiev metropole."²⁵ A real tragedy happened in 1482 when the grand duke of Moscow Ivan III used the help of Crimean khan Mengli-Girej. On September, 1st, 1482 the Crimean Tatars attacked Kiev and destroyed it almost completely. Many books and icons were burnt. As a sign of his allied obligations Mengli-Girej sent a gold chalice from St. Sofia profaned by Tatars to Ivan III; the fact that such a gift was accepted, shall be regarded as sacrilege.²⁶

Actually, the attitude of the Moscow ruling circles towards Kiev was dual.²⁷ On the one hand, they wanted to expel this ancient city-symbol from public consciousness and minimize its spiritual authority. However, on the other hand, Moscow based its foreign policy program on the accentuation of the role of Kiev in the life of the Old Russian lands when, according to the grand duke of Moscow Ivan IV, "and Vilna, and Podolsk lands, and Halitia lands, and Volynsk lands all belonged to Kiev."²⁸ At the end of the XV – the beginning of the XVI century Moscow even managed to fix its claims on Kiev in its allied agreements with the emperors of the Sacred Roman Empire.²⁹

Kiev was not less important from the point of view of claims of the Moscow dukes on the tsar title which was officially accepted by Ivan IV in 1547. The basis of these claims was the "Monomakh cap" legend. Shortly before 1480 when Moscow finally got rid of the power of Mongols, the grand duke Ivan III married Sofia Paleolog, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. Thus, Moscow court acquired Byzantine greatness and ceremonial. The ideological base was supported with the legend that Emperor Constantine Monomakh granted signs of the imperial power and a crown to the Kiev duke Vladimir Monomakh. Then the crown presented became the regalia of Moscow grand dukes. As a result, post factum Kiev was given the imperial status, while Moscow was declared to be the Kiev heir-

ess and the successor of the imperial tradition. Besides, the acquisition of this status meant the formulation of the foreign policy program potentially allowing Moscow to lay claims to all territories which were managed by some Rurikovich. Already in the 1520s Pskov monk Filafej formulated the general outline of “the third Rome” concept which described the result of the mixture of secular and religious heritage.³⁰ However, the monarchs of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, for example, Sigismund August in 1548, had their own arguments as Kiev was a part of the GDL and “it was not decent for anyone to use the name and title of the Kiev kingdom, only his royal Worship could do it but not the grand duke of Moscow.”³¹

Modern Ukrainian researcher Olena Rusina supposes that the reaction to the discrepancy of Kiev heritage “privatisation” was, in essence, “compromise theory” according to which Moscow already incorporated the Kiev heritage, therefore, as a matter of fact, it was the second Kiev.³² There are not many proofs of this theory, thus allowing Charles Galperin to say that it was not explicitly stated.³³ But as it becomes apparent from the quoted fragment of “Kazan history” and as O. Rusina notes, the “Moscow is the second Kiev” concept found its embodiment in the monuments of Russian thought in the XVI century. Actually, at that time in Moscow there co-existed two ideas: “Moscow is the second Kiev” and “Moscow is the third Rome”.

It lets us see that in order to preserve the role of the spiritual and political centre of Slavic Eastern Europe Kiev took up the symbolically-sacral functions of Constantinople, and through it of Jerusalem. The latter image concept (“Jerusalem”) only strengthened with the beginning of the new time (from the XVI century) while the ideological importance of Constantinople subordinated by Turks, grew considerably dull. However, (at first, the Moscow state), the emerging Russian empire did not need a symbolical competitor. Therefore, it became clear that the role of Kiev as New Constantinople should have been minimized a long time ago and then its being New Jerusalem that remained in people’s consciousness, though the internal gravitation towards “Kiev times” and “Kiev heritage” was still, nevertheless, experienced by Moscow ideologists thus exposing the duality of the Kiev role in a new imperial ideology.

East and West in Ukrainian Perusal: “Byzantine Factor” of Ukrainian Historiography

The counting of representations of modern Ukrainian academic thought regarding the reception of Byzantine heritage shall be started with the works of the Ukrainian historiography classic M. Hrushevsky. In his “History of Ukraine-Rus” M. Hrushevsky addressed the eternal problem of the countries in our region, namely the problem of choice, “In the first centuries of historical life Ukraine occupied a middle position between the influences of Eastern and Byzantine cultures which, however, itself was an alloy of antique and Eastern elements. In the other half of the X century Ukraine unconsciously turned from the East to Byzantium.”³⁴ However, M. Hrushevsky simultaneously asserted that it was

already Duke Vladimir who “consciously and vigorously” pushed Rus’ in the direction of Byzantium. According to the historian, Rus’ got under the cultural influence not of Western but Eastern Rome, i.e. Constantinople, and it was quite natural, for “Byzantium was close geographically, and its culture, both spiritual and material, was above this comparison; it is possible to say that it was a hot clear day, while a pale dawn ascended over Germany.”³⁵ Thus, Byzantine culture was closer due to its content as it acquired not only Eastern elements which Ukraine was familiar with directly, but also some Slavic elements. “It was unrealistic to expect that the western culture was to grow, and the Byzantine one was to lag behind.” Byzantium was both politically and culturally at the peak of its power and glory.

The Ukrainian historian emphasized the existence of various opinions regarding Ukraine’s “Byzantine turn”, “Current times evaluate the results of it differently: some believe that the turn to Byzantium, instead of to the West, represented great salvation, while to others it seemed to be fatal [event – *O.D.*] which prevailed then over the whole further destiny of Eastern Slavic culture.” The first opinion was, certainly, typical of Russian Slavophiles with the second one being more characteristic of Western culture supporters. Continuing his reasoning, M. Hrushevsky makes a very important conclusion, departing from manikheisky perception of history, “In reality, we do not see anything especially saving or fatal in this turn. It is clear that we did not receive any special benefits from it; but in itself this turn was not harmful. In any case, Byzantine culture itself was not worse for further cultural development than Roman-German culture.”³⁶

Claiming that contemptuous opinions about “Byzantium orientation” became a vestige of science, Hrushevsky further addresses historical stereotypes, “If for Eastern Slavic peoples this Byzantine culture degenerated into Byzantium imitation then it is not culture that is guilty, but those circumstances which did not provide any possibility to acquire the Byzantine culture in all depth and completeness, with all its noblest features and then did not allow these positive feature lines to develop accordingly.”³⁷ Besides, the acceptance of the Byzantine culture did not at all mean any exclusive counteraction to western culture as throughout later centuries of its history Ukraine and especially its western part was getting ever more close to the European culture and Byzantine bases did not prevent it from acquiring certain elements of western civilization.

Nevertheless, M. Hrushevsky remained “geographical fatalist”: “The Ukrainian territory is guilty in many respects for its historical heritage that is rich in sacred, noble, even occasionally brilliant aspirations but at the same time doubtful because of its real content which the millennium of historical life transferred to modern generations.”³⁸

Besides “historiosophic examination” “the Byzantine block” was used by M. Hrushevsky to profoundly analyze the questions of church organization, specifically the relations between the Russian church with the patriarch and the emperor as well as the reception of Byzantine law.

As a matter of fact, from the organizational point of view the land of the Kiev state made up (with a small exception) only one metropole, namely, “Russian”, which permanently depended on the Constantinople patriarch and was one of his metropolises. In spite

of the fact that this metropole surpassed in its sizes the territory of the patriarchy, its hierarchical position was absolutely low – at the beginning it occupied the sixtieth place in the Constantinople metropole, while later (in the XII–XIV centuries) it was the seventy first or seventy second, and almost completely depended on the patriarch. The patriarch himself, without any consultations with Russian dukes, chose the candidate for metropolitans, who was usually a Greek or, as a last resort, an Ellinized Byzantine, then conducted the ceremony of ordination and sent him to Rus' without any preliminary dealings with governors and bishops of Rus'.

It is important to keep in mind that in the consciousness of Byzantines there was a connection between this church-hierarchical practice and their opinion that the Byzantine emperor, due to the dependence of the Russian church on Tsargrad, had certain rights of leadership over Russia, as a protector of the Constantinople patriarch. This concept became widely known in the XIV century when Moscow dukes tried to achieve more independence for Russian (meaning Moscow) metropole. Then, in 1393, when the question regarding Moscow dukes interdiction to remember Byzantine king in churches arose Constantinople patriarch had to explain the following to Moscow dukes: the king is the tsar and autocrat (αὐτοχράτωρ) of Romeis (Byzantines) and all Christians, therefore, “it is impossible to have church and not to recognize over oneself the power of the tsar (Byzantine) as the imperial power and church have much in common, therefore they cannot be separated.”³⁹ M. Hrushevsky noted that in our corner of the world we do not know the real displays of these Byzantine sights, but we register them from the theoretical point of view.⁴⁰

Later historiography analyzed one more aspect of the Byzantine missionary work. If one is to consider this mission not from the perspective of the people who have accepted Christianity from the Byzantium but not from the Empire position, then the most important question of Byzantine Greeks is formulated as follows: “Is it possible to turn a barbarian into a Christian?” Deep contempt for barbarians from Greek-Roman culture generated the ambivalent attitude of Byzantines towards missionary work. Therefore, the answer to the raised question for a Romej was most likely negative as even Christianity would never be able to transform a barbarian into a Christian.⁴¹

Reception of Byzantine law also turned out to be a controversial issue. As M. Hrushevsky wrote that it was the law of “society that was older, considerably more developed which in those days also served as a model for Russia, had been cultivated and codified for a long time and was presented in ready, written forms and, as a matter of fact, could give answers to new questions in society evolution.”⁴² Moreover, this law had rather competent and influential propagandists, namely, the clergy who naturally praised Byzantine law as the law of Christian community in comparison with Russian law transferred by the pagan past. Thus, Byzantine law had the potential to influence Russian law, as well as its own specific sphere, specifically the church court that had certain influence over some social classes. It is logical to assume that consequently Byzantine law had to affect secular law and

legal practice, especially in the spheres close to church court, concerning mainly family law and inheritance.

It is important to underline that, in spite of such possibilities, the influence of Byzantine law on the Russian one was not very significant. This can be explained by a great difference in Byzantium and Rus' culture as well as the existence in Rus' of "deeply rooted" and different legal views. It is especially noticeable in the system of punishments. Rus' did not know corporal punishments; on the contrary, they were widespread in Byzantium. M. Hrushevsky noted that through the church sphere similar punishments came to Rus' but could not take any roots there.⁴³

In his comments to the main text M. Hrushevsky identified the problem that leads to the issue "influence – dialogue" in intercultural contacts. When speaking about certain similarities in Byzantine and Russian law, the historian says that one shall not forget about noticeable Slavinization of late Byzantium and possible influences of Slavic common law on Byzantine law. Analogies with "Ruskaya Pravda" ("Russian Truth") are found in the latest Byzantine codes – *Ecklog*⁴⁴ and *Prokhiron*⁴⁵ based on new common law, such as *leges barbarorum*, and not just old Roman law. Therefore, in each separate case one shall study the norms thoroughly as one can observe the real influence of these codes or analogy of Russian law with Slavic common law of Byzantium.⁴⁶

"Byzantine factor" continued to excite Ukrainian historians throughout the whole XX century. It is also connected with the old problem in its new interpretation, specifically, the problem of "East-West". N. Yakovenko notices that physical geography does not coincide with "the geography of representations" in respect of the basic co-ordinates East-West, North-South.⁴⁷ The most inconsistent in the Ukrainian discourse is the concept of the East. Penetration of Byzantine civilization into Podniester is believed to be the influence of the Byzantine East though in its geographical location towards Kiev Byzantium was not in the east, but in the south. It is obvious that this spatial orientation shows the transferring of the vision of Church split into Western (Latin) and Eastern (Byzantine). However, "an average Ukrainian" today still has a chimerical image of the East which combines the incompatible – Eastern Christian (Byzantine, and in a wider sense Mediterranean) civilization, Tjurk-Muslim culture of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean khanate and "really" steppe East of nomadic hordes. This context also includes exotic culture of Russia in its ancient (Moscow) hypostasis.

N. Yakovenko believes that the situation was made even more complicated by Vyacheslav Lipinsky's metaphor who already in the 1920s defined the cultural space of Ukraine as the space "between the East and the West", i.e. between Eastern (Greek-Byzantine) and Western (European-Latin) civilizations. In 1923 Lipinsky wrote that the joining of the East and the West "is the essence of Ukraine, its soul, given its historical calling, a symbol and a sign of its national identity on its birthday by God."⁴⁸ Similar evaluations can serve as an answer to the theses of another Ukrainian author, geographer and publicist Stepan Rudnitsky who presented Ukraine as a "suburb" phenomenon simultaneously both of Europe and Asia, believing it to be the space where they flew into each other. This

“suburbanness” consists of the geographical placing of Ukraine at the crossroads of three worlds – European, Oriental-Islamic and nomadic Asian. This circumstance transforms Ukraine from “the border country” into “the country of borders”.⁴⁹

Contrary to this “polyborderness” V. Lipinsky defined cultural-civilization space of Ukraine from a binary point of view. According to V. Lipinsky, the dual image of Ukraine lies in history itself starting with the hesitations between Rome and Byzantium when selecting a Christian ceremony and finishing with different directions of political and cultural aspirations towards Poland and Moscow representing “two different cultures, attitudes, concepts and civilisations”⁵⁰. This multidirectedness is the integral line of the Ukrainian nation’s existence; therefore, a successful national life requires not the mourning of “fatal geography” and mutual rivalry of two opposite beginnings, but the search for ways of their harmonization and aspiration to unite these different territorial parts of Ukraine into “one national-political and spiritual integrity”⁵¹. In his later treatise “Letters to Brothers-Grain Growers” among the reasons for Ukraine’s non-stateness Lipinsky identifies Ukraine’s geographical position as being “on the way between Asia and Europe, ... in the geographically unstable border zone of two different cultures: Byzantine and Roman” as reason number one⁵². As we can see, V. Lipinsky, nevertheless, identifies “Byzantine” and “Asian”.

Both political and intellectual environment of the first quarter of the XX century encouraged almost simultaneous emergence of rather controversial works of these well-known Ukrainian researchers⁵³. Intellectuals of Eastern Europe believed “West” and “East” to be the main antagonists of European history. In 1918 Russian thinker Nikolay Berdjaev wrote about the connection between East and West as the main theme of world history which Europe had to face⁵⁴.

It is possible to say that “borderness” ideas of Ukrainian researchers expressed between the two World wars were developed though in a changed form by one of the most influential intellectuals of emigratory Ukrainian studies in the 1960-1970s Ivan Lysjak-Rudnitsky. In his report at Slavyansk historical congress in memory of Saints Cyril and Methodius (1963) “Ukraine between East and West”, I. Lysjak-Rudnitsky defined Ukraine as a classical region of “Union traditions” because social and political structures of the European type are combined here with Eastern Christian (Byzantine) ethnos. However, it makes it possible to see a considerable modification in the traditional opinions of Ukrainian researchers in the 1920-1930s. I. Lysjak-Rudnitsky writes that “Eurasian Orient” represents a bigger threat for Ukraine than “Byzantine Orient”⁵⁵. There are also some racial notions about the introduction of “anarchiness” into the Ukrainian character by Turkic elements behind “Eurasian Orient”⁵⁶.

However, if one is to dismiss the Euro-centered axes East-West and to look beyond Ukraine’s horizons then one shall discover that the system of spatial co-ordinates becomes more complicated. First of all, as N. Yakovenko writes it is because “little will be left from the Byzantine East”⁵⁷. Having won back its historical role in the XV century, just when the Ukrainian people began to separate from “amorphous Rus” the East in Ukrainian history turns into three independent geocultural directions: the Neobyzantine North (Moscow),

the stable and developed Muslim South (Bakhchisarai and Istanbul) and the “present” East, to be exact – Great Steppe which was approaching Ukraine with the so-called Wild field of Priazovye and future Slobozhanshchina. Each of them somehow affected the formation of Ukraine’s new shape in the XV–XVIII centuries, i.e. during the epoch which laid the foundation for new Ukrainian history.

One can notice that every ethnos has its own West and East, North and South. However, this fact does not play the defining role in the formation of ethnic specificity for each ethnos. According to Yaroslav Dashkevich's concept, Ukraine’s territory can be referred to the so-called big border, namely a cultural border zone between groups of civilizations⁵⁸.

N. Yakovenko notes that before foreign Ukrainian studies could overcome an “Anti-turkic” syndrome, there had to be an alternation of generations and modification of views about history in general⁵⁹. To a great extent it was promoted by a new wave of Oriental studies. However, in the 1980-1990s foreign Ukrainian studies specialists seriously reconsidered the “West” concept in its reference to Ukrainian history. From indistinct “West in general” researchers moved to the problem of transmitting the European cultural tradition into Ukraine through the intermediation of Poland in models of political culture, types of formation, intellectual priorities, and religious positions⁶⁰. Igor Shevchenko expressed this reevaluation in the most concentrated form, “If one is to look at things from the point of view of Eastern Europe then one shall face a paradox according to which without Byzantium there would be neither Ukraine, nor Belarus, but on the other hand, there would be neither Ukraine, nor Belarus without Poland”⁶¹.

What shall one do then with the understanding of “East” as there were three “historiographic Easts” for Ukraine: Byzantium, Russia, and the Turkic world. In Ukraine’s history all these “Easts” were not only mixed up among themselves also included “West” *nuances*. N. Yakovenko is ready with the following example: the “Western” model of values dominated in school and in intellectual and political culture of the Ukrainian elite of the XVI–XVII centuries; the soteriological (the salvation doctrine) aspect of thinking tenaciously preserved the Byzantine matrix, while the knightly subculture of that same elite had obvious signs of Turkic tradition. Even more expressively this steppe Orient was fixed in the genotype, priorities of life styles, types of management, the household standard of “beautiful”, clothes, toponimies and anthroponimies⁶². In this sense Ukraine’s Ukraine due to its geographical location at the junction of Eurasian Steppe and two bodies of the European culture (“Byzantine” and “Latin”) is really the crossroads between Asia, orthodox Europe and Latin Europe. The outlined intertwining of western and eastern civilization filled the Ukrainian culture with such a rich polyphony that sometimes it is almost impossible to distinguish its “own” from the acquired ones.

***In Search of Harmony:
Newest Moldavian Historiography and Problem of Byzantine Heritage***

Modern Moldavian historiography, as well as the elite of the Republic of Moldova had to face the problem of the substantiation of the state's historical legitimacy, and, accordingly, the construction of historiographic continuity between Moldavian hospodariate of the XIV–XVI centuries and the modern Republic of Moldova.

Themes of Rome and Byzantium occupy a special place in the Moldavian historiography since they are connected with the ethnocultural and ethnolanguage origin of the Eastern-Roman people. In 106 Dacia was conquered by Roman emperor Trojan and turned into a Roman province. The urbanization of Trojan Dacia, the formation of city community (municipalities), the introduction of slaveholding, the rooting of Roman traditions and the Latin language, and, in general, of the Roman way of life, the inclusion of a new province into the general Roman economic and spiritual system could be recognized as Romanization components⁶³. Romanization was the historical process during the course of which Roman civilization penetrated into all spheres of province's life and finally led to the replacement of the language of the indigenous population with the Latin language or, more precisely, with the local versions of Latin. The formation of the Rumanian ethnos occurred as a result of mix of Dacians and Roman colonists. Rumanians and Moldavians make the two most Eastern Roman peoples with the common literary language, namely Romanian.

The Roman conquering of Dacians was accompanied by the terror of wartime which was "the original act of birth of the Rumanian people". In turn, as Vasil Stati states, the population of the Carpathian-Dniester lands, especially those people who lived between the Prut and Dniester, did not participate in this "original birth act". Geto-Dacian tribes which were not part of the Roman province Moesia (to the south of the Danube) and of Dacia (the southwest of Transylvania) and which in the I–II century AD continued to live on their own territories, were given the name "Dacia liberi" or "free Dacians" by modern Rumanian historiography. "Ancestors ... of Moldavians, free Dacians, were not in Roman chains"⁶⁴. This is the pathos of modern Moldavian historiography.

Moldova's territory even though it was not part of Dacia province, nevertheless, throughout the II–IV centuries experienced strong Roman influence. When Romans left Dacia provinces during the reign of Emperor Aurelian the basic centre of Romanization to the north of the Danube was Roman and Romanized population of the former Trojan Dacia. Liquidation of the recent border which separated the inhabitants of Roman province and free Dacians of Carpathian-Dniester area, created additional conditions for the spreading of Romanization on the whole territory of the former "free Dacia". Free Dacians were in constant contact with fellow tribesmen and gradually their counteraction to the Romanization process weakened considerably; later they adopted the language and more developed culture of the Romanized population of the former Trojan Dacia⁶⁵.

The division of the Eastern Roman world is directly connected with the split of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern and the process of Great resettlement of the

peoples⁶⁶; consequently, already in the VI century AD there seems to have been the bases for separate existence of future Moldova. In the VI century Slavs started settling on the territory of Moldova and in the IX century Slavic Ulich and Tiverian tribes began occupying the interfluvial territory of the Prut and Dniester. Thus, in the X century these lands were included into the sphere of influence of Kievan Rus'. However, the invasion of Cumans (Polovtsy) and Padzinaks (Pechenegs) had led to the disappearance of the Slavic population by the end of the XII century. Moldavian historians, supporters of Romaniaism, note the Byzantine influence on the Eastern Roman population already during the epoch of "rudimentary state formations of Rumanians". Penetration into the region to the north of the Danube of the Cyrillic writing and liturgy in the Slavic language was also accompanied by "the adoption of some Byzantine elements in the organization of state institutions, including "domini" ("reigning") following the example of Greek "basileis" and Bulgarian "tsars"⁶⁷. Thus, while the local medieval states were created, along with the "autochthonous" tradition of "National Rumanians", a great role was also played by both Byzantine-Southern Slavic influence, and the presence of the "Altay" migrating tribes. In the XIII – the beginning of the XIV century the territory of Moldova was under the power of Mongols.

The medieval Moldavian state emerged in 1359 as a result of liberation from the Hungarian rule. The struggle for independence was headed by the future prince (in the terminology of that time "voivoda") Bogdan I (the Founder) who had been Voloshsky voivoda in Maramuresh and the vassal of the Hungarian king. Soon, as a result of the victorious campaign of the grand Lithuanian duke Algirdas and the battle of Blue Waters in 1362 the interfluvial territory of the Prut and Dniester was liberated from Tatars. The eastern frontier of the Moldavian principedom was established on the river Dniester. The western border passed through the tops of the Carpathian Mountains, while the southern one went across the Black Sea and the rivers Danube, Siret and Milkov. There was no natural border in the north while Pokuttya was for a long time a disputable area leading to numerous wars between Moldova and Poland. The modern Republic of Moldova occupies the middle part of the Eastern region of historical Moldova.

Because of numerous invasions and long absence of statehood Moldova up to the XIV century did not have its own church organization. The sacred rites were performed by priests coming from the adjacent Halitsky lands. After the foundation of the Moldavian principedom a separate Moldavian metropole was formed as a part of the Patriarchy of Constantinople (for the first time it was mentioned in 1386)⁶⁸ at the end of the XIV century. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Moldavian church delegation led by metropolitan Damian participated in the ecumenical cathedral of Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Florence in 1439 which made the decision to unite both churches (Florentine Union)⁶⁹. However, the Union was rejected by the majority of the orthodox states.

When describing the process of Moldova's formation of state institutions in the XIV century Victor Stepanjuk underlines the fact that at the initial stage it had a trace of old traditions⁷⁰. Further, the Moldavian author refers to modern Roumanian researchers who believe that "such institutional structures as a hospodariate, high court services, and also the

relations between boyars and their hospodar ("lord") during that period reflected features of the rule in the Byzantine empire"⁷¹. However, when one looks at all these comparisons it becomes easy to see that the essence of the state system is described too generally, "Like the Byzantine emperors-autocrats the hospodar of Moldova disposed of life and death of the citizens whether it is a peasant, a small or big boyar"⁷².

Moldavian historians believe that hospodars of Moldova, continuing the Byzantine tradition, "adapted to new geographical, national, religious and cultural realities"⁷³, considered themselves to be the proprietors of the country's whole space and were its Supreme owners⁷⁴. The argument in favor for this statement can be found in the presence in the Moldavian hospodars' title of the adjective "autocratic" which appears already in the charter of Roman I on November, 18th, 1393: "The great autocratic master of the Moldavian land from the valley to the seacoast". It is interesting that the concept "autocratic/autocrat" allows Moldavian historians to appeal to some parallels in Russia's history. However, V. Stepanjuk believes that autocracy idea was developed in Russia one century later than in Moldova. Parallels with Russian history amplify when Moldavian political realities of the end of the XIV century are explained on the basis of the Moscow ideological practice of the XVIth century: the titles of Moldavian hospodars Peter I Mushat (1392) and Roman I (1393) containing the words "autocratic master" have what the historian of Russian church A. Kartashev defined as "the copy of the title of Byzantine basileis and the term specific to Russian people, expressing the pleasure of full liberation from the Tatar bondage"; the autocrat meant "absolutely unbound, free from any citizenship, independent"⁷⁵. Besides, the origin of autocratic ideology seems to be foreign, namely Byzantine and Southern Slavic⁷⁶. Moreover, Voloshk and Moldavian law contain some borrowings from Byzantine law. These law norms of Moldova pursued the goal "to moderate the tendencies of an encroachment of large nobility on the prerogatives of the hospodar and also to resist the attempts of the latter to liquidate the nobility privileges reflecting the sociopolitical opposition which is characteristic for all history periods of the Moldavian State"⁷⁷.

In the decades which followed the creation of the Moldavian principedom, its own interstate institutions were created and perfected: political, administrative, judicial, religious. The basis for the creation of Moldova's political establishments was formed by the original alloy of traditions of managing the local rural community according to "the custom of the land" with the Byzantine, Southern Slavic, Central and Western European traditions, thus representing. The synthesis from which original political structures of Romanian principedoms subsequently crystallized⁷⁸. Legal proceedings contained the practice of reference to written laws of the Byzantine origin, for instance, to "Legalist" ("Syntagma") by Matvej Vlastares the copy of which was made in Moldova in 1472.⁷⁹

In turn, medieval Moldova seems to have become a retransmitter of Byzantine political concepts to Moscow, thereupon, the rooting of autocratic ideology in Russia is connected with the crowning that took place February, 4th, 1498. It was the Moscow crowning of Dmitry, the son of Elena Voloshanka, the daughter of Stefan III the Great, and the

grandson of great Moscow prince Ivan III. It was “the first Moscow crowning which was later repeated and became a custom only during the reign of Ivan the Terrible”⁸⁰.

Idea of Symphony

One more aspect of the Byzantine influence is found by Moldavian historians in the sphere of state and church interaction. “Joint actions of the Moldavian State and Metropole of Moldova, mutual support of efforts of Moldova hospodar and Moldova metropolitan regarding the preservation of country’s independence and protection of its citizens”⁸¹ reminds of the “*idea of symphony* [underlined by us – O.D.] in mutual relations between Church and State, formed in Byzantium”⁸², from where it moved to Moldova. V. Stepanjuk supports the concept of ideal functioning of similar “division of power” designs referring to the opinion of Russian historiography: “The church took care of divine affairs while the state dealt with terrestrial matters; however, the state should look after the church, care about the preservation of the doctrine and “honor of priesthood”. The priesthood together with the state “directs all public life to follow the directions approved by God”⁸³.

In early Byzantium one of the fundamental ideas of medieval ideology – the idea of the union of Christian Church and Christian Empire – gradually crystallized. Theorists of Christianity believed that the essential condition for this union was the orthodoxy of Christian Church and the Emperor. Since the time of emperor Constantine I Christian concept of the imperial power gradually merges with the Roman theory of the state. Theoretical foundation of the political theory *of symphony* that dominated for a long time, specifically, harmonious relations between Orthodox Church and the Christian Emperor was developed in early Byzantium. The idea of the Byzantium Empire’s Christian providential election is connected with the Byzantium Empire. The cult of the emperor as the governor of the whole Orthodox populated universe and the cult of the Romei Empire as the defender and patroness of Christian peoples, born in early Byzantium, will be consistently strengthened over the next centuries of the empire’s existence. The imperial ideology and glorification of the imperial power are the most characteristic features of Byzantium’s public life distinguishing it from the countries of Western Europe⁸⁴. The political theory of Byzantines, their views on the state and the emperor powers strongly influenced the formation of concepts of the supreme power in the countries of Southeastern and the Eastern Europe⁸⁵.

Western church was the carrier of the universalism idea that led to the creation of the centralized hierarchical church organization headed by a theocratic sovereign, namely, the Pope. The papacy did not obey the secular power and conducted its independent policy. In Byzantium, on the contrary, the secular state itself personified a Universalist idea and was at the head of the whole Christian populated universe. Byzantium’s spiritual power was limited by the secular power through the widespread theory of Caesar-papism, i.e. full domination of the state over the church popular at some point in time but rejected in modern Byzantium studies⁸⁶.

Gilbert Dagron believes that if one wants to understand what “Caesar-papism” means it is necessary to compare and oppose this indistinct term to another one, a much more accurate term “theocracy”⁸⁷. Society can be called theocratic if it is operated by and watched over by God⁸⁸ showing, directly or indirectly, God’s will in everything. Already in the XVII century sociologists (Thomas Gobbs, Benedict Spinoza) identified a number of differences between several kinds of the political organization based on revelation and closely connected with religion: in some cases priests are content with giving legitimacy to the worldly power (“hierocracy”), in others the high priest or the head of the community possesses the supreme power believing that it is due to the fact of their holding a certain position (theocracy in the true sense of the word), in some other cases the secular power to a greater or lesser extent dominates the religious sphere (forms of Caesar-papism). This division is used to oppose theocracy and Caesar-papism, the model of the priest-caesar and the model of the caesar-priest. Later the term “Caesar-papism” began to be used widely to stigmatize every “secular” sovereign laying claim to become the Pope. Though the term has a sociological character it was used with obvious polemic pathos, within the framework of the general classification opposing theocratic or Caesar-papist east to West where the independence of “two powers” was perceived as a dogma. Justus Henning Bohmer (1674–1749), the professor of university in Halle, in his textbook on church Protestant law devoted the whole passage to two main kinds of power abuse in the religious sphere: “Papo-Caesaria” and “Caesaro-Papia”. He used this method to speak on behalf of the Reformed church to equally expose the Pope who had appropriated the political power, and the secular governors, dealing with religious problems the way it had already been done by emperor Justinian. From two members of this opposition, only the second term was a success: it was often used in the second half of the XIX century, though not so much as a theoretical concept, but to sting Byzantium and its orthodox successors implying that the “schism” between the Christian East and the Christian West was the fault of “Constantine” or “Justinian” intervention in religious affairs. Such an approach transformed the difference between the secular and spiritual power into their full incompatibility.

In the XIX century the term “caesar-papism” was actively spread by Catholic theologians and historians (German scientist I. Hergenreter, etc.). Reformist Russian Orthodoxy also participated in this process. In the last decades of the XIX century Vladimir Solovjev discredited imperial absolutism and its statements that Eastern Church “itself refused the rights” to hand them over to the state. He especially blamed Orthodox Church for having become “national church” that, therefore, lost the right to represent Christ who possessed all power on the earth and in the sky.

Byzantium was once again criticized because while it was pretending to be the center of universal Church, it actually initiated the turn towards nationalism. “Byzantine harm” consisted of the absence of clear distinction between the spiritual and the secular, of the priority of interests of the latter over the former and in the acceptance by Caesar upon himself the responsibility for divine affairs. In this respect Russia is described as “provincialized and barbarized Byzantium”.

In reply to these numerous reproaches “Easterners” whose belief and whose concern for the truth had been called into question tried to show resistance. They introduced essential corrections into this black picture of retrograde “Byzantianism” and showed that “caesar-papism” was an anachronism incorrectly projecting the Western concept of papacy onto the East. Byzantium never denied the distinctions existing between the secular and the spiritual, it never officially allowed for the emperor to be the priest: those autocrats who risked offering something of the kind this were considered heretics and those who encroached on church rights (or, that is even worse, on church riches), were called church robbers. Besides, the interventions of the Empire into Church affairs should not be unduly generalized – some of them were admissible (the right of the emperor to convoke and preside over Cathedrals; promulgation of laws and canons; support and modification of church hierarchy), others were worthy condemnation (appointment of bishops; formulation of faith symbol).

Interaction of the Moldavian state and church illustrates the principle of appointment of Suceava metropolitans for Moldavian historians. Until the 80s of the XIV century Constantinople patriarchs sent priests from the neighboring states which were not under the power of the Moldavian prince to Moldova. In 1387 hospodar Petru Mushat made Joseph the metropolitan of the Moldavian church (Suceava metropoly). This step led to a conflict with the patriarchy of Constantinople which had sent metropolitan Eremija to Moldova. When Eremija was exiled from the country, the patriarch threatened hospodar and boyars with an anathema. Only in 1401 prince Alexander Dobryj (Alexandru chel Bun) managed to settle the dispute. Henceforth, he could choose the metropolitan, but the patriarch had then to confirm the choice. The metropolitan became the second person in the state and the first adviser to hospodar⁸⁹.

Last decades of the XVI century see the penetration of the Moldavian (Romanian) language into the hospodar official documents. In the first decades of the XVII century this process completely rooted itself. But the native language of the Moldovan people made its way into the official office-work, culture and science in the conditions of mass emergence of Greek Church books and canons during the same time period. The process of penetration of Greek culture and Greek elements was supported by traders and Greek dignitaries-fanorits who also became hospodars⁹⁰. However, this process was not the consequence of actually Postbyzantine influence on the Moldavian culture, but rather the strengthening of the Turkish control over the state life of Moldova. Not trusting the local elite, the Turkish court decided to operate Moldova through its devoted servants of the Greek origin, natives of the Istanbul quarter Fener. Gradually Greeks-fanorits began to occupy high hierarchical positions of Orthodox Church in Moldova, so by the end of the XVIII century the metropoly of Moldova had become some kind of the Greek episcopacy subordinated to other political structures⁹¹. This example clearly shows that for Moldavian history and historiography the Greek presence and the Byzantine influence are two different notions.

Stefan III as New Constantin

Besides its own vision of the problem of the relation between the state and the church, Moldavian historiography also offers its understanding of the theme "East-West". V. Stati believes that "due to fate located on the brink of the Catholic world, having in the South the Slavic people of the orthodox-Byzantine belief, Moldova managed to use fruitfully the historiographic models created by other peoples"⁹². The Moldavian historiography of the late Middle Ages had "a Slavic frame" and creatively modified written historical models of the southern Slavic countries, namely, Bulgaria and Serbia which, in turn, used the Byzantine matrixes. Thus, the written Moldavian culture of the times of Stefan III the Great (Ștefan cel Mare / Stefan chel Mare) (1457–1504), "keeping his Moldavian content and essence in the Slavic-Byzantine form, continued the cultural, but not ideological continuity with the Slavic world"⁹³. This duration of "the cultural continuity" with the Slavic world is the defining feature of the Moldavian spirituality.

One of the most ancient monuments of the wall painting which has remained since the times of Stefan III is the frescos of churches Petreuts (1487), Sacred Ilia (1488) and Voronets (1488). Their remarkable peculiarity is the presence of iconographic themes whose ideological content is the direct allusion to the problems of big political urgency which Moldova's society was concerned about in the XV century. The western wall of the Petreuts pronaos contains the painting of Byzantine emperor Constantine on a horse, directing a cavalcade of sacred soldiers led by George and Dmitry. Ahead of the emperor there is Archangel Michael ordering heavenly armies and showing to Constantine a white cross in the sky. Such an iconographic method is used to represent the legend "Constantan's Life", narrating the story about the emperor who is going into the battle to protect Christianity⁹⁴. Moldavian historians found it important to interpret in such a way the meaning of this composition offered by French historian of art Andre Grabar (*L'origine des facades peintes des eglises moldaves*. 1933). One cannot find a similar plot in the painting in other orthodox countries.

Stefan III devoted Petreuts church to the Great Sacred Cross, and Moldavian historians do not find this gesture accidental. "Was not a well-known voivoda the apostle of the struggle against infidel Turks, the first prince in Eastern Europe who, after the falling of the Byzantine Empire, wished to transform a traditional defensive war into a Christian expedition against Islam?" When listing the attempts of Stefan III to unite forces of the neighboring states against Osmons and reminding about the victory of the Moldavian army over Turks and Vlachs in 1475, researchers directly connect the Cavalcade scene in Petreuts church with the ideological program of Moldavian hospodar, "In this church devoted to the Sacred Cross, the procession of sacred taxiarkhoses (military chiefs) under the sign of the Christian victory acquires a certain obvious allegorical sense. As once emperor Constantine entered the struggle against pagans and destroyed them so Stefan the Great Moldavian, new Constantine, would defeat the infidel enemy of the Sacred Cross". Similar representations of the Cavalcade were also later used in the Moldavian wall painting with

the same Christian meaning⁹⁵. In general, the state of Stefan the Great is Moldavian “Eden” for modern Moldavian historiography of different directions⁹⁶.

During the times of hospodariate of Petru Rares (1527–1538, 1541–1546) a whole program of the exterior wall paintings of the Moldavian churches was realized: Probota (1532), Sacred George in Suceava (1534), Khumor (1535), Baja (1535–1538), Moldovitsa (1537), Belinesht’ (1535–1538), Arbure (1541), Voronets (1547)⁹⁷. The basic plots of these iconographic monuments are very similar in many respects. The plot of “Siege of Constantinople” is especially unique. The center of the painting is the reinforced city besieged from the sea and land by the enemy. One of the inscriptions informs that it is the Persian siege of Constantinople of 626. However, the besiegers are dressed in Turkish clothes, and the defenders of the city and their enemies use artillery. Modern Moldavian historians wonder, “Why did Moldavian painters change the Greek sample and replace Persians with Turks and introduce the artillery unknown in 626?” The majority of researchers assume that the Moldavian frescos represent the Turkish siege in 1453. However, it seems possible that the then spiritual and secular authorities of Moldova could not allow to represent the catastrophe of the Christian world on the facades of orthodox churches. Hence, the painting describes the Persian siege of 626 when the divine assistance of the Virgin Mary helped to beat off the pagans. But what shall one think about the artillery and Turks? By using the guns and Turks the painters of Petru Raresha adapted the “Siege” theme to the realities of the country, having transformed it into a demonstrative national appeal: “As once the Virgin Mary helped Byzantines to defeat besieging Persians, let her today help Moldavians to defeat Turkish aggressors”. Thus, the composition has got a dual meaning: on the one hand, it represents Constantinople, while on the other hand it represents the orthodox country of Moldova.

For modern Moldavian historians the correctness of such understanding of the scene “Siege” is also supported by the fact that the painter (Khumor, 1535) added a new element, namely, a horseman who managed to get out of the besieged city and was promptly attacking the enemy’s cavalry leader with a pike. A small inscription over the horseman’s head gives the character’s name – Toma. It is believed that it was exactly the painter of the church whose original horse image was the first self-portrait in Moldavian art. This conclusion is confirmed by the letter sent in 1541 to Suceava by a certain “Toma, zograph from Suceava, courtier of glorified and great Moldavian hospodar Peter-Voivoda”. Thus, one comes to the conclusion that the author of this letter is the painter of the church in Khumor. The fact that the painter of Petru Raresha epoch managed to represent himself as the defender of the besieged fortress clearly testifies that for Moldavians of those years the “Siege” theme showed not only the image of victorious Constantinople, but also the symbol of Suceava and, in a broader sense, of victorious Moldova. A Moldavian Toma from Suceava defends not the Byzantine capital but protects his own country⁹⁸.

The reigning of Stefan the Great is seen in Moldova and Rumania as the nicest period in the medieval history of the Moldavian (Rumanian) people and a struggle culmination for independence and self-affirmation in the general context of the Western civilization of

the XV century. "Having managed to establish social balance in the country, hospodar put an end to intestine wars of boyar groupings and created a public base for the strengthening of the duke power which united under its sceptre stately nobility (boyars), military nobility ..., peasants-civil guardsmen, and townspeople"⁹⁹. In this sense the evaluation of activities of Stefan the Great has something in common with the vision of the role of the Byzantine emperors who towered over all empire estates and were a unifying, central element of the state-political system of Byzantium.

In 1992 in the monastery Putna where Stefan III was buried his canonization by Orthodox Church as a saint took place. The year of 2004 being the year of the 500 anniversary of hospodar's death was declared by the president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin the year of Stefan the Great and Sacred (Saint).

For the last one and a half decade the defining role in the construction of the concept of the national state in Moldova was played by "Moldovanism" and "Roumanism" which defined two parallel identities. Frequently finding proof of the ideological postulates in the same historical sources, "Roumanism" and "Moldavanism", nevertheless, are characterized by conceptual differences. If "Roumanism" could be defined as ethnocultural nationalism postulating ethnic and linguistic identity of Moldavians and Rumanians then "Moldovanism" eventually developed into civil nationalism legitimizing both the historical past of the independent Moldavian state and its future¹⁰⁰.

Moldova's political polarization and ambiguity of possible solutions to the problems of the state territory consolidation are projected onto different currents of Moldavian historiography. The question of the Byzantine heritage, certainly, is not defining, but it allows to identify certain distinctions. This issue is most important for historians – "Moldovanists" who aspire to find the continuation of ancient civilization and cultural tradition in the Moldavian hospodariate and to stretch it to the Republic of Moldova. Historians – "Roumanists" find the Byzantine tradition to be of great value, though they are inclined to speak more about political and legal borrowings rather than about the continuity of the whole cultural complex. However, the historiography of the Dniester region is not really interested in the Byzantine theme.¹⁰¹

If the problem of the ethnocultural and ethnolanguage origin of Eastern Roumanians in Moldavian historiography is directly connected with the theme of the Roman presence in the Carpathian-Dniester region, Romanization of Geto-Dacians (northern Thracians) then the existence of the medieval Moldavian state is accompanied by the symbolics of Byzantium and the reference to its traditions. Unexpectedly, the substantiation of Moldova's "historical legitimacy" happens through the appeal to ideological and political practice of Russia of the XVI century, but only that part of it which mainly concerns the adoption of the Byzantine tradition. In this sense modern Moldavian historians find that their country appears to be a true successor of Byzantium as before other orthodox countries Moldova established the symphony principle in the country. So Moldavian consciousness and Moldavian historians of different political and cultural orientation are in this search of harmony with their own history

We can see now how important the Byzantine theme is for modern historiographies and historiosophies of Ukraine and Moldova. Byzantine symbols give to historians of the Border zone a possibility to substantiate their own statehood tradition. At the same time, this image of pride and uncertainty contains a strong cultural-religious component; it finds its strongest expression in the Ukrainian situation in the concept “Kiev as New Constantinople / [or] New Jerusalem”, while in the case with Moldova it is expressed in the idea of symphony idea. The question of a civilized choice maintains its topical importance for Ukrainian historiography and in a certain sense it remains an intellectual and psychological stimulus. Moldavian historians believe the Roman-Byzantine heritage to be the source of European identity of their people.

Meanwhile, Byzantine reminiscences of historiographies of the Border zone make up open concepts and do not serve as the basis for the strategy of self-isolation that we observe in the case with Russian historiosophic and politological practices. Thus, one can see a considerable modernization potential of the Byzantine heritage for the Ukrainian and Moldavian intellectual thought. The Byzantine factor for it is the way of discussion, doubts and cultural variety.

Notes

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44 Ecklog is a selection of the code of laws of emperor Justinian known as Corpus juris civilis. It was created during the epoch of emperor Leo III the Isaurian in the first half of the VIII century. Ecklog reflected the changes in the public and political life of the Byzantian empire, having brought the legislation closer to the norms of Christian philanthropy. Ecklog consists of eighteen chapters or titles devoted to the main civil law questions (loans, wills, purchase and sale, rent relations, etc.). Marriage questions are a big part of it as well. The last XVIII title gives a list of punishments for various sorts of crimes. The law collection of Ecklog was quite popular in Slavic countries. Ecklog can be correctly considered to be the first act of the state level which introduced Christian norms in marriage relations. For more details see: Ecklog. Vyzantiskij zakonodatelnyj svod VIII veka / Vstup. Stajja, perevod i kommentarij E.E. Lipshitsa. M, 1965.
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